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1 
IN MEMORY OF REX E. LEE (1937–1996) 
 
Not long after former Solicitor General Rex E. Lee died, the 
Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General held its 
annual meeting in Washington, D.C. All fifty state attorneys general 
attended the meeting, which was held at the Supreme Court. During 
a question and answer period, Justice David Souter was asked how 
advocacy before the high court had changed in recent times. Justice 
Souter paused for a moment and answered, “Well, I can tell you that 
the biggest change by far is that Rex Lee is gone. Rex Lee was the 
best Solicitor General this nation has ever had, and he is the best 
lawyer this Justice ever heard plead a case in this Court. Rex Lee was 
born to argue tough cases of immense importance to this nation. He 
set new standards of excellence for generations of lawyers and 
justices. No one thing has happened to change the nature of 
advocacy of this Court which has had as much impact as the loss of 
that one player.”∗ 
 
∗ Quoted by Utah Attorney General Jan Graham, Address at the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School (Feb. 28, 1998). 
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∗ On September 12–13, 2002, on the campus of Brigham Young University, an 
unprecedented number of past and present solicitors general of the United Sates assembled: 
the Honorable Theodore B. Olson, Seth P. Waxman, Walter E. Dellinger III, Drew S. 
Days III, Kenneth W. Starr, and Charles Fried. The solicitors general were joined by a number 
of distinguished attorneys who worked in the office, including Donald B. Ayer, Michael R. 
Dreeben, Andrew L. Frey, Judge Daniel M. Friedman, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Kenneth 
S. Geller, John H. Garvey, Keith Jones, Michael W. McConnell, Maureen Mahoney, Thomas 
W. Merrill, Carter Phillips, John G. Roberts, Richard G. Wilkins and Barbara D. Underwood. 
For two days these outstanding lawyers and public servants participated in a ground-
breaking series of panel discussions on the key cases and major issues they confronted during 
their terms and the history and purpose of the Office of the Solicitor General. 
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The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s Stewardship 
Through the Example of Rex E. Lee 
Theodore B. Olson∗ 
I am honored to be a part of the first Rex E. Lee Conference on 
the Office of the Solicitor General. I feel this way not merely because 
I presently occupy the position whose role Rex exemplified in so 
many ways, but also because Rex was my friend—indeed, he was our 
friend. Rex had what his son Tom has called “a sort of ‘gift’ for 
friendship,”1 a gift that, in addition to his extensive and diverse legal 
talents and experiences, served him well as solicitor general. It was a 
gift that infused him with civility and respect, that made him a 
colleague and friend not only to those who shared his views on 
questions of law and politics but also to those who did not.2 
I was fortunate to have served with Rex in the Department of 
Justice when he was solicitor general. As the head of the Office of 
Legal Counsel, I worked closely with Rex in formulating the Reagan 
administration’s positions on a number of important, complex legal 
issues. More importantly, we sat next to one another virtually every 
morning for four years at Attorney General William French Smith’s 
daily senior staff meetings (just across the table, I might add, from 
General Smith’s chief of staff and future judge and solicitor-general-
to-be, Kenneth Starr). I soon came to marvel at Rex’s extraordinary 
combination of legal talent and human goodness. Now that I have 
the privilege to serve in the position he filled so well, I appreciate 
him even more. Tonight, based principally on Rex’s example, I want 
to share with you some thoughts on the place of the solicitor general 
in the life of our Republic. 
 
∗ Solicitor General of the United States. This article was the Keynote Address given at 
the Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General at Brigham Young 
University, in Provo, Utah, on September 12, 2002. 
 1. Thomas Rex Lee, Tribute to the Honorable Rex E. Lee: Solicitor General of the United 
States 1981–85, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 557, 560 (2001). 
 2. See Rodney K. Smith, Tribute to the Honorable Rex E. Lee: Solicitor General of the 
United States 1981–85, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 557, 580–82 (2001) (describing Rex Lee’s 
interactions with Justice Blackmun and Walter Dellinger). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
4 
I. 
Americans have never spent much time thinking about the 
solicitor general. When a neighbor once asked Rex’s wife, Janet, 
what her husband did for a living, she replied, “He’s the solicitor 
general.” “Gee,” said the neighbor, “it must be great being married 
to a military man!”3 The relative obscurity to the public of the 
solicitor general is a recurring theme throughout the history of the 
office. After his first day on the job, William Howard Taft attended a 
dinner party held by a friend of his father’s and 
was seated between two ladies who, he learned by glancing at their 
place-cards, were Mrs. Henry Cabot Lodge and Mrs. John Hay. 
They likewise had glanced at his place-card but all they read there 
was “The Solicitor General.” It was not until the end of the 
evening that it dawned on Taft that the reason why they had 
addressed him throughout the dinner as “Mr. Solicitor General” 
was that neither of them had the slightest idea [who he was].4 
Things have not changed very much over the past 112 years. Judge 
Bork claims that people still mistake him, to his relief, he asserts, 
with former Surgeon General Everett Koop. Of course, in that case, 
the beards might have something to do with it. 
However, while perhaps obscure to the public, the solicitor 
general is certainly familiar to the Supreme Court and to those who 
follow its work. Indeed, he is best known for his role as the 
government’s advocate in the Supreme Court. At the petition stage, 
he must decide, in cases in which the United States is a party, 
whether the government will petition for certiorari, oppose 
certiorari, acquiesce in certiorari, or confess error. Where the United 
States is not a party, he must decide whether the government will file 
a brief amicus curiae, and he must file an amicus brief when the 
Court invites him to express his views on a case. At the merits stage, 
the solicitor general is responsible for handling the government’s 
briefing and argument if the United States is a party, and for 
deciding whether the government will participate as amicus curiae in 
cases in which it is not. And this role represents a major portion of 
the Court’s docket. Last term, for example, the United States 
 
 3. John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General’s Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734, 736 
(1983). 
 4. Theodore B. Olson, William Howard Taft: Solicitor General of the United States, 
Founder’s Day Speech (Feb. 16, 2002), at 4. 
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participated as a party or amicus in sixty-five of the Court’s seventy-
eight arguments—a full eighty-three percent of the Court’s 
argument docket. 
As nearly everyone here knows, the solicitor general also 
performs a function that the Court does not see, nor does anyone 
outside the Justice Department for that matter, except indirectly. He 
supervises the government’s litigation in the lower courts. He 
ultimately decides whether the United States will appeal a case it has 
lost, seek rehearing en banc, seek an issuance of an extraordinary 
writ, file a brief amicus curiae, or intervene to defend the 
constitutionality of an act of Congress. 
In sum, by representing the government in the Supreme Court 
and by supervising the government’s appellate litigation in the lower 
courts, the solicitor general endeavors to ensure that when the 
United States speaks in court, it does so with one voice. In doing so, 
he has important responsibilities to all three branches of the federal 
government. 
II. 
Rex Lee discharged these responsibilities superbly across the 
broad expanse of cases he handled as solicitor general. First and 
foremost, as the president’s advocate before the Supreme Court, the 
solicitor general owes a duty to defend vigorously the core powers of 
the executive. Rex was called upon to fulfill this important role at the 
very beginning of his tenure in the Office of the Solicitor General, in 
helping the president bring an end to an international crisis. 
On November 4, 1979, the American embassy in Tehran was 
seized, and our diplomatic personnel there were taken hostage. In 
response, President Carter declared a national emergency. And to 
apply leverage in order to assist in obtaining the release of the 
hostages, he issued executive orders freezing Iranian assets and 
otherwise affecting the claims of American creditors against Iran. 
After President Reagan took office, and as a part of the settlement 
with Iran, he ratified some of those orders suspending contractual 
claims then pending against Iran in U.S. courts. The claims would be 
arbitrated by an international claims tribunal. It was the president’s  
claim suspension that posed an important constitutional question in 
Dames & Moore v. Regan.5 
 
 5. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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Rex had not yet been confirmed by the Senate as solicitor 
general at the time oral argument was set in the summer of 1981 
pursuant to an expedited schedule after the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari before judgment in several of the Iranian claims cases. 
Judge Wade McCree, the outgoing solicitor general, assigned to Rex 
the responsibility to argue the case on behalf of the United States—
just five days after Rex’s confirmation hearings. Judge McCree 
thought it would be beneficial to have the new president’s solicitor 
general appear before the Justices for that purpose. 
Rex naturally rose to the occasion, ably defending the exercise of 
executive power in foreign affairs, and the Court unanimously held 
that the claims suspension at issue was within the president’s legal 
views and constitutional authority.6 In representing the president’s 
legal views and constitutional authority of the Supreme Court, Rex 
did what every solicitor general regards as one of his highest callings: 
acting as the executive branch officer under the attorney general who 
serves the president, in whom Article II vests the entire executive 
power, in expressing the president’s constitutional position in the 
nation’s highest court.7 
Dames & Moore also demonstrates how important it is for the 
solicitor general to defend the president’s exercise of core Article II 
powers during a period of national crisis. It is a responsibility crucial 
to the effective functioning of our Republic, for it is triggered at a 
time when, in Alexander Hamilton’s words in Federalist No. 70, 
“energy in the executive” is needed the most.8 
At a very emotional time in American history, when United 
States soil had effectively been invaded, Rex’s discourse before the 
Justices was measured, dispassionate, reasoned, and reassuring. He 
exemplified the standard of excellence to which the solicitor 
general’s advocacy must always aspire. Rex was acting not merely as 
the president’s representative but also as a friend and officer of the 
Court, a trusted counselor who could be relied upon to deal fairly 
with questions of great legal, political, and emotional moment. 
 
 
 6. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688 (so holding because “the settlement of claims 
ha[d] been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy 
dispute between our country and another” and because “Congress [had] acquiesced in the 
President’s action”). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). 
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I will return to that theme, but before I do, I want to address the 
solicitor general’s duty to Congress. Article II mandates that the 
president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”9 and 
the president delegates an important aspect of that executive duty to 
the solicitor general. He has thus long been responsible for 
defending the constitutionality of congressional statutes, so long as a 
defense can reasonably be made. 
Rex discharged the solicitor general’s role as an advocate for 
Congress, for example, in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Wyoming.10 In that case, he successfully argued that 
the extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state 
and local governments was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers and thus was not precluded by the Tenth 
Amendment under National League of Cities v. Usery.11 And two 
years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,12 Rex argued on behalf of the Department of Labor that 
San Antonio’s Transit Authority was not immune from the 
minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act under National League of Cities. The Court agreed, overruling 
National League of Cities. Rex had not asked the Court to overrule 
National League of Cities, which he had hoped the Court would 
leave in place, but the Court did so anyway. 
(I have a keen memory with respect to Garcia because Rex 
permitted me to argue that case when it first came before the Court. 
When the Court set it for reargument with specific instructions to 
address whether National League of Cities should be reversed, I tried 
to no avail to convince Rex to let me argue the case again. He knew 
then, as I did not appreciate then, but do now, that when the 
Supreme Court is considering overruling itself on an important 
constitutional issue, it expects to see before it the solicitor general, 
not the assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel.) 
In Garcia, Rex thus defended the validity of agency action 
implementing a congressional enactment against the states under the 
Commerce Clause, despite his deeply held Madisonian concern that 
the regulations might pose a serious threat, as he would later express, 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 10. 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
 11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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to the “double security [which protects] the rights of the people” 
under a federalist structure of government.13 Rex felt that the Garcia 
Court “abdicate[d] its duty to interpret the Constitution” and 
transferred some of its interpretative powers to Congress, thereby 
“radically alter[ing] the state of separation of powers and federalism 
in America.”14 As solicitor general, however, he understood his role, 
and he faithfully exercised the responsibilities of his office. 
Sometimes the solicitor general is obligated by his office to defend 
causes to which he does not personally subscribe. Some people 
regard that as remarkable, but as Rex well understood, the solicitor 
general’s client is the government, and it matters considerably less 
what the individual solicitor general believes than what the interests 
of his clients require. 
But Rex also argued a case that stands as a classic example of one 
of those relatively rare instances in which it is appropriate for the 
solicitor general to challenge rather than defend the constitutionality 
of an act of Congress—Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha.15 
In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress delegated to 
the attorney general the authority to suspend the deportation of 
aliens in certain situations. But in order to retain control over the 
exercise of that power, Congress reserved to itself a one-house 
legislative veto over each decision by the attorney general to suspend 
deportation, so that the vote of one house of Congress could reverse 
the attorney general’s decision. Chadha, the plaintiff, was one of 
several aliens with respect to whom the House of Representatives 
had exercised that veto. 
Chadha came along in an interesting context. Presidents going 
back as far as Franklin Roosevelt had acquiesced in various 
manifestations of the legislative veto device. In fact, President Carter 
and his attorney general had supported their constitutionality and 
had even proposed a legislative veto as a part of a bill authorizing a 
presidential reorganization of government. Later in the Carter 
administration, however, he and his Department of Justice had 
perceived how invasive of presidential authority legislative vetoes had 
become and had changed their position to one challenging their 
 
 13. Rex E. Lee, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of Garcia, 1996 BYU 
L. REV. 329, 330 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). 
 14. Id. at 341–42. 
 15. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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constitutionality. But Rex found himself serving a president who had 
supported legislative vetoes during his campaign, and powerful 
Republican senators strongly supported them. But after much 
internal debate and strife, and considerable pressure to reverse 
course, the Reagan administration endorsed the Carter 
administration’s legal position that legislative vetoes were 
unconstitutional. Faced with the serious encroachment on the 
authority of the executive branch that legislative vetoes represented, 
Rex argued in the Supreme Court that the legislative veto violated 
the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which 
requires that every bill be presented to the president for his signature 
so that he may decide whether to veto it. Further, because the 
particular veto provision at issue could be exercised by one house, 
Rex contended that it contravened the bicameralism requirement of 
Article I, Sections 1 and 7, according to which both houses of 
Congress must pass a bill before it can become law, or, at least, that 
is how the story goes in that famous Schoolhouse Rock cartoon 
about how a bill becomes a law.16 
The Supreme Court agreed that the House had exercised 
legislative power in exercising the veto and thus had violated the 
Constitution’s presentment and bicameralism requirements. Its 
decision was sweeping in its effects, essentially striking down virtually 
every type of more than 200 legislative veto provisions Congress had 
enacted over a fifty-year period, many, as I said, with the approval 
and occasional outright complicity of past presidents.17 The Court 
thus effectively invalidated more federal statutory provisions in that 
one decision than it had over its entire previous history since first 
declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional in Marbury v. 
Madison.18 
Looking back more than a decade later, Rex considered Chadha 
one of the dozen most important cases ever decided by the 
Supreme Court. It would be difficult to imagine a more important 
issue than the one decided by Chadha: how legislation is to be 
enacted in this country, and particularly, whether the 
constitutionally authorized presidential veto—which effectively 
 
 16. The sad bill sang, “I’m just a bill, yeah I’m only a bill, and I’m sitting here on 
Capitol Hill.” 
 17. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE vii (1988). 
 18. See id. 
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gives the President one-sixth of the votes in each house of 
Congress—can be taken away by majority vote of both houses of 
Congress.19 
Rex’s experience with Chadha teaches us that, as an executive officer, 
the solicitor general’s constitutional duty to the president is 
paramount to his duty to Congress where core executive power is 
threatened. 
In addition to his responsibilities to the political branches, the 
solicitor general has an important responsibility to the Supreme 
Court. Though all lawyers are officers of the court in which they 
appear, the solicitor general is an officer of the Supreme Court in a 
more special sense. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and the 
Supreme Court are steeped in tradition, and the solicitor general has 
a duty to uphold the long tradition of fidelity to the best interests of 
the Court as an institution. 
That duty is even evident in the sartorial correctness that a 
solicitor general is expected to exhibit. Rex once recalled: 
 I remember seeing [Chief Justice Burger] one night at a social 
event . . . . And he told me, very seriously, “Some of your lawyers 
have been appearing in button-down shirts. That’s not appropriate. 
They should not wear button-down collars with their black frock 
coats.” I told him I’d get someone on it right away. But I didn’t 
know of anyone other than me who had ever appeared in a button-
down shirt! I got the message. 
 Well, the next time I was supposed to appear in court, it was to 
move an admission, and I’d forgotten about it until I got to the 
office. I had worn a yellow button-down shirt! And I had to look 
all over the department for someone who was wearing a white shirt  
my size with the right collar, so that I could trade! Now, I keep an 
extra shirt in the office at all times.20 
I remember that day well. Rex approached me at our early 
morning attorney general senior staff meeting and said: “Ted, we’re 
good friends right? We’re such good friends that we’d give each 
other the shirts off our backs, right?” I found this behavior a bit 
strange because Rex was not the insecure type, and we obviously 
 
 19. Rex E. Lee, The Advocate’s Role in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 GONZ. L. 
REV. 265, 267 (1996). 
 20. Jenkins, supra note 3, at 736. 
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were close friends. “Of course, Rex,” I assured him. “What’s on your 
mind?” “Well,” he replied, “I need the shirt off your back!” Rex and 
I have always had a lot in common, and Rex had sized me up, so to 
speak, and calculated that my shirt would be just about right to him. 
As I recall he wound up getting a shirt from a lawyer in his office, 
but I’m proud of the fact that he asked me first. 
Of course, Chief Justice Burger would have agreed that the 
solicitor general has other, more essential obligations to the Court 
besides his costume. He must be extraordinarily meticulous about 
the accuracy and fairness of every legal and factual representation he 
makes to the Justices. As Rex once put it: 
[T]here is a widely held, and I believe substantially accurate, 
impression that the Solicitor General’s Office provides the Court 
from one administration to another—and largely without regard to 
either the political party or the personality of the particular Solicitor 
General—with advocacy which is more objective, more 
dispassionate, more competent, and more respectful of the Court as 
an institution than it gets from any other lawyer or group of 
lawyers.21 
 Rex identified “[t]he advantage to the Court” that such 
advocacy confers. “[I]n more than half of its cases,” he wrote, “it has 
a highly-skilled lawyer on whom it can count consistently for 
dependable analysis rendered against the background of an unusual 
understanding and respect for the Court as an institution.”22 
The government now participates in a greater percentage of cases 
than it did when Rex was solicitor general. As I mentioned earlier, 
the Justices heard argument seventy-eight times in eighty-eight cases 
last term (some of the cases were consolidated), and the United 
States participated as a party or amicus in eighty-three percent of the 
docket. In the 1983 term, by contrast, the Court heard argument in 
184 cases, and the government participated in 118 of them, or sixty-
four percent of the docket. That was the term in which Rex guided 
the government to a remarkable eighty-three percent winning 
percentage. By comparison, the average winning percentage from 
1943 through 1983 was sixty-nine.23 (I am proud to say that last 
 
 21. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics, & Principle, 47 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 595, 597 (1986). 
 22. Id. 
 23. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 299 n.19 (1987). 
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term the government matched Rex’s outstanding October 1983 
term, prevailing in fifty-four of sixty-five arguments or 83.3%.) That 
is a tribute to the skilled career lawyers who work in the Office of the 
Solicitor General. Imagine, 65 arguments, 130 moot courts, scores 
of briefs, several hundred op certs, 2000 or so appeals, interventions, 
other decisions, and other cases occasionally assigned to the solicitor 
general by the attorney general, all handled by about twenty lawyers, 
virtually all career professionals, dedicated lawyers who must be 
protected from political pressures. Rex was extremely proud of his 
career staff and invariably demonstrated a willingness to take the heat 
for tough decisions. 
In that regard, the government’s increased rate of participation 
makes it all the more important that the solicitor general make 
responsible use of his role as the government’s litigation gatekeeper. 
He must reconcile the positions of the components within the 
Department of Justice, the U.S. attorneys, the other executive 
departments, and the administrative agencies, and he must exercise 
restraint in seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to ensure that 
only the most important cases in which the government has an 
interest will receive the Court’s close scrutiny. He thus conveys 
important information to the Court that would be obscured if he 
were too aggressive in seeking Supreme Court review. He also helps 
them to maintain control over a caseload that remains daunting. 
But determining which of the government’s cases deserve further 
review is not easy. The problem the solicitor general faces is that 
most entities within the executive branch will want to appeal cases 
that the government has lost. In those circumstances, the solicitor 
general must judiciously exercise several different skills, all of which 
Rex possessed in abundance. Indeed, even in the relatively few cases 
in which the solicitor general agrees that review is warranted, 
agencies with different mandates and constituencies will often 
disagree about the government’s position on appeal. 
During his tenure as solicitor general, Rex described how he 
would handle those recurring situations: 
I’m called upon to mediate. I have to do it; it’s part of my job. 
When it happens, I function very much like a judge. We get memos 
from both sides—they’re like briefs—and frequently they ask for a 
conference, and I sit and listen to both sides. It’s like an oral 
argument . . . . But the startling consequence of my making a  
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decision in these circumstances is that the side that I rule against 
doesn’t get represented at all.24 
At those times, Carter Phillips recounts, Rex’s “extraordinary 
people skills” were on display.25 Carter, who later became Rex’s law 
partner, served under Rex in the Office of the Solicitor General. He 
recalls being “fascinated” by “how genuinely attentive [Rex] was to 
the arguments that each participant offered” and by his ability to 
“ensure that everyone felt that he or she had been fully heard.”26 
But Rex’s commitment to due process in his dealings with 
government lawyers did not render him any less a faithful servant of 
the Supreme Court. As all solicitors general must, he respected the 
principle of stare decisis, resisting calls that he ask the Court to move 
too far too fast when his highly informed legal judgment counseled 
him that the Court was not prepared to be so moved. As Rex 
memorably explained in responding to a question regarding whether 
the solicitor general should make arguments he knows the Court will 
reject, “He is not the Pamphleteer General.”27 
Indeed, one of Rex’s special contributions as solicitor general 
was his remarkable ability to resolve the paradox of the solicitor 
general’s role in situations where he experienced pressure to advocate 
positions that he believed would jeopardize his special relationship 
with the Supreme Court. I use the word “paradox,” and not 
“contradiction,” because of the depth of Rex’s appreciation of the 
nature of the problem and its solution: although certain goals of the 
administration might be in tension with his duty to the Court in a 
particular case, he understood that success in realizing the president’s 
overall litigation objectives ultimately depended on his preserving the 
solicitor general’s special relationship with the Court. As Rex put it, 
“[A] wholesale departure from the role whose performance has led 
to the special status that the Solicitor General enjoys would unduly 
impair that status itself. In the process, the ability of the Solicitor 
General to serve any of the President’s objectives would suffer.”28 
 
 24. Jenkins, supra note 3, at 738. 
 25. Carter G. Phillips, Tribute to the Honorable Rex E. Lee: Solicitor General of the 
United States 1981–85, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 557, 564 (2001). 
 26. Id. at 565. 
 27. Lee, supra note 21, at 600. 
 28. Id. 
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For example, Rex recounts in Wallace v. Jaffree,29 “It was 
seriously urged that [the government] advance—as one argument in 
support of the constitutionality of Alabama’s moment of silence 
statute—that the first amendment generally and the establishment 
clause in particular were not binding on the states.”30 Rex declined to 
do so, and he later explained why: 
If, as the Solicitor General of the United States, I had advocated 
that the first amendment was not binding on Alabama, I would 
have destroyed—with one single filing—the special status that I 
enjoyed by virtue of my office. I would have also acquired a new 
status, equally special. The Court would have written me off as 
someone not to be taken seriously.31 
As Professor Wilkins later explained, Rex appreciated, as some others 
did not, that “the law moves in careful modulations rather than great 
leaps.”32 
In cases such as Wallace, Rex was effective in serving not only 
the Supreme Court, but also his president over the long run by 
exercising lawyerly restraint in a given case. He would later reveal the 
historical perspective that informed his judgment: 
 There has been built up, over 115 years since this office was first 
created in 1870, a reservoir of credibility on which the incumbent 
Solicitor General may draw to his immediate adversarial advantage. 
But if he draws too deeply, too greedily, or too indiscriminately, 
then he jeopardizes not only that advantage in that particular case, 
but also an important institution of government. The preservation 
of both—and striking just the right balance between their 
sometimes competing demands—lies at the heart of the Solicitor 
General’s stewardship.33 
“One of the most important jobs I have,” Rex said while he was 
solicitor general, “is protecting the tradition of John W. Davis, 
Robert H. Jackson, Charles Fahy, and Thurgood Marshall.”34 
 
 29. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 30. Lee, supra note 21, at 600. 
 31. Id. at 600–01. 
 32. CAPLAN, supra note 23, at 105. 
 33. Lee, supra note 21, at 601. 
 34. CAPLAN, supra note 23, at 76. 
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III. 
Finally, I would like to focus on a special quality of Rex Lee that 
contributed greatly to his skill as an appellate advocate and as an 
exemplar of the standard of advocacy appropriate to a solicitor 
general speaking before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United 
States. Tom Lee has recalled a pertinent discussion with his father: 
I remember him drawing an analogy between oral argument and a 
conversation about an important topic with a friend—not just any 
friend, but one that is respected and looked up to. When this 
model is followed, he explained, an advocate’s persuasiveness is 
enhanced because he naturally incorporates some basic guidelines 
of oral advocacy—to maintain eye contact, speak conversationally 
and candidly, and listen to and answer questions that are raised. 
These were some of the hallmarks of a Rex Lee argument . . . .35 
Just as Benjamin Bristow, the nation’s first solicitor general, argued 
with “an absence of all attempt at display,”36 so too did Rex. And so 
must all Solicitors General if they are to be effective advocates for the 
United States. 
Of course, that is not as easy to accomplish as Rex made it 
appear. Tom has noted that the idea of oral argument as a talk with a 
respected and reliable friend came naturally to Rex because “he saw 
the guidelines . . . not merely as rules for appellate argument, but as 
principles to live by.”37 For example, Carolyn Brammer, still the 
executive officer at the Office of the Solicitor General, was hired by 
Rex Lee, and she worked closely with him first at the Civil Division 
and later at the Office of the Solicitor General. Carolyn’s face lights 
up at the mere mention of Rex’s name. With an admiration, 
enthusiasm, and joy that is infectious, she remembers him as perhaps  
the kindest, wisest, funniest, and most truly respectful person she has 
ever known. 
Thus, Rex was so successful as a Supreme Court advocate not 
merely because he had the benefits of a fine legal education at the 
University of Chicago, a clerkship with Justice Byron White, and 
formative experiences in public service, private practice, and legal 
 
 35. Lee, supra note 1, at 559–60. 
 36. Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States as It Should Be”: The 
Solicitor General in Historical Context, Address to the Supreme Court Historical Society (June 
1, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/sgarticle.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). 
 37. Lee, supra note 1, at 560. 
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academia. His work in those contexts certainly helped him become a 
lawyer’s lawyer. But Rex also was such an outstanding advocate for 
our country because he was so skilled at being a trustworthy friend. 
Rex Lee set an example for the rest of us during his tenure as 
solicitor general. It was a stewardship forged by the unusually sound 
judgment he developed through varied experiences in the law as well 
as by the deep understanding of human beings he brought to the 
sincere friendships with which he enriched the lives of so many. I feel 
very fortunate to have been Rex’s friend, and I am often inspired by 
his rare qualities as I exercise my responsibilities as solicitor general. 
It is fitting that we should honor his memory by gathering at his 
home university to discuss the office whose mission he so nobly 
advanced. 
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Pre-Reagan Panel 
 
Judge Daniel M. Friedman: Deputy Solicitor General, 1969–1978; 
Acting Solicitor General, January–March 1977. 
 
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook: Deputy Solicitor General, 1978–1979; 
Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1974–1977. 
 
Keith A. Jones: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1972–1975; 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1975–1978. 
 
Andrew L. Frey: Deputy Solicitor General, 1973–1986. 
 
Dean Reese Hansen: We have two days of what promises to be 
very, very interesting conversation, questions, and discussion. Today 
is the day that we have looked forward to with great anticipation for 
many months at the law school at BYU. The idea for this conference 
was Tom Griffith’s. I am grateful to him for his active imagination 
and for the force that he has put behind the organization of this 
historic conference. Tom is well known to many of you already, and 
you will hear from him in just a moment. In addition to Tom and his 
ideas and good work, I want to thank everyone from the university 
and from the law school who have worked so hard to make this 
event possible today. That our participants would come to BYU 
today is a wonderful tribute to Rex Lee, whose memory we honor 
with this conference. 
At the side of the table over there is a bronze casting of Rex and 
his favorite dress. He is in his morning coat and arguing a case at the 
United States Supreme Court, which was maybe his second most 
favorite place in all the world to be. And so we honor him here today 
and your coming honors him. We thank you, participants, for the 
honor you pay us by being here also. Of course, your coming 
together today also honors the Office of the Solicitor General of the 
United States. The Office of the Solicitor General embodies all that 
is the very best in our great nation and in the legal profession. 
I visited with Rex in his office in Washington, D.C., while he was 
serving as solicitor general. As usual, on that day Rex was animated, 
gracious and kind. He enjoyed showing off the office. He spoke 
glowingly of all of the attorneys in the office and of the importance 
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of the cases to our country. He told me how interesting and how 
complicated they were, sometimes in great detail. He spoke of the 
political pressures he was subjected to. And then he said to me, and 
this is a quote, “Reese, this is without any question the best job in 
the world. I love every minute of it.” And I knew that he really 
meant it. 
All of the participants in the conference have personally 
experienced the things Rex so loved about the Office of the Solicitor 
General. We are looking forward to hearing from you. On behalf of 
the students and the faculty of the law school, I extend a warm 
welcome to you each to BYU. We look forward to hearing from you. 
I am pleased now to introduce Merrill J. Bateman, president of 
Brigham Young University. After President Bateman welcomes you, 
Tom Griffith, general counsel of the university, will introduce the 
conference. President Bateman has served as president of BYU since 
1996. He earned his bachelor’s degree at the University of Utah and 
his Ph.D. at MIT in economics. He has been a Danforth Fellow, a 
Woodrow Wilson Fellow, a lecturer in Ghana, a professor at the Air 
Force Academy, a professor at BYU, and dean of the business school 
at BYU. He is a General Authority of the [the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints] and a great leader of our university. 
President Bateman, we will be delighted to hear from you. 
Tom Griffith—let me just introduce Tom before he gets up and 
then I will not have to get up again. Tom is assistant to the president 
and general counsel of BYU. He was a partner at Wiley Rein & 
Fielding. He was Senate legal counsel of the United States from 
1995 to 1999, practiced law in North Carolina, got his law degree at 
the University of Virginia, and has been a great addition to BYU 
since August of 2000, when he joined us as general counsel. 
President Bateman. 
 
BYU President Merrill Bateman: I would like to add my 
welcome to you for being here at Brigham Young University in the 
Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General. It is 
really an historic occasion and an unprecedented gathering of some 
of the finest lawyers in the history of the United States, all of whom 
have had the distinction of serving in the most prestigious legal 
office, that of the Office of the Solicitor General. Your presence at 
this conference also honors Rex E. Lee, the thirty-seventh solicitor 
general of the United States, who was not only my next-door 
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neighbor when he lived in Provo, but who was also my immediate 
predecessor as president of Brigham Young University. 
Your presence also honors us as a university community. We are 
pleased to have you here. Some of you have been here before, and 
we welcome you upon your return. For others, this is your first visit. 
We hope that you enjoy not just the unmatched physical setting of 
this university, but the special atmosphere that prevails here on 
campus. As you may know, Brigham Young University is a part of 
and affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Because of that, we are dedicated to a particular proposition here. 
That proposition is that the life of the mind and the life of the spirit 
can be joined in a way to produce lives of service. I know of no 
better exemplar of that aspiration than Rex E. Lee. 
You know Rex Lee and are well acquainted with his significant 
public service. You know the love and respect he felt for the Office of 
the Solicitor General. We are very proud of his accomplishments in 
that capacity. Not long after Rex passed away, there was a meeting of 
the committee of the National Association of Attorneys General held 
in the Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. During a 
question and answer period, the Associate Justice David Souter was 
asked how advocacy before the Supreme Court had changed in 
recent times. His answer was very interesting. He paused for a 
moment and then said, “Well, I can tell you the biggest change by 
far is that Rex Lee is gone. Rex Lee was born to argue tough cases of 
immense importance to this nation. He set new standards of 
excellence for generations of lawyers and justices. No one thing has 
happened to change the nature of advocacy before this Court more 
than his passing.” He also noted there were at least four other things 
that Rex valued in his life. First was his family, his faith, the 
university, and his country. 
For a moment, let me just tell you something about this 
remarkable institution that he so loved. We have more than 30,000 
students. They come from all 50 states and from 110 countries 
across the world. We speak about 80 languages on campus in 
addition to English. We teach about 66 languages. We believe 
Stanford and Yale vie for second with 24. More than 14,000 of our 
sophomores through graduates have taken two years out of their 
academic experience to serve at their own expense as missionaries for 
the Church all over the world. So, you can imagine the rich milieu 
that occurs when they come back, having had two years of another 
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culture, learning another language. More than that, also coming 
back with them are people from those countries themselves. So, it is 
a very interesting cosmopolitan group of students that we have on 
campus. We also anticipate that half of every freshman class will also 
serve missions, that they will do the same. That service comes 
between the freshman and the sophomore year. Our students are 
involved in more extracurricular activity and community service than 
any other college or university from the data that we have. 
Academically, our incoming freshman class matches up well in terms 
of SAT and ACT scores with most classes in the nation. In fact, we 
have a very large freshman class, given most universities, of about 
5,500. If we took the top 1,500, it turns [out] they would match 
those at Harvard or Yale or Princeton or Stanford. I mention these 
things so that you will appreciate why Rex loved this university. It is 
a special place. 
Finally, we are honored by your presence here. Seeing you and 
knowing something about the role you played in shaping our 
nation’s legal history, I am reminded of the story told about 
President Kennedy. While welcoming a group of Nobel laureates to 
the White House, he reportedly said, “This is the greatest assembly 
of minds in the White House since Thomas Jefferson dined alone.” 
This conference may very well be the greatest collection of lawyers 
gathered together to discuss the history and workings of the Office 
of the Solicitor General. We are looking forward to listening in on 
the conversations, and we thank you for allowing us to share this 
remarkable moment. Thank you very much. 
 
Thomas Griffith: Well, it is my pleasure to officially begin the 
conference. After my remarks, I will ask John Fee to come up and be 
the session leader for our first session. But I want to echo President 
Bateman’s remarks and thank the participants for being here. We are 
truly honored by your presence. 
It is my personal view, although I have never worked in the 
Office of the Solicitor General, that the workings of that office 
present the most interesting issues in terms of the interplay between 
law and policy that exists. And I am looking forward, over the course 
of the next two days, to listening in as well on the conversation 
amongst these excellent lawyers who have practiced the legal 
profession in its highest form by representing the interest of the 
United States before the Supreme Court and other courts. 
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But I just want to second what President Bateman [said] in 
terms of thank you for those participants who have come and hope 
that you enjoy your time here. If there is anything we can do to 
make this experience more pleasant for you, please let us know. We 
are just very grateful to have you here. 
 
Andrew Frey: Let me say first a word about Rex, who some but 
not all of us served with. In addition to all the other qualities that 
were referred to, he was just the nicest guy that you would ever want 
to meet, a truly decent human being, and it was a pleasure as well as 
an honor to serve with him. 
Now, I have tried to identify certain themes that I think would 
occur, that are issues for how the Solicitor General’s Office 
functions, what its role is. And they, I hope, will be topics that will 
be touched upon to some extent in the various panels that you will 
hear about because they are institutional issues. I thought I would 
mention some of them at the outset and then turn it over for 
discussion among the other panelists. 
One question is: Who is the solicitor general’s client? Is it the 
Supreme Court? Is it the United States government? Is it the 
president, by whom the solicitor general was appointed? Is it the 
public at large? The conception of who the client is can play a 
significant role in deciding how to handle difficult, publicly 
important matters. In that connection, of course, how does the role 
of the solicitor general differ from that of other lawyers for other 
types of clients? 
A second question is—and these are in no particular order: To 
what extent should the positions taken by a solicitor general be 
guided by previous positions taken by the department and by the 
Solicitor General’s Office? What are the justifiable bases for 
abandonment of previous positions? When do the political views of 
the current incumbent administration justify change of positions? 
You may have read recently about the change in position with 
regards to the interpretation of the Second Amendment. That is an 
example of this issue that Ted [Olson] had to wrestle with. 
A third question is: What is the nature and extent of the 
responsibility of the solicitor general to defend the constitutionality 
of federal statutes? What should a solicitor general do who personally 
believes that a statute or portions of the statute are unconstitutional 
but who also concludes that a non-frivolous defense can be made of 
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the statute? What should the solicitor general personally do? What 
should the Office of the Solicitor General do? Maybe we will talk a 
little bit about that in a few minutes. 
Another issue concerns the amicus curiae policy of the office. 
When should the office participate in cases that involve private 
parties or the states, to which the federal government is not a party? 
What are the standards for determining that there is a sufficient 
governmental interest to justify participation in the case presentation 
of views as those of the United States? This issue, which came up a 
lot during Rex’s solicitor generalship, and we will talk about it some, 
I imagine, in the Reagan panel. Examples included cases about 
school prayer or abortion or other things that do not directly involve 
federal government activities but are nationally important questions 
on which different administrations may have radically different views. 
Ought the solicitor general and the United States government be 
participating before the Supreme Court in these cases or ought it to 
stay its hand? 
Another very important function of the Solicitor General’s Office 
is to arbitrate disputes among various constituents of the Justice 
Department and various agencies of the federal government as to 
what position to take in government appellate litigation. So, the 
question is: How does the solicitor general function in that capacity? 
To what extent should the solicitor general be deferring to the views 
of constituent governmental agencies with which he does not 
necessarily personally agree? For example, when Bob Bork was 
solicitor general, the department took some of the most liberal 
positions in civil rights cases that were taken at any time. And it did 
so, even though I do not think Bob personally agreed with many of 
them, because his conception of his role was not as a policymaker in 
the area of civil rights, but rather to defend the policies that others in 
the government, the Civil Rights Division, for example, wanted to 
pursue if those policies were defensible. Other people might have 
different views about how that should be handled. 
Another example is a case in which I was personally involved, 
called Bell v. Wolfish,38 which concerned prisoners’ rights. At the 
time, this was in the mid-70s, the Civil Rights Division—and 
Solicitor General Days was then head of the Civil Rights Division—
was actively involved in bringing litigation to reform state prison 
 
 38. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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systems, some of which had quite deplorable conditions. At the same 
time, one of the constituent components within the Justice 
Department was the Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau of Prisons ran 
prisons. It desired minimal judicial interference in its operations. And 
it became clear that the government was in danger of taking 
conflicting positions, depending on who was the proponent of the 
position. So, it was saying one thing on behalf of the Bureau of 
Prisons and the opposite on behalf of the Civil Rights Division—not 
a very satisfactory way for the federal government to act, it seemed to 
us. And this particular case brought it to a head because the legal 
issues were ones that were important to both entities. And it fell to 
Solicitor General McCree to decide which position would be taken 
and then to really make sure the means were adopted to coordinate 
the competing concerns because there was legitimate room for each 
party to operate, but the areas of conflict had to be resolved one way 
or the other. 
Another question that you may have heard about, if you have 
read anything about the Solicitor General’s Office, is the confession 
of error. And there were a number of historic cases of special 
interest: the Pentagon Papers39 case was one where I think a lot of 
people in the Office—and Dan was there; I was not yet there—did 
not necessarily believe in the position, but they felt it their duty to 
rally around under very difficult conditions to defend the 
administration’s positions. And there were a number of other such 
cases. Now, those are some of the recurring kinds of problems—as 
well as unique but historic cases—that the solicitor general wrestled 
with. 
At this point, what I would like to do is have a little bit of 
historical reminiscence about some of the interesting things that 
happened. And the person who has the greatest institutional memory 
in this regard is Judge Friedman who—I guess Tom neglected to 
mention this—actually joined the Department of Justice in 1951 and 
joined the Solicitor General’s Office as an assistant in 1959. There 
are few people alive today who served in the Solicitor General’s 
Office prior to Dan. So, let me turn the floor over to Dan with some 
comments about the early history of the office. 
 
 
 39. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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 Judge Daniel Friedman: Thank you, Andy. I would like to go 
back a ways. I would like to go back to the mid-1930s. The first 
solicitor general who served under President Roosevelt was a man 
named James Crawford Biggs. Mr. Biggs was a lawyer in a small 
town in the South. I do not know how he got that position, but I 
think he was overwhelmed by it. There is a story, which I will tell 
you a little bit about. How authentic it is, we do not know. The 
story is that after Mr. Biggs had appeared on behalf of the 
government a number of times in the Supreme Court, sometime in 
1935, Chief Justice Hughes went to visit President Roosevelt. And 
what the Chief Justice reputably told the president was that there 
were going to be a number of major New Deal cases coming before 
the Court in the next few years and that if President Roosevelt had 
any hope of prevailing in all or some of them, the first thing he 
should better do is get a new solicitor general because Mr. Biggs was 
clearly not up to the task. That was 1935 it happened. Mr. Biggs 
departed from the office in 1935. The story carries on that some 
people with some influence obtained for Mr. Biggs another position, 
not in the government, that paid twice what the solicitor general 
should pay and Mr. Biggs was unable to resist that temptation. Now, 
this story has been reported in a number of places. Nobody 
apparently has ever been able to check it out. There does not seem 
to be any documentation that supports it. Erwin Griswold, who had 
been a lawyer as a young man in the Solicitor General’s Office and 
who had served under Mr. Biggs, told me that he had repeatedly 
tried to check that story out and could not do it. So, I cannot swear 
by the story, but it was told to me by a number of people and the 
frequency with which the story is repeated makes me suspect that at 
least there is some basis for it. 
Well, the next story that I have to tell you is about the successor 
to Mr. Biggs, Stanley Reed, who went on to become a distinguished 
Supreme Court Justice. Solicitor General Reed was arguing very 
early in his career in the Supreme Court, trying to defend some New 
Deal legislation and apparently was subject to an incredible barrage 
of questioning. Those of you who have never been in the Supreme 
Court have no idea what the questioning can be like when it comes 
from nine different justices. They do not even let you finish 
sometimes answering the question—or sometimes before you have a 
chance to even start to answer the question, another justice will jump 
on you. Well, anyhow, poor Mr. Reed was subject to this barrage, 
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and it was too much for him and he fainted right in the Court. 
People asked, “What happened?” I understand that the case was 
being submitted on the basis of the arguments that were made up to 
that point. Justice Reed, however, in his subsequent arguments did 
not seem to have any such problems. 
The Solicitor General’s Office, like I suppose all institutions, can 
sometimes get some characters in it. When I came to the office, there 
was a man in his—I would say his 60s—a very genial, friendly fellow. 
It was difficult to find out exactly what he did there. He never 
seemed to work on most of the cases that came in, and I was told 
that he was a real expert on customs law and that whenever there was 
a customs case; he handled it and argued it to the Supreme Court. 
Well, of course, the number of customs cases that the Supreme 
Court hears is probably about three every twenty years. I do not 
know what he did in between. 
There was also a sad story—this was again, I think, in the 
1930s—of a lawyer in the Solicitor General’s Office who committed 
suicide by jumping down the stairwell on the stairs on Ninth Street 
between Constitution Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue. Those of 
you who know the building will know where that is. I was told that 
he was in despair, that he was a very good lawyer, but unfortunately 
he had come not from a very good law school, and he felt inferior 
with all of these relatively young hotshot people in the Solicitor 
General’s Office and felt that he would not carry his weight. 
Although they told me [he] was very good and did an excellent job, 
it was too much for him and he plunged down the stairs. 
Now, Andy had mentioned something about the problem of 
what does the solicitor general do when different parts of the 
government are in conflict and they cannot agree on what position 
to take in a case. That is obviously a difficult situation. But let me tell 
you of an unusual solution that Solicitor General Archibald Cox had 
to this dilemma, at least two cases that I remember. What he did was 
he first filed a brief arguing both sides of the case. It was fifty pages. 
The first twenty-five pages argued for the petitioner; the next 
twenty-five pages argued for the respondent. And then at the end of 
the brief, he indicated how it should come out. But, that was not the 
end of it. The solicitor general decided to argue this case himself. 
And yes, that is what he did. He presented both sides of the 
argument. He first argued on behalf of one party and then on behalf 
of the other party. Now, that may not be quite what one would 
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expect to happen under an adversary system of appellate jurisdiction, 
but that is what he did. Well, there was an unhappy sequel from the 
point of view of the office to that. 
After Solicitor General Cox left, the office was run by Ralph 
Spritzer, who was then the acting solicitor general under the 
procedures that have been mentioned because the solicitor general 
was not there. There was a case which presented an interesting legal 
issue. It was a tax case.40 And the question was whether a broker who 
had been charged with tax fraud and acquitted could deduct as a 
business expense the legal fees he had incurred in that defense. The 
Internal Revenue Service, of course, following its practice that it 
always rejects any claim that is going to cost them money said, 
“Absolutely not.” 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, which 
controls broker dealers, had a different view of the matter. They said, 
“yes, you should be allowed to deduct it because if he had been 
convicted of stock fraud, then the next step would have been [that] 
we would have revoked his registration as a broker. That would have 
put him out of the brokerage business. Therefore, his legal fees 
incurred in defending his criminal prosecution for stock fraud were a 
necessary business expense.” 
Well, the acting solicitor general filed a brief and argued both 
sides of the case. And then one of the assistants to the solicitor 
general was sent up to argue the case, and he argued both sides of 
the case and after he had been doing this for a while, Chief Justice 
Warren interrupted him rather annoyed and said to him, “Well, what 
are you asking us to do in this case? You say on the one hand that 
this could be said on one side and on the other hand there is this 
that could be said on the other side. What is your position?” So, the 
assistant said, “Well, it depends. If I am wearing my SEC hat, I think 
they are entitled to claim the deduction, but if I am wearing my 
Internal Revenue Service hat, I think they are not entitled to the 
deduction.” So, Chief Justice Warren looked at him very annoyed 
and said, “Well, what kind of an answer is that? That is no help to 
us.” He said, “We have got a case here. We have to do something 
with it. We have to either affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
or reverse it. Now, you are here on behalf of the government. What 
are you asking us to do in this case?” Glaring like that, “What are 
 
 40. Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
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you asking us to do in this case? Are you asking us to affirm or are 
you asking us to reverse?” 
There was a long pause while the assistant kind of looked 
uncomfortable and finally, he said in a weak voice, “Well,” he said, 
“if I have to make a choice, I think you should affirm.” And that is 
what happened. I think, Andy, now it is time to get on. This is 
enough history. Let’s get on with some more actual [substance]. 
Although, by the way, the last one is actual history. 
 
Andrew Frey: Well, what about TVA v. Hill,41 which is another 
example—the infamous snail darter case, where there was a question 
of the interpretation of the Endangered Species Act42 and at stake 
was the survival of this species, the snail darter, in which there were 
half a dozen specimens or so left? And the Interior Department 
fervently supported the strict enforcement of the Endangered Species 
Act, while the Tennessee Valley Authority, which was the petitioner 
in the case, fervently took the opposite position. And I guess that 
was under Solicitor General McCree? 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: He was—well, unfortunately, I found 
myself the acting solicitor general in that case because Judge McCree 
had been a member of the panel of the Sixth Circuit that had 
decided the case. Then he came in as solicitor general and obviously 
could not participate in the case. So, this took place just as the Carter 
administration was taking over. And the TVA had authority to 
represent itself in the Supreme Court, but it preferred to have the 
solicitor general represent it. So, the case began with the petition 
stage, and we filed a petition for certiorari on behalf of the TVA. The 
case is captioned TVA against Hill and the Supreme Court granted 
the petition.43 And during the preparation of the brief and also at the 
petition stage, I checked with the Interior Department to find out 
what positions they recommended we take in the case, but all of the 
people from the old administration had left and the people from the 
new administration had not come in yet. So, I spoke to some 
“acting” somebody—I was acting myself—and they said they had no 
problem with the solicitor general supporting TVA’s position that 
 
 41. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 42. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000). 
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this dam that was being built down in Tennessee should be allowed 
to be completed despite the woe it would impact on the poor snail 
darter. 
Well, after the Carter administration was in office, there was a lot 
of opposition to that position in the White House. The White House 
filed its own brief taking the other position. And then the question 
came, who was going to argue this case? And the solution was 
Solicitor General McCree was out of it. I was willing to do it and 
prepared to do it, but Attorney General Bell decided he was the only 
one who could answer some of the questions that the Court might 
raise about it. So, Attorney General Bell argued the case and in 
response to questions about what is going on here, what is the 
government’s position, he could just stand up there and say, “Well, I 
am the attorney general and I am presenting the government’s 
position and the government’s position which I am presenting to 
you is that this dam should be allowed to go ahead and that the 
Endangered Species Act should not be read to block its completion.” 
The end result of the case was a six to three win for the snail darter, a 
loss for the TVA, [and] a loss of about a hundred million dollars in 
government funds that were used to build the dam but it had not 
been completed yet. That is one way that these cases are sometimes 
resolved. 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: And can I interject? This was also 
one of the more colorful oral arguments. Attorney General Bell went 
there with a snail darter in formaldehyde, to show the Justices that 
this was really an insignificant little fish. This led to the question: 
“General Bell, did you kill that member of an endangered species 
just for us?” And then, of course, it turned out the snail darter was 
not endangered after all. There are snail darters in abundance 
everywhere. 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: But they did not know that at the 
time. 
 
Andrew Frey: Actually, the way the briefing problem was solved 
was that there was a brief for TVA and then there was an appendix, 
which was a brief for the Secretary of the Interior taking the opposite 
position. 
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Now, another case that had the solicitor general personally and 
the attorney general having their doubts about the constitutionality 
of an important federal statute was Buckley v. Valeo,44 which involved 
the Campaign Finance Act.45 Maybe Frank would like to say a few 
words about how that was handled. 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: Well, I would love to talk about 
Buckley, but first I would like to step back and talk about this general 
problem and the question whether the solicitor general is obliged to 
defend the constitutionality of statutes. And before I do that, I 
would like to say one thing about Rex Lee. Like Andy, I found him a 
wonderfully personable and gifted lawyer as well, but one thing the 
four members of this panel had in common is that we were all in the 
Solicitor General’s Office during the Ford administration when Rex 
Lee was the assistant attorney general for the Civil Division. Keith  
was the deputy for the Civil Division, so Keith can say even more 
about that. I think all of us had legal dealings with Rex at the time 
and personal legal dealings and can vouch for the many wonderful 
things that have been said before today and will continue to be said. 
Anyway, I would like to come back to this constitutionality 
problem. The president of the United States is charged by the 
Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,46 but 
of course the laws to be faithfully executed include the other 
provisions of the Constitution. This can create a very substantial 
question for the solicitor general, for whether a particular statute of 
dubious constitutional standing can be defended is itself a matter of 
faithful execution of the full set of laws. It is also a delicate question 
because many of these problems involve fights among the branches 
of the government. Buckley was one of those. And also they are the 
kind of cases that are apt to create very high political heat for a 
solicitor general. 
The office long has valued its independence and its ability to 
make a reasoned decision, but yet as in cases like Buckley v. Valeo, 
dealing with the Federal Election Campaign Act, the political forces 
are very strong on all possible sides of the question. As the name 
suggests, Buckley v. Valeo involved two politicians. The plaintiff was 
 
 44. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 45. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442 (1971). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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Senator James Buckley; Valeo was the clerk of the House of 
Representatives. So there was no way to avoid a very heavy dose of 
politics. 
If you go back in history, it turns out the very first time a 
solicitor general refused to defend the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress was in 1926. The case was Myers v. United States,47 
involving principles behind the Tenure of Office Act. Ever since 
Myers, solicitors general have felt themselves to have an independent 
power, but one to be exercised only sparingly in three categories of 
cases, two of them less controversial than the third. One category is 
abandoning statutes that are incompatible with recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court. That has been very important in civil rights 
cases. After the Supreme Court decided Brown,48 the solicitor 
general could have gone statute by statute trying to defend every law 
but did not.49 
In the 1970s, during the Ford and Carter administrations, there 
were a long series of cases involving sex discrimination and 
illegitimacy discrimination in the social welfare programs like social 
security. Many of them were defended with some tenacity. Keith can 
talk to that. They were not defended to the very last. There were 
hundreds of these provisions, and by the time Solicitor General 
McCree came to office, it was common not to defend one or another 
of these things—provisions essentially identical to something that 
had been held unconstitutional. The Congress required a report to 
the Secretary of the House and Senate and when the solicitor general 
was willing to leave a statute in the lurch. So even though I had 
characterized this as a noncontroversial use of their power, it has 
political consequences. 
The second category is clashes between Congress and the 
executive. A good example of that is the history of the one-house 
veto litigation, which finally came before the Supreme Court when 
Rex Lee was solicitor general but had been kicking around ever since 
FDR’s time in the White House, when he concluded that statutes of 
this kind were unconstitutional. When Bob Bork was solicitor 
general, there were several occasions in which one-house veto 
provisions were challenged in the Supreme Court. It turned out 
 
 47. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 49. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 1990 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905. 
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Buckley v. Valeo was one of them.50 There was a one-house veto 
provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act. The solicitor 
general, as I will tell you shortly, filed three briefs in Buckley v. Valeo. 
These three briefs covered every conceivable position and its 
opposite. There is a footnote in one of those saying, “Well, this is a 
one-house veto provision. This is plainly unconstitutional.” Stop. No 
elaboration. It turned out it did not have to be reached in Valeo. 
The dispositive case—what became Chadha51—came to the 
Supreme Court as a result of cooperative work between Solicitor 
General McCree and the Office of Legal Counsel [“OLC”]. There 
was basically a war counsel formed between the OLC and SG’s 
Office during the Carter administration to get that case on the fast 
track. As an example of the operation of the Solicitor General’s 
Office, the brief and argument in the Ninth Circuit were done by 
Dick Allen, who was an assistant to the solicitor general at the time. 
The Ninth Circuit, which had expedited the briefing, then waited 
approximately four years to decide the case, which explains why it 
was briefed in 1978 by the previous solicitor general and decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1983. The category to which Chadha 
belongs—in which the president through the solicitor general 
defends his own turf—is a central set. The cases are individually 
controversial, but it is not controversial that the solicitor general 
should play this role. 
Now, I am going to give you the third and most difficult 
category, both for the solicitor general trying to figure out what best 
to do and for those who must ask what is politically astute. These 
entail statutes that do not involve recent Supreme Court decisions, 
do not directly involve the powers of the executive branch, and yet 
the solicitor general is in grave doubt that the laws should be viewed 
as constitutional. One stream of argument some solicitors general 
have accepted is that statutes should be defended if you can make an 
argument in their favor without breaking out laughing. It is the 
risibility test for a constitutional defense. If trying to state the 
defense of the statute does not have you rolling in the aisles, you 
should defend the statute. That has been the position of some 
solicitors general. 
 
 
 50. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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I do not think it is the correct decision because it turns the 
solicitor general into a parrot. Whatever strands of argument the 
solicitor general can get from the Supreme Court’s opinions, he is 
supposed to parrot back to the Supreme Court. But the solicitor 
general is in fact the spokesman for the executive branch of 
government. Just as the judicial branch and legislative branch can 
have a view about the constitutionality of statutes, so can the 
executive branch. Now having teased you, I arrive at Buckley where 
this question comes up front and center. 
Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act.52 It has in it 
several things: it has a one-house veto clause that managed not to 
get reviewed; it has a clause providing that the appointment of 
members of the Federal Election Commission bypasses the 
president—two members are to be appointed by the president; two 
members are to be appointed by the Senate directly; two members 
are to be appointed by the House directly. That falls within the clash 
of branches the president and the SG believe violates Article II. And 
it was uncontroversial to file a brief saying that in the president’s 
view vesting appointment in the Congress is unconstitutional. The 
other things in this law regulated campaign finance, both 
contributions and expenditures. It also created the federal system 
underwriting presidential campaigns. 
Senator Buckley, who attacked it, and Ralph Winter, then on the 
Yale faculty, who was Senator Buckley’s lawyer, did not have any 
difficulty persuading Solicitor General Bork that that statute was 
unconstitutional root and branch. In fact, Bob Bork kept referring to 
the issue involved in this case, the constitutionality of the FECA, as 
the “fecal matter.” He was not in favor of this statute. Defenders 
insisted that the law represented a “narrow” regulation of politics. 
And his reaction was, “Yeah, it has been narrowed right to the core 
of the First Amendment.” What to do? Well, in the end he 
authorized the filing of three briefs; he came to the bold conclusion 
to do everything. 
One brief was titled “Brief for the Attorney General as a Party 
and the United States as Amicus Curiae.” This brief attacked, on 
Article II grounds, the appointment the FEC by Congress and then 
offered the Supreme Court a lot of gratuitous advice about the rest 
of the law—suggesting things to think about. The solicitor general 
 
 52. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442 (1971). 
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concluded that it would not be acceptable directly to challenge the 
Act’s constitutionality. But this brief did imply that independent 
thought might raise a lot of deep questions, and by defending some 
parts of the Act, the brief conveyed a signal about the rest. That is 
brief number one, signed by—to give you an indicator of the 
importance of the case—Attorney General Levi, Solicitor General 
Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Randolph, and an insignificant 
assistant to the solicitor general, me. 
Brief number two is styled “Brief for the Federal Election 
Commission as a Party and the United States as Appellee” (implying: 
Except to the Extent that the United States Has Already Filed the 
Other Brief). It vigorously defended the constitutionality of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act except with respect to the Article II 
issue. It was signed by Attorney General Levi, Solicitor General 
Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, and Louis Clayborn who 
was a once and future deputy solicitor general. Last, Solicitor 
General Bork authorized the FEC to file its own brief on behalf of 
itself defending the constitutionality of the appointments matter. 
This was all quite extraordinary. Three briefs in one case is well 
beyond stating two sides in a single brief or filing a brief urging an 
outcome (with an appendix). Both the attorney general and the 
solicitor general signed separate briefs on (effectively) different sides 
of the same proposition. 
Why did this occur? It is a shame that Bob Bork is not here to 
tell you himself. I was not privy to that final decision. It obviously 
entailed an assessment of what the Ford administration, given the 
politics of the time, thought was tolerable. It shows that if the 
political heat is high enough, then even if the solicitor general is very 
much convinced that an important act of Congress is 
unconstitutional, that argument still cannot be made. 
There are a number of other wonderful examples of two-headed 
government presentation, but our time is short and I will spare you 
some of the examples. Maybe some of them will come up in 
discussion later, cases like Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney,53 a two-and-a-half-headed case. 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: I would just like to add one thing to 
what Frank has said and that is when the case got to the oral 
 
 53. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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argument of the Supreme Court, the government dropped one of its 
heads. There was only one argument presented and that was an 
argument in defense of the statute. And obviously neither the 
solicitor general nor the attorney general in light of what they had 
filed were prepared to defend the statute, so it was left to me to 
defend it, and I defended it, I would say—what would you say—with 
75 percent success? 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: Seventy-two percent. Seventy-five is 
an overstatement. 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: The Court rejected some of our 
arguments, but, at least I like to think, it accepted the major ones. 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: The bottom line for those of you 
who do not know the opinion is that they held the composition of 
the FEC unconstitutional on Article II grounds. The Justices held 
that a number of challenges were unripe. They upheld the federal 
financing of presidential campaigns, something that even Solicitor 
General Bork thought was defensible. They held the independent-
expenditure limitations unconstitutional but the contribution 
provision constitutional. Some of the justices said later—some to 
Bob Bork, some to me, and I would not be surprised if some to 
Dan—that although they were annoyed by this Cerberus-headed 
presentation, by the time they were done reading these things, they 
found the arguments very helpful in drafting a decision. But I think 
it was cases like this that led the Court in 1979 to set a 50-page 
limitation on briefs. Brief number one, the one I was involved in, 
was 122 pages long. Brief number two, the one Dan was involved in, 
was I believe 84 pages long. Brief number three, the FEC’s brief, was 
fairly short. (I will say in slight defense that my brief had larger type.) 
 
Andrew Frey: Do you have anything to say on these topics? 
[Acknowledging Keith Jones] 
 
Keith Jones: When I heard the composition of this panel, I 
knew I was in trouble. Here I am with three close-mouthed 
shrinking violets. I knew I would have to carry most of the panel 
discussion on my own. 
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I would like to follow up on what Frank said about the time 
when Rex Lee was assistant attorney general for the Civil Division. 
Rex became the assistant attorney general in 1975. That was about 
the same time that I was made deputy solicitor general in charge of 
cases arising out of the Civil Division. This threw me and Rex 
together on a number of occasions; we worked together on appeal 
recommendations, certiorari matters, and merits briefs. 
Working with Rex was a real pleasure. He was a delightful 
gentleman, and I enjoyed it very much. By my calculations, Rex and 
I together jointly signed nine briefs on the merits in the Supreme 
Court over a period of about eighteen months. Our success ratio was 
seven wins and two losses, which for a baseball team would be pretty 
good. There were no blockbusters among these cases. Most of the 
cases, quite frankly, were eminently forgettable even to those of us 
who briefed and argued them. 
One case that does stick in my mind was called Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.54 This case involved the act of state 
doctrine. If you do not know what that is, I am no longer in a 
position to help you. But at the time the custom of the solicitor 
general was to assign each assistant attorney general one case to 
argue, and this normally would be a case arising from his division. In 
the Alfred Dunhill case, I took a young inexperienced assistant 
attorney general under my wing and coached him for his very first 
Supreme Court argument. The act of state doctrine was a little 
tricky; we had to spend quite a bit of time preparing for the 
argument. But it is not what you think. The neophyte with whom I 
was dealing was not Rex Lee. It was Antonin Scalia. And I can assure 
you that he was a very fast learner. 
Rex did argue at least one case on which he and I had worked 
together. The case was Matthews v. de Castro,55 and the issue there 
was whether, under the Social Security Act, Congress could 
constitutionally award death benefits to the widow of a deceased 
wage-earner while denying benefits to a divorcee of a deceased 
wage-earner. It may have been an uphill struggle, but Rex was able 
to persuade the Supreme Court that Congress could constitutionally 
make that distinction. This was fairly typical of the kind of case that 
the Civil Division had in the Supreme Court back when Rex was the 
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assistant attorney general. We also had, as Frank intimated, a number 
of cases involving sex discrimination. We fought those out valiantly, 
but ultimately to no avail. 
Let me turn to one other interesting case during my time in the 
office. You almost always think of the Solicitor General’s Office as 
dealing with Supreme Court matters, but actually one of the most 
interesting and important cases that I had was at the trial court level. 
It is hard to conceive now, but there was a brief period of time back 
in 1973 when Spiro Agnew looked like a pillar of integrity in an 
administration that otherwise had lost its moral compass. President 
Nixon was struggling day by day to put out one Watergate fire after 
another. Spiro Agnew was sitting back in dignified silence, not 
exercising his penchant for bombastic alliteration—and then, of 
course, the bribery scandal erupted. It turned out that the U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Maryland was investigating Agnew’s 
conduct while governor, investigating allegations that Agnew had 
demanded and received bribes while governor and indeed had 
continued to receive bribes in the White House as vice president. In 
response, Agnew’s lawyers decided to play a game of political 
chicken. They knew that President Nixon was quite concerned, to 
put it mildly, about the possibility of an indictment arising out of the 
Watergate investigation. And so, Agnew’s lawyers filed an action in 
Maryland seeking to enjoin the grand jury from proceeding on the 
bribery matter, hoping that President Nixon’s administration could 
be maneuvered into taking the position that the Constitution 
protects both a sitting vice president and a sitting president from 
prosecution and that both are immune from federal indictment. 
Elliot Richardson was the attorney general at the time and 
responsible for the litigation. He asked Bob Bork as the solicitor 
general to handle the government’s briefing of the case. Bob turned 
to me and Ed Kitch, who was then on leave from the University of 
Chicago, to help with the briefing. This is a matter that was 
politically quite important. It was a time of tension in public affairs 
and we agreed with the court that we would file a brief, I think, 
within three days. My memory may play tricks on me. Perhaps we 
had five days, but it was a very short and intense period of time 
within which the brief had to be filed. I was assigned the easy task of 
explaining why the sitting vice president is not constitutionally 
immune from prosecution. Bob Bork and Ed Kitch took the more 
difficult portion of the brief that explained why the president is 
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different. We put this brief together, submitted it to the attorney 
general and the president, who approved it, and then filed it. I think 
it may have been the only brief in the history of the Office of the 
Solicitor General that was reprinted in full in the Washington Post 
and the New York Times. 
I think that the brief had substantial legal force, but much more 
important to Agnew and his lawyers was the political will it 
manifested. Within four days the vice president had entered into a 
plea agreement and had resigned from office, not giving the trial 
judge any opportunity to rule on the novel constitutional issues 
addressed in our brief. 
 
Andrew Frey: Speaking of people not giving opportunities to 
rule on pleadings, there is a Utah-related story. There was a famous, 
or perhaps notorious, judge here in Utah name Willis Ritter, who 
was quite an old curmudgeon and would hold in contempt people 
who made noise outside his courtroom and do various other things. 
He took a substantial dislike to the federal government, and he gave 
virtually every federal lawyer, unless it happened to be an attractive 
young woman—and there were a lot fewer of those in those days 
than there are today—a very, very difficult time. And it got to be 
such a problem that we were besieged by the Criminal Division and 
the Civil Division and so on with pleas to figure out something to do 
about Judge Ritter. Frank worked with me on this matter. Of course, 
it is difficult, given the Article III protections that federal judges 
enjoy, to think of what to do. There had been a previous problem 
with a judge named Chandler in Oklahoma and I think it was 
probably that precedent that we relied on. Anyway, the strategy that 
we hit upon was to make an application to judicial council for the 
Tenth Circuit and ask them to order that Judge Ritter not be 
permitted to sit on any federal government cases. Obviously this was 
a novel suggestion, the validity of which was debatable. They did ask 
for Judge Ritter to respond; however, he departed the globe rather 
than doing so and the case became moot. But it was an interesting 
incident. 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: Could I add a few words about that? 
It is actually a very interesting example of the collaborative effort of 
the Solicitor General’s Office. Solicitors general do not do things on 
their own. There is an elaborate process of getting views from 
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elsewhere within the government—from agencies, from divisions of 
the department, and exchanging views and drafts among all 
concerned. The Ritter case is an example of that process over an 
extended period because Bob Bork concluded that it would be 
wholly inappropriate for the solicitor general on his own to ask for 
what amounted to the removal of the powers of an Article III judge, 
even though what was technically asked for was only the removal of 
the federal cases. (This led, by the way, to panic in the state of Utah, 
because the state saw that if all federal cases were removed from 
Judge Ritter, what would be left on his docket? Well, all the state 
cases from the other judges would have to be assigned to Judge 
Ritter, so there was a “me too” petition from the state of Utah. That 
led to panic in the private bar about what would be left for Ritter.) 
Anyway, Ritter was a case in which the solicitor general walked down 
the hall to Attorney General Levi and initiated a process with him 
about whether it was appropriate for the executive branch of 
government to ask for the de facto removal of a judge’s powers. The 
deputy attorney general at the time, Harold Tyler, had been an 
Article III judge in New York before he had come in as deputy 
attorney general. So again, a fairly large war council within the 
Department of Justice worked through this process in a leisurely, 
almost academic way. Research memos were written—I remember 
having written some of them myself—and thoughts were exchanged. 
At this point, a change in political administration occurred. Before 
the document was filed, Griffin Bell became attorney general. Ben 
Civiletti became deputy attorney general and Wade McCree became 
solicitor general. The process was gone through again and the 
document that was filed was signed by—to indicate the 
significance—Griffin Bell and Wade McCree, although you would 
never ordinarily expect a document filed in the District of Utah to be 
signed by the attorney general of the United States. A cover sheet 
told the Tenth Circuit that the filing of this has been approved by 
both Attorney General Bell and Attorney General Levi, Solicitor 
General Bork and Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Attorney 
General Tyler and Deputy Attorney General Civiletti, and we want 
you to take notice that three of these people have been Article III 
judges. This increased the force, not only of the collaborative 
process, but also of the presentation that the collaboration produced 
and the degree of harmony that had been achieved was evident. 
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Andrew Frey: Let me come back to something that Frank said 
and also something that Dan said. Frank was talking about the 
legitimacy of the solicitor general [in taking certain positions]. By 
and large the solicitor general’s development of legal positions that 
he, or maybe someday she, will adopt asks the question, “What are 
the institutional interests of the United States?” The United States as 
an institution is only temporarily in the custody of any given political 
party, any given administration. It has certain institutional interests. 
And I am going to pause here for a minute to say that I think 
probably the person here who is the strongest proponent of a 
different view was probably Charles Fried. I know he and I have had 
many discussions about this question of “who the client is.” I have 
come to think of Charles’s view—and something Dan said about the 
way that Solicitor General Cox handled problems, who was also a 
Harvard law professor confirms this metaphor—as the Harvard law 
professor model of the solicitor general. And that model is that 
naturally Harvard law professors know what is right and what is 
wrong in the law. Their role is to help guide the Supreme Court to 
reach a correct decision. And then there is the humble lawyer model 
where you have this client that may have institutional interests, and 
you ask yourself, “Well, what are their interests?”—not what do I 
personally think. But now, I am not saying that— 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: The Yale law professor law model 
espoused by Robert Bork and Drew Days. 
 
Andrew Frey: It certainly was Wade McCree’s view, it was Bob 
Bork’s view, and I think it was Rex’s view. I am not saying it is the 
only legitimate view because there is genuine room for debate, and 
we may talk a little bit in the next panel about the Garcia56 case and 
the National League of Cities57 and the whole problem about the 
power of Congress to regulate state minimum wages, and the Tenth 
Amendment issues that arose, and the tremendous problems that 
Rex had between his sense of duty to defend these federal statutes 
and his genuine belief that they trenched upon state rights under the 
Tenth Amendment. These are not easy problems to resolve. By the 
way, I would like to say that the other participants in the 
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PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
40 
conference—I am sure have views on some of the things we are 
saying—if they want to raise their hands and butt in on any part of 
this, I think that would enrich the discussion. So, I do hope that 
people will feel free if we say something that provokes a thought. 
Yes, Dan [points to Judge Daniel Friedman]. 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: Well, part of it, I think, depends 
basically on the concept of the individual who holds the solicitor 
generalship. That is, does he think his job is to try to take positions 
that he believes are right or is his job somewhat other than that? Let 
me give an example under Solicitor General Bork. One of my jobs as 
a deputy was to be in charge of the antitrust cases. Practically every 
antitrust case that came through the office from the Antitrust 
Division took what Bob Bork believed to be an absolutely ridiculous 
position and quite wrong. But, he told me on several times that his 
job as solicitor general was not to make antitrust policy. That was the 
job of the assistant attorney general in charge of the Antitrust 
Division. He said, “As solicitor general, as long as you can write a 
brief that seems within its own terms reasonably convincing, I have 
no basis to refuse to sign it.” But he said, “I am not going to get up 
in the Supreme Court on my two hind legs and try to defend that 
position.” From my point of view it was splendid because it gave me 
a chance to argue a large number of antitrust cases that I probably 
would not have gotten to argue under some other solicitors general. 
But part of it, I think a very important part, is what philosophy the 
individual has with respect to the job. It would be an interesting 
study to figure out to what extent were solicitors general who had 
served in the office as a young lawyer influenced by that service in 
their attitude toward the office. 
 
Judge Frank Easterbrook: If I could throw in a few words on 
this client question. I think Andy and I may have a disagreement. It 
may go to the same issue that Andy raised with Charles Fried. My 
inclination is to say that the client of the solicitor general is the 
executive branch of the United States government. Not to say that 
the solicitor general is an independent agent, but he is litigating on 
behalf of the executive branch. The president’s job is to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed, and he is representing that part 
of the government that takes care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. I think Bob Bork had that same sense. That was why he 
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took the position in the antitrust cases and civil rights cases that have 
been mentioned. The executive branch of the United States 
government, acting through the people appointed for that purpose, 
had settled on a particular antitrust policy and civil rights policy. 
Given that the executive branch had taken that view, his job was to 
defend it. 
Many of the great difficulties for a solicitor general arise when 
you have that conception of who the client is and the executive 
branch will not take a position or cannot take a position or is 
internally conflicted. One of the cases that arose while I was deputy 
solicitor general had to do with OSHA’s regulation of benzene.58 
The OSHA adopted a regulation that most people thought would 
save on average one to two lives a year and cost three or four billion 
dollars a year to implement. Alfred Khan, the president’s chief 
regulation officer at the White House, thought that was terrible. The 
EPA, it turns out, also thought that it was terrible. They were not 
against saving lives, but their fear was that the OSHA benzene 
regulation would divert so much money into reducing the amount of 
benzene that industry would not have the resources left to 
implement other regulations that EPA thought would be more 
productive. But F. Ray Marshall, the Secretary of Labor, refused to 
recede from OSHA’s view about the significance of benzene. That 
led to a series of impassioned pleas by these different actors within 
the executive branch, each asking the solicitor general to represent 
his side. The solicitor general very much wanted the president to 
resolve that problem—to resolve this fight among his advisors. 
President Carter refused. What does the solicitor general do in that 
case? 
What Solicitor General McCree did was to say, “Okay, the 
designated decision maker for OSHA regulations is the Secretary of 
Labor. The Secretary of Labor refuses to recede. We will defend the 
benzene regulations as best we can (and the next year the cotton 
dust regulations, posing some of the same problems).” But this was 
still a very hard decision for Wade McCree. It was hard for Griffin 
Bell to fend off the political pressure from the EPA who wanted 
Wade McCree to sandbag the Department of Labor. It seems to me 
 
 58. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 581 F.2d 493 
(5th Cir. 1978), aff’d sub. nom., Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980). 
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very difficult for a solicitor general to operate if you think you know 
who your client is, but your client will not make the hard decision. 
 
Andrew Frey: We have one or two minutes left and I wonder 
whether, Dan, you would like to comment on the question of 
personnel and politics in the Solicitor General’s Office and how it 
was then, and maybe we will hear later about changes. 
 
Judge Daniel Friedman: Well, how it was then—back then 
when I first joined the office, as far as I could tell, people were 
appointed to the staff of the office solely on the basis of their 
abilities. Politics never seemed to enter into it. In fact, a lot of people 
I did not know what their politics were. Now, of course, I do not 
know what the solicitor general said to some of these applicants. I 
heard one story on one occasion in which a Republican solicitor 
general decided that it was time to appoint some Republicans to the 
office. So, he found a couple of people who were Republican and 
seemed very well qualified for the office. He interviewed them and 
checked out that they were Republicans. Then he kind of smiled and 
said, “Well, that is not the final question because I would like to 
know what kind of a Republican are you. There are different kinds of 
Republicans. There are conservative Republicans; there are more 
liberal Republicans. What kind are you?” 
The other tradition in the office used to be that the supervisory 
people, now called the deputies who used to be called first and 
second assistant, were all selected from the staff. People worked there 
for a number of years and then eventually some of them were 
selected to the supervisory positions. Again, as far as I could tell, they 
were selected solely because it was considered that they were the best 
qualified professionally to handle the job. 
We did not have in those days the position that is now known as 
the political deputy. People objected that the political deputy is really 
an unfortunate politicalization of the office. I am not so sure. I 
would be interested to hear from the solicitors general who have had 
a political deputy if they thought that worked out well. There is an 
advantage to it on the other side, which is if you have someone who 
is a deputy and is also considered to have some political significance, 
it prevents the unfortunate situation that I found myself in the 
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famous snail darter case59 of being a career person who suddenly is 
subjected to all sorts of political pressures. Those [career] people 
may not be in a position to withstand and may not know how to deal 
with [political pressure]. After all, part of being a political person, I 
suppose, is knowing how to deal with political pressures—what you 
can or what you cannot do—and that may not be so clear to people 
who have not had that kind of background. 
 
Andrew Frey: We have just about run out of time. So, thank 
you all for your patience in listening. 
 
 59. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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Reagan I Panel 
 
Kenneth S. Geller: Deputy Solicitor General, 1979–1986. 
 
Andrew L. Frey: Deputy Solicitor General, 1973–1986. 
 
Michael W. McConnell: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1983–
1985. 
 
Richard G. Wilkins: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1981–1984. 
 
John H. Garvey: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1981–1984. 
 
Andrew Frey: Thank you. Let me start off with a few words 
about the organization of the office which I don’t think we discussed 
before. This is, I think, the last panel, which will not have the 
“horse” but only the “straw and the stable boys,” because I think we 
have actual solicitors general for each of the ensuing panels. 
The solicitor general is, of course, a presidential appointee. The 
office is one that is closely scrutinized by the Senate when a 
nomination is made. At the time that I joined the office in 1972, the 
solicitor general himself was the only politically appointed person. As 
Judge Friedman said, everybody else was a career person. When I 
joined the office, it was the end of the first Nixon administration. I 
personally was no particular fan of President Nixon even before his 
troubles, but Solicitor General [Erwin] Griswold credibly assured me 
that I would be acting as a lawyer for the people of the United States 
in a professional and nonpolitical capacity. And I certainly do not 
regret having made the decision to serve in the office, which was a 
wonderful experience. 
Now, the way the office is organized is you have the solicitor 
general. You then have—it at one time was two, then three when I 
joined the office, now, four, maybe up to five, I am not sure—
deputy solicitors general. Now, each deputy solicitor general has an 
area of responsibility—certain agencies, certain divisions of the 
department that he or she is responsible for overseeing and handling 
the cases that come from there. My area as a deputy was the Criminal 
Division. From that vantage point, I missed a lot of the exciting 
action because the Criminal Division was an area where there was 
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not that much controversy. The United States government was a 
prosecutor. Our job basically was to take the prosecutor’s position. 
Even in Democratic administrations, the differences in emphasis 
were very minor and we were rarely caught up in the highly political, 
highly controversial cases, as compared to the people who were 
responsible for cases from the Civil Rights Division, let’s say—that is 
a particularly contentious one—sometimes the Civil Division, [and] 
the Antitrust Division, which is responsible for a heavily policy-laden 
area. So, as I think I said in the last panel, Rex Lee’s solicitor 
generalship was in some ways a transitional period in the office and it 
was a period of some intense pressures and controversy at a 
heightened level over what certainly I had previously experienced. 
I will say that when the Carter administration came in, the career 
people in the Solicitor General’s Office were viewed as Nixon/Ford 
holdovers and distrusted. When Reagan became president and his 
people came into the political offices in the Justice Department, I 
can assure you that the same views prevailed: we were Carter 
holdovers now and still, of course, not to be trusted and viewed as 
obstructionists trying to block some of the new administration’s 
policies. There was no area where this was more strongly felt than in 
the civil rights area. Those of you who are old will recall that in the 
1980 presidential election affirmative action and busing were 
significant issues in President Reagan’s campaign. He was opposed 
to both of them. When he took office, he appointed Brad Reynolds 
as assistant attorney general for civil rights. Brad conceived it, 
perhaps appropriately, as his role to implement those policies, which 
were politically, of course, highly controversial policies and which 
sometimes ran into conflict with regulations that government 
agencies had adopted in the Carter administration or the Nixon or 
Ford administration for their own hiring practices, their own 
contracting practices, and so on. 
A very important feature of Rex’s solicitor generalship was 
dealing with the pressure that was coming from the Civil Rights 
Division to take very aggressive positions on these highly 
controversial issues—often positions that the career lawyers in the 
Solicitor General’s Office felt, regardless of their personal views 
about their merits, were tactically unwise. That is, I think the 
feeling—and none of us really had a lot to do with the civil rights 
cases who are on this panel, but I will give people a chance to 
comment—but my perception from a slight remove was that the 
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career people in the SG’s Office were saying, “This is not the way to 
persuade the Supreme Court to adopt any of the legal principles that 
you are so anxious to get them to adopt. You are pushing too fast; 
you are pushing in the wrong ways.” This was viewed by people in 
the Civil Rights Division, however, perhaps understandably enough, 
as obstructionism and as attempts by the people in the SG’s Office to 
implement their personal preferences. Rex was caught in the middle 
on these issues. I do not know if anybody has any comment, but I 
will stop now to see and then we can talk for a minute about the Bob 
Jones case,60 which was one of the most interesting things that 
happened during that period. Richard [acknowledges Richard G 
Wilkins]. 
 
Richard Wilkins: Well, I think you have highlighted one of the 
things that happened to the Solicitor General’s Office, at least 
publicly during Rex’s administration, and that is that the nature of 
the role of the solicitor general became a matter of public discourse 
with people who perceived themselves as very conservative, loudly 
claiming that Rex was not sufficiently protecting the president’s 
interests or the interests of the political party then in power. While 
more liberal politicians were arguing that Rex was busily trouncing 
the office and was squandering the goodwill of the great tradition of 
the Solicitor General’s Office. 
I wrote a little law review article—I wrote two papers actually. I 
wrote one that was published in 1988 defending Rex against the 
liberal critics.61 I wrote one earlier in 1985 that was never actually 
published, but Caplan in his book The Tenth Justice62 quotes a lot 
from this little piece where I responded to the conservative critics. I 
put copies of them out so those of you who want to get a whipsaw, 
you can read them and say, you know, one of them says, “No, he 
really is conservative” and one of them says, “No, he hasn’t trashed 
the constitution. He really is presenting reasoned arguments.” But 
one thing that my research did at the time that I was preparing both 
of these is the Solicitor General’s Office has always had this debate. 
It is nothing new. What happened was it came to the public 
attention for the first time during Rex’s administration, but the 
 
 60. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 61. Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 
21 LOY. L. REV. 1167 (1988). 
 62. CAPLAN, supra note 23. 
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pressures on the solicitor general to follow executive direction have 
always been there. In this Loyola article, I trace it back as far as it can 
be traced.63 There is a lot of high rhetoric by people. I cannot 
remember the name of the solicitor general in the early 1940s—
Francis Biddle, I think—who said, “I am servant to no one. I do not 
answer to the man who appointed me. I serve only justice.”64 But 
when you look at what Biddle did, it’s nonsense. He did what 
President Roosevelt wanted done. Every single solicitor general, as 
far back as you can trace it in the papers, has followed the political 
predilections of the person in office. 
With that said, you have to balance the fact that as solicitor 
general, you do have a unique role in that you are speaking for the 
executive branch. There are conflicts that have been noted within the 
political branches of the executive branch. Not everyone within the 
executive branch has the same view. Also, as the chief advocate for 
the United States of America you have to be very careful and present 
reasoned arguments. You cannot just dash off on a horse because 
you want to reverse case X and make arguments A, B, C that are so 
far removed from case X, which is now at the end of the alphabet. 
You cannot begin arguing A, B, C. You have got to start arguing 
something closer to X, a little further down, if you are going to push 
it back to A. Rex knew that. 
So, when it would come to cases, and I was involved in one of 
the busing cases, and I will just mention it briefly without naming 
any names. One of the briefs came up and it had a sentence that said, 
“This court has never ordered busing as a remedy for racial 
discrimination.” I knew that was not right. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg65 said that busing was a remedy, and I knew I could not 
put that in the brief. Rex knew that it could not go in the brief. So, 
the brief was rewritten. It still argued against the extension of 
busing, but it did not make arguments that simply flew in the face of 
legal reality at the time. Now when you did that, you made people 
who were, you know, really true believers very, very mad. That is 
what prompted this first little piece in 1985 because to listen to the 
true conservatives, Rex was a card-carrying communist or at least a 
member of the ACLU, and it just was not true. I guess my 
 
 63.  See Wilkins, supra note 61. 
 64. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 98 (1962). 
 65. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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observation, and I have gone on too long, is simply the kinds of 
tensions that Andy has highlighted, and I think maybe the focus of 
this panel’s discussion, were not new. They have always been there. 
They only began to get public attention when Rex became solicitor 
general. I am not sure that the appointment of even the political 
deputy changed things all that much. It just simply made apparent 
what was already de facto there in the office. It just simply made it 
more apparent, which I am not sure is a bad thing either. 
Finally, and it is my personal judgment on Rex Lee—and you 
know, I cannot be unbiased, I named my eleven-year old after him. 
But I think Rex did a very good job of representing the political will 
of the executive branch that appointed him in a reasoned manner 
that could be well supported by the law as it stood. And as witness of 
that fact, you had the editorial pages of the New York Times 
screaming that he was splashing blood on the pillars of the Court at 
the same time that you had the conservative press screaming that he 
was not really a true believer. 
 
Kenneth Geller: I would like to respond to that, but before I do 
so I think it would be appropriate for me just to say a few words 
about Rex as some of the panelists in the prior panel did because I 
had a long association with Rex as did many of us. I was in the 
Solicitor General’s Office in 1975 and 1976 when Rex was the head 
of the Civil Division. The very first brief I ever wrote in the office, a 
totally inconsequential case Chandler v. Roudebush66 was argued by 
Rex. I had the pleasure of working with him in preparation for that 
argument when he was an assistant attorney general. If your record, 
Keith [Jones], with Rex was seven and two, this was one of the two. 
When Rex became solicitor general from 1981 to 1985, I served 
as his deputy during that entire period of time and handled cases out 
of the Civil Division and a number of the independent agencies, 
which was a heavy workload in the office and gave me many 
opportunities to work closely with Rex. It was an invaluable and 
irreplaceable experience. I can remember just one quick anecdote. I 
was in the office one weekend day working and decided to take a 
break to watch a football game for a few minutes. For those of you 
who know the Solicitor General’s Office, the solicitor general has a 
suite. When the building was built, the solicitor general was the 
 
 66. 425 U.S. 840 (1976). 
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second highest official in the Justice Department and he got the 
second best office. He has a large office with a suite, which includes 
not only a back room, but a bedroom upstairs and it had a TV in the 
suite. I walked in there and turned on the TV and started to watch 
the football game. I did not realize it but Rex was in the office 
preparing for an argument. I was embarrassed and apologized. I 
believe he said, “No, no, no. Watch the football game. I have got so 
many kids at home, I can work through anything.” He was a 
remarkable, remarkable person and it is my pleasure to be here 
today, partly in his honor. 
I think the problem I had with the discussion in the prior panel 
and to a certain extent Richard’s comments; I think we have to 
distinguish—there are really two types of cases that the Solicitor 
General’s Office handles. The overwhelming majority of the cases 
involve purely legal issues in which there is very little doubt about 
what the government’s position is, there is a long-held institutional 
interest. On the other hand, there is a small segment of cases that 
really does not involve so much law as policy. I think that many of 
the civil rights cases fall into that category as do some other cases 
involving antitrust policy. It is clearly the case that the government’s 
position in those cases varies from administration to administration. I 
think that the Supreme Court appreciates that when it gets a brief in 
one of those cases, it’s getting the position of the current 
administration rather than the institutional interest of the United 
States. That, as Richard said, has been the history of the Solicitor 
General’s Office for a very long time. I do not think there is anything 
wrong with that. I don’t think there is anything wrong with 
presenting the president’s position on those issues. If the president 
can give a speech on busing or abortion or some other issue of great 
public concern, it is not clear to me why his solicitor general cannot 
present views to the Supreme Court on those issues when a case 
arises. 
I do think, though, that when those cases arise the Court 
appreciates, as I said, that it is hearing from the administration rather 
than the institutional interests of the United States. It is incumbent 
on the solicitor general to present those positions in a way that is 
faithful to precedent and completely professional. It is a mistake to 
ask the Supreme Court to do things that it is simply not going to do, 
based on precedent or the predilections of the justices. I think the 
problem that arose in the first Reagan administration was not that 
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the solicitor general weighed in on many of those cases but that 
there was a perception that the people in the Justice Department 
wanted the government not simply to weigh in but to go over the 
boundaries that I discussed a minute ago, involving fair use of 
precedent, asking the Court to do things that it was simply not 
going to do.  The result was a loss of credibility for the government 
that spilled over to the more traditional cases where the 
government’s winning percentage in the Supreme Court is so high in 
part because of the credibility of its representations. I think that was 
a concern during that period of time. 
Let me say as to the first category of cases [that] there were many 
cases that arose during those four years, and I worked on several of 
them, where it was clear to me that the government had a consistent, 
long-held, and important position to present to the Supreme Court 
but it was clearly inconsistent, I think, with Rex’s personal views. I 
never saw in my time that there was any wavering on his part in 
terms of what his role should be in those types of cases. One case 
[in] which certiorari was never granted, so it never became a 
published decision but took up a lot of time when I was there, was a 
case involving right-to-work laws.67 The issue arose of whether state 
right-to-work laws applied on federal enclaves within a state where 
the state has ceded its legislative jurisdiction to the federal 
government. One circuit had held that state right-to-work laws did 
not apply, and the employee sought Supreme Court review, and the 
Court asked for our views. 
I know that this was an issue close to Rex’s heart and he got 
lobbied very, very strongly and over a long period of time by people 
who wanted him to take the position that state right-to-work laws 
applied in those federal enclaves. It was clear, though, that there was 
a consistent federal government position to the contrary. The NLRB 
felt strongly about the issue. Rex not only filed briefs saying that 
certiorari should be denied because state right-to-work laws did not 
apply there, but also he wrote a letter, which I still have a copy of, to 
some people on the other side explaining what the proper role of the 
solicitor general should be. 
Another case that arose during that period of time which took up 
a lot of our energies was a case involving whether the Fair Labor 
 
 67. Lord v. Local Union No. 2088, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 646 F.2d 1057 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
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Standards Act applied to states and municipalities. The case arose in 
the context of the San Antonio Municipal Transit Authority68 and it 
involved very serious federalism issues. The Supreme Court had 
jumped back and forth on the question of whether laws like that 
were constitutional. One case, called National League of Cities,69 had 
held that the federal government could not intrude into those areas 
of traditional state concern. The Court granted [certiorari in] the 
Garcia case. The issue was posed to us of whether the Court should 
overrule National League of Cities and hold that the federal 
government could regulate areas of state concern that did not go to 
core governmental instrumentalities. There again, I know that Rex 
had substantial concerns about what the proper balance of power 
should be between the state and federal governments, but there was 
again a federal statute to be defended and a strong federal interest on 
the part of the Labor Department to assert that authority in this 
context. Rex not only took that position but argued the case. I think 
it was argued by Ted Olson originally. It was set for reargument. 
Those are just two examples of where I think Rex clearly 
understood that in the first category of cases, no matter how much 
pressure he might have gotten from within the Justice Department 
or elsewhere, he understood what his role was. I think we have to 
distinguish, though, between that category of cases and the second 
category of cases, which was really—although it got all the publicity 
during our four years—in many respects a small percentage of our 
daily workload. 
 
Richard Wilkins: I would just add that I agree with everything 
that Ken said. My remarks were aimed more at the, what he calls, the 
category-two cases. I know for a fact that it was anguish for Rex to 
argue Garcia because he taught me constitutional law. I remember 
him enthusing about National League of Cities v. Usery in class—
about how this was the best decision of the Supreme Court in fifty 
years. And then as solicitor general he was faced with the task of 
arguing to reverse National League of Cities v. Usery, and he did. He 
did so very, very well. And I remember being in his office late at 
night one night just talking about that case and he said, “You know, 
it’s kind of ironic, isn’t it, Richard?” 
 
 68. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 69. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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Michael McConnell: Am I misremembering? I could have 
sworn that the resolution of this—one of the biggest federalism 
controversies of our time—is that the position that Rex argued was 
that the federal government should prevail but should prevail under 
the rule of National League of Cities v. Usery, rather than by 
overruling that decision. It was a position, by the way, which no 
member of the Supreme Court—not one justice—bought. They split 
five to four, with five of them overruling National League of Cities v. 
Usery and the other four dissenting and saying that the federal 
government should have lost. It was, I think, a very interesting case 
to think about in terms of both jurisprudence and lawyerly strategy 
because it presented such an array of possible positions. The heart of 
the problem, and I had not known what an enthusiast Rex may have 
been for National League of Cities, but the heart of the problem was 
that National League of Cities was itself a very ill-thought-through 
opinion. Even if you agree, as I do, with the fundamental federalism 
thrust of it, the actual doctrinal superstructure of the opinion made 
very little sense. It was indeed paradoxical. I do not mean from a 
left-right or federalism or anti-federalism point of view. I just mean it 
was not a very well constructed opinion. Nonetheless, National 
League of Cities was an icon, in a sense, of federalism, so you could 
not quite attack it. So, Rex was in a doubly difficult position.  
The ideal thing would have been to be able to file a brief that 
would help the Court to reformulate the National League of Cities 
doctrine in a way which would have retained its solid core. 
Unfortunately, the facts of that particular case did not lend 
themselves very well to an intelligent reformulation, because if there 
was a case where the federal government should lose under National 
League of Cities, it was probably that case.  
 
Kenneth Geller: I can remember a lot of meetings. You might 
have been involved in them, Mike. I know Ted Olson was involved 
in some of them as head of the OLC [Office of Legal Counsel], 
involving what position we should take. There seemed to be 
unanimity that we should not ask that National League of Cities be 
overruled. It was not so clear what position we should take that 
would defend the statute in the context of this transit authority. Rex 
had to decide between making an argument that Congress could not 
regulate core governmental functions, as I recall, or another 
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argument that was being put forward, which went off on a 
government/proprietary distinction, which some people found much 
too slippery. But you are right. Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
it could not work its way out of that box without overruling 
National League of Cities. Rex, I think, to a large extent, submerged 
his personal views because he understood what the government’s 
interest was there. 
 
Michael McConnell: But I wanted also to put some of the 
comments here into a bit of an historical comparative perspective. All 
three of the speakers so far have commented on the phenomenon 
that the career lawyers were stigmatized as not loyal; that briefs that 
were being filed were tactically very ineffective, and that there was a 
heightened sense of politicization. I think, “Where have we heard 
this before?” 
There is a wonderful, recent book by a legal historian named 
Barry Cushman, called Rethinking the New Deal Court.70 As most of 
you probably know, there is a standard story about the changes in 
constitutional doctrine at the height of the New Deal. And the 
standard story goes something like this: You had a bad, old 
conservative Court. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president. 
The Court strikes down a lot of New Deal legislation. Roosevelt 
proposes adding a bunch of new justices, instead of nine. Then one 
justice, Owen Roberts, switches his votes in order to avoid that: the 
famous switch in time that saved nine. And the rest is history. Well, 
Cushman argues that in almost every respect this was erroneous. 
This was a myth. This is simply not what happened. 
An interesting part of the book from our point of view is that the 
author gives a detailed account of what was going on in the Solicitor 
General’s Office, part of the story that we never ordinarily even talk 
about. In particular, he notes this phenomenon that the new 
Roosevelt people who came in did not pay much attention to the 
professional advice they were given from the lawyers who were 
holdovers. I am referring to the briefs filed under Solicitor General 
Homer Cummings, the first of the Roosevelt solicitors general. They 
filed a number of briefs which were in fact not very effective. What 
Cushman argues is that a major reason for the greater success of the 
 
 70. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). 
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Roosevelt legal strategy a few years into it is simply that they started 
writing tactically more effective briefs—briefs that got you to the 
same place but did it in a way which would enable the court to get 
there without, for example, having to confess error all the time. 
Now, eventually once Roosevelt and Truman named the entire 
court, the Justices were confessing error all over the place. But, for a 
few years there, it was important to be smart and not just to have the 
votes. 
It just strikes me that this is much the process that was going on 
in the office during our time; there was a lot of suspicion about 
professional advice. And by the way, I sympathize a lot with the 
administration’s stalwarts who felt suspicion. They come in and they 
talk to great lawyers like Andy and Ken. And Andy and Ken are so 
smart. They can give you—I don’t care what the issue is—they can 
give you twelve reasons why you cannot do whatever it is you 
wanted to do. It is very difficult in the midst of serious legal struggle 
to tell the difference between tactical caution and irrelevant 
roadblocks. And to relate this to one institutional issue, we have 
touched upon the existence of a political deputy. I believe, correct 
me if I am wrong, that the first political deputy was under Rex and 
the first holder of that unfortunately named position was Professor 
Paul Bator of Harvard Law School, a person whose memory, I think, 
deserves perhaps as much credit and respect even as Rex’s. Paul was a 
great man and a perfect person to fill this new and controversial role. 
One reason is that Paul was someone whom the stalwarts would view 
as one of their own. Paul could say to them, “Look, this is tactically 
stupid. We have got to do it in a different way. We cannot just ask 
the court to profess error all over the place. We have got to do 
things in a different way.” When it comes from somebody that the 
stalwarts can trust, then things actually work relatively smoothly. 
And that is why I think the professionalism of the office was 
enhanced, not threatened by the addition of an expressly political 
deputy. 
 
John Garvey: Let me try to shift the focus but not the question. 
Ken Geller said that in most of the cases that come before the office, 
what the government does is the same from one administration to 
the next. There are a few cases that are politically sensitive, and the 
government might want to shift positions from one administration 
to the next. The place where you see this a lot is in the filing of 
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amicus briefs, which the Solicitor General’s Office does often. But 
even there—let me give you the example of cases about religion.  
There were many in the first Reagan administration. I think we filed 
in more than a dozen cases involving the Free Exercise Clause or the 
Establishment Clause. Some of those were of Ken’s type number 
one, the sort that are easy, roughly the same from one administration 
to the next: Should we excuse Amish from paying taxes? Should we 
enforce the unemployment insurance tax on religious schools? What 
about the Fair Labor Standards Act for religious workers? The 
government was a party in those cases. In another half dozen cases 
the government filed amicus briefs. Even in some of these it was 
pretty easy to decide what the government’s position should be. One 
was about a legislative chaplain in Nebraska. Well, the Congress also 
has a chaplain, so if Nebraska went down, Congress would probably 
go down as well. We knew where we stood on that one. Another 
involved Title I aid to parochial schools. That was a case in which we 
were a party. It had a companion case from the state of Michigan 
involving parallel state aid programs for parochial schools. It was 
pretty clear that we ought to take the same position in both cases. 
In the great majority of these cases, as Ken says, we either were 
parties taking the government’s side or filed an amicus brief asserting 
a government position of long standing. But there were a few where 
this was not true. One was Lynch v. Donnelly,71 the first crèche case. 
School prayer was a big issue in the first Reagan administration. I 
want you to think about Lynch for a minute. When the government 
files an amicus brief, the earliest section in the brief is entitled “The 
Interest of the United States.” It is a paragraph in which the Solicitor 
General’s Office is obliged to state why the government is filing—
what is our interest? This was a ticklish thing in the crèche case. 
What business does the government of the United States have filing 
about crèches or school prayer? This is an issue that Andy and I are 
divided on. 
I am going to sound like an academic, but let me ask you to 
think about four different kinds of reasons. I think they sum up the 
positions people have taken. First, you might say, the solicitor 
general ought to stay out because there is not a federal statute and 
this is the business of the states. This is a federalism argument for the 
 
 71. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). These cases deal with the constitutionality of displaying 
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SG’s Office staying out. I think this is a mistake. The reason the 
question comes up is that the Constitution of the United States has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and 
other branches of the federal government to apply to school prayer 
in 1962.72 The federal government is already regulating the states in 
this regard. If there is a problem, it is not that intervention by the 
United States upsets the balance of federalism. 
There is a second possible reason. Maybe—this is what Frank and 
Andy were talking about on the last panel—this is a separation of 
powers problem. Maybe the SG’s Office ought to stay out because 
this is the business of another branch of the federal government, in 
this case the judicial branch (though sometimes it might be Congress 
that we are deferring to). I feel about that pretty much the way 
Judge Easterbrook does. I think it might actually be good for the 
Solicitor General’s Office to get in. If the Court is already involved, 
as it is in interpreting the First Amendment, maybe they could use a 
little help. Maybe it would bring a little balance or separation to the 
various branches of the federal government. It might be good for the 
Solicitor General’s Office to think of itself as an agent of the 
executive branch (It is a part of the attorney general’s department, 
after all). But there are a couple of reasons why the office holds back. 
You have heard them from most of the lawyers who have been 
talking. 
A third reason for holding back on amicus filings is that the 
office has some fidelity, not to the United States as its client (Andy’s 
view), but to the Constitution and statutes of the United States. If 
you are not a devotee of critical legal studies, you will think that the 
Constitution and laws have a lot of meaning, and one of the things 
that ought to constrain the SG’s Office from swerving from one 
position to the next, from one administration to the next, is that it is 
bound within certain limits by the law. This is the sort of thing that 
good lawyers do. Rex sometimes felt that he had to hold back in a 
particular case because there was a long-standing interpretation of 
the law. The office has an obligation of fidelity to what the 
Constitution or the statute is saying.  You can only do so much 
within those limits. I do not want to overstate this. A lot of the 
positions we took on religion cases in 1985 that were slapped down 
by the Court, have changed now. The court now takes the position 
 
 72. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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that the Solicitor General’s Office took in the 1984 term.  So I do 
not want to overstate this argument. But that is one thing that 
constrains you. 
The fourth, and last, constraint is that it may be tactically stupid. 
The Roosevelt administration did better when it started listening to 
its lawyers. You do not want to spend the office’s capital by taking 
extreme positions that the Court is going to be angry with you 
because they are so dumb. You do not want to jeopardize the next 
brief you file because the Court will think you said something stupid 
the last time. I do think that there are reasons for restraint. But I am 
not above seeing the office take political positions from one 
administration to the next. 
 
Andrew Frey: My views may be in the minority in this, but the 
question that I ask is, what is the legitimacy of government 
involvement when the question involves an issue like school prayer? I 
do not believe the fact that the First Amendment bears on that 
question means that it is the federal government’s business. It seems 
to me whether or not there may permissibly be school prayer is 
between the students, the schools, and the Supreme Court. That is 
my personal view. Now, the issue is an important issue. It is an issue 
on which solicitors general and presidents and attorneys general may 
have strongly held views. And, as I think is obvious to everybody, the 
views will be very different from one administration to the next. In a 
case like Wallace v. Jaffree,73 which was the Alabama school prayer 
case, it is perfectly clear that in the Carter administration if a brief 
had been filed, if this issue would have come up, it would have said 
that it violates the Establishment Clause. The Reagan administration, 
you know, would like to say that it is perfectly all right. The Clinton 
administration would go back. The question in my mind is: if there is 
not an anchor in the institutional interests, needs, and responsibilities 
of the federal government, then is it right to use the Solicitor  
General’s Office as a bully pulpit for what, I view, is essentially the 
personal views of the people who happen to hold office at the time? 
Now, it is true that in a democracy these are issues that are also 
politically important and they are among the issues that the voters 
think about and the candidates take positions on. One can well say, 
and I think maybe the majority of the people would say, that the 
 
 73. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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president got elected on a platform. The platform, if it includes 
school prayer or whatever, it is his right to get up there before the 
Supreme Court and try to persuade them to adopt that position. 
That does not happen to be my view. Now, I don’t know whether 
Michael will care to comment on this. 
 
Michael McConnell: I do want to talk a little bit about Wallace 
v. Jaffree because I think it was a really interesting case to have gone 
through and one of the first of the series of religion cases in the 
court during that time that I worked on. I am a little bit unsure 
whether or not to agree with Andy on the propriety of filing a brief 
at all. I suppose one can construct an argument that the federal 
government, the Solicitor General’s Office, should simply keep out 
of issues where there is not some sort of an institutional or agency 
involvement. I have been surprised, for example, in teaching Baker v. 
Carr,74 certainly one of the most important cases in modern 
constitutional history, to find out that the solicitor general was not 
heard from in that case. That seems a little odd. Today we would 
fully expect that the solicitor general would be filing a brief in a case 
of that magnitude. It is also true that the United States has 
institutional interests in many issues that may sound as if they are just 
state matters. There is, after all, the District of Columbia, which has 
schools. There are military schools. All of these have to decide what 
their position is going to be on issues of school prayer. I do not find 
these overwhelming arguments but I think that it may be at least 
legitimate. Fundamentally, I guess, as the Supreme Court becomes a 
decision maker in more and more matters of practice as to which the 
people of the United States care deeply, well, of course the political 
branches are going to find a way to participate. Maybe Andy is right 
that they should not, but it would be very odd. It is not at all 
surprising that it has become the practice of the Department of 
Justice to express its views. 
But I wanted to talk about Jaffree as an example of a case where 
I think that the office walked a very narrow line, almost successfully, 
in the presence of major league landmines. This is a case that 
involved three statutes that were passed by the Alabama legislature. 
One of them required the recitation of a particular prayer, which I 
gather was drafted by the governor’s son. And a second statute—
 
 74. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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actually I am forgetting now [what] the second statute is—and the 
third statute instituting a moment of silence. [The second statute] is 
a Biblical passage, Richard reminds me. There was already an old 
moment of silence law on the books in Alabama. This particular case 
involved a new one. Basically, they were running school prayer up 
the flagpole in every way that they possibly could and to the great 
political enjoyment of the good folks of Alabama. Anyway, the case 
then went before Judge Brevard Hand in Alabama. I cannot resist 
pointing out that in some circles he became known as Judge 
Unlearned Hand. But he wrote an opinion which was exceedingly 
inflammatory.75 Namely, he held that the state of Alabama was 
entitled to have these statutes, not because school prayer comports 
with the First Amendment—that was not his argument. His 
argument was it is because the Bill of Rights does not apply to the 
states. Now, some people laugh at that. But this is in fact one of 
those hoary chestnuts of constitutional history, though it was 
decided by the Supreme Court fifty years ago. I never teach my 
constitutional law class without spending some time on the question 
of whether the Bill of Rights is in fact incorporated against the states. 
I am persuaded the other way, but there are serious and substantial 
arguments on Judge Hand’s side. In fact, Judge Hand wrote an 
extraordinarily long, scholarly, interesting opinion. John Garvey and 
I have excerpted it in our Religion and the Constitution casebook.76  
The Eleventh Circuit reverses unanimously, summarily, and I 
believe even without opinion.77 The state of Alabama then appeals. 
And at this point, it is an appeal (not certiorari) because we still have 
the jurisdictional statute authorizing an appeal when a state law was 
struck down as unconstitutional. Moreover, the case is coming up just 
when President Reagan has endorsed the school prayer amendment. 
So, this is a huge school prayer case about something where our 
president was taking a position that the Constitution needed to be 
amended. What do we lawyers do under the circumstance? Well, I will 
tell you what we did and you can judge for yourself the quality of our 
lawyering and loyalty to the Republic and so forth. 
We filed a brief saying that the Supreme Court should summarily 
affirm the decision without argument on the two statutes, the Bible 
 
 75. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). 
 76. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002). 
 77. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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passage and the spoken prayer, and thus not even hear argument on 
the question of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. That was 
settled. But we latched onto the third statute and said that the Court 
should note probable jurisdiction and take full argument on the 
question of whether a moment of silence law is constitutional or not. 
This is called, in technical legal terms, “changing the subject” 
because we did not want to talk about incorporation, and we did not 
want to talk about school prayer, but we did not mind talking about 
moment of silence laws—as to which one could make a pretty 
substantial argument that they can be defended under First 
Amendment doctrine. Then we filed a brief arguing why they should 
be upheld. 
The Supreme Court struck down the statute, although on very 
odd and somewhat difficult-to-understand grounds having to do 
with the earlier statute in Alabama. Essentially, the Court held that 
the existence of the earlier statute, along with some post-enactment 
testimony from the bill’s sponsor, proved that this statute had no 
secular purpose. But the opinion carried the strong implication that 
moment of silence laws in general might be constitutional if they do 
not have this peculiar Alabama context. I think what we were trying 
to do is not completely abandon a cause which the president had 
staked but also to do it in a way which could be legally responsible, 
and where we had some possibility that the Court would go along 
with us. We lost five to four—it was a close thing. 
 
Kenneth Geller: Excuse me. There is a part of that story that I 
think you left out, Michael. My recollection is that there were people 
in the Justice Department who were arguing strongly that the 
government should file a brief in the Eleventh Circuit saying that 
Judge Hand was right. 
 
Michael McConnell: Yes. 
 
Kenneth Geller: Rex [Lee] had the good sense to argue that, 
whether he was right or wrong, if these Supreme Court decisions are 
going to be reconsidered, it should be done in the Supreme Court 
and not the Eleventh Circuit, but that decision was made ultimately 
by the attorney general, who agreed with Rex. I would say that there 
were probably more decisions about what position to take that were 
made in the Attorney General’s Office during that four-year period 
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than in the prior history of the Solicitor General’s Office. And that 
certainly was one of them. 
 
Michael McConnell: May I talk about another one, which I 
think was rather an interesting case from another area of law and 
which presents the question of politics versus constitutional law. And 
when I say “politics,” we have been talking about ideology so far—
philosophy—but this was a case that actually involved politics, 
namely, political gerrymandering. A case had come up out of Indiana 
where the Republican Party had taken over all branches of 
government in Indiana and had gerrymandered the state legislature 
to its advantage. The constitutionality of political gerrymandering 
was thus teed up for a Supreme Court decision.78 Everyone knew 
two things about this case. One is that if you looked nationwide, 
political gerrymandering tended to hurt the Republicans and help 
the Democrats. Thus, it was in the long-term political interest of the 
party in power to have the Supreme Court strike down political 
gerrymandering. The second thing that everybody knew is that 
because this was a case that came up in the context of a Republican 
gerrymander, there was nice cover. That is, it would look as though 
we were being against the narrow partisan interest of the Republican 
party. Wow! What a great setup, right?—to be able to advance your 
long-term interests while looking as though you’re very 
statesmanlike and defending the rights of the other side. Well, to 
make a long story short, the ultimate decision was not to file a brief, 
because the case was too political. I think that was both the right and 
the wise thing to do. 
 
 
 
 78. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev’d by Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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Bush Panel 
 
Kenneth W. Starr: Solicitor General, 1989–1993. 
 
John G. Roberts: Deputy Solicitor General, 1989–1993. 
 
Maureen Mahoney: Deputy Solicitor General, 1991–1993. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Thank you very much. Let me join in paying 
tribute to the memory of Rex Lee, a dear friend to so many of us in 
the room and a treasured colleague. It was my privilege and honor to 
serve as two-term member of the board of visitors of the J. Reuben 
Clark School of Law as Rex took his leave from Washington, took 
his partnership at Sidley & Austin, [and] a chaired professorship here 
before ascending to the presidency of the university. Reese 
[Hansen], it is good to be back. So, thank you. 
Well, it has been wisely observed that the great events of 
humanity, the great tide of human events, do not pass judges by. I 
think the prior panel discussion suggests as much with respect to not 
only judges, but also the Justice Department’s, if I may say so, top 
lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office. And just as now, the 
Solicitor General’s Office is being called upon—and perhaps we will 
hear about this in the fullness of time during these proceedings, to 
focus upon legal issues flowing out of the events of 9/11—so too, 
each new administration and each new solicitor general, even in an 
incumbent administration, has its own context shaped typically 
rather early in the administration’s life. And so I think it has made 
good sense for the organizers of this conference to have the unifying 
principle, organizing principle, of “let’s look at this administration by 
administration in four-year terms tied to presidential elections.” So I 
think it should be. And I think our comments this afternoon 
concerning the Bush administration, and I would say, “President 
Bush the Forty-first,” by way of clarification. Some say, “George the 
First”; I resent that and object to it. But concerning the Bush 
administration, I think we will mirror that context within which we 
found ourselves. I think this audience in particular already 
understands—many, of course, are grizzled veterans of the  office—
that the broad currents of the  office’s work continue without fanfare 
in the daily flow of work going without notice. The grist for the 
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daily mill simply attracts no attention at all, and I hope we can focus 
a little bit of attention on that as well as some of the more electric 
issues that do arrest the attention of the New York Times and other 
publications. 
But this reality of daily SG life was captured, and it was 
emblazoned firmly in my memory early on, in the Reagan 
administration, the first Reagan administration about which we have 
just heard. John [Roberts] and I were privileged to serve as lawyers 
on the personal staff of Attorney General William French Smith, my 
mentor and law partner for a brief period and law partner of Ted 
Olson, our solicitor general. Bill Smith, the attorney general, loved 
the attorney general’s dining room, and he used that dining room 
essentially as what I suppose the management consultants would call 
a “management information device.” A lot of business was 
conducted over lunch there quite informally. When Rex came on 
board, he was on board at first as a consultant, but then, after the 
confirmation process because Judge McCree remained in office by 
the decision of the attorney general to finish out the term of court, 
the attorney general invited Rex and his deputies, some of whom are 
in the room today, for a get-to-know-you gathering and everyone 
reported quite agreeably on items of interest. Then, we came to a 
slightly enigmatic deputy solicitor general, Lewis Claiborne. And I 
will remember always, I think, when it came his turn, Louie with a 
cigarette—one could smoke in those days, and Louie avidly did 
indulge in that habit or should say addiction, as some may say—
[would say], “I have nothing.” And he had an unusual way of 
speaking, “I have nothing that should arrest the attention of the 
attorney general.” Well, I thought it was a pretty kind of odd way of 
talking, and I understood that at least at that time we were no longer 
in a crisis mode. President Reagan had in fact survived John 
Hinckley’s assassination attempt. We were working quietly at the 
time on a Supreme Court nomination. But it was not that Louie’s 
perception was that the attorney general is just too busy to hear what 
he had in mind. And in fact, I am sure Louie was an experienced 
veteran of the  office at the time and was there for many years of 
total service and quite distinguished service. [He] knew full well that 
one of the joys of being a cabinet officer is that you more or less set 
your own schedule. It is not like being the SG. Being the AG is a lot 
of fun. You just kind of get to decide what you want to do unless—
9/11 kind of ruined that. Otherwise, it is a lovely job. The point is 
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there was, in Louie’s considered view, nothing on his very significant 
agenda that merited the focus of the attorney general of the United 
States. So there was no contempt citation; the conversation went on. 
So, above all, even though we will, of course, naturally focus on 
those huge issues that get the attention. But it does need to be said 
for clarity of the record that the work of the  office is 
overwhelmingly, satisfyingly, deeply professional and deliciously 
nonpolitical. It is lawyers’ work at a law office. But we will be 
flagging some of the hot issues I am sure. So before turning the 
discussion over to my dear friends and former colleagues, Maureen 
[Mahoney] and John [Roberts], I do want to make, then, one brief 
contextual point to set the stage. We served in the wake of that last 
year of the Reagan administration and although we were to see on 
our watch the decidedly extra-legal developments of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Panama invasion, Desert Storm, and the like—these 
great moments of enduring significance—the perception was that the 
presidency had been badly weakened during the last two years of the 
Reagan administration in 1987 and 1988 obviously beyond the 
compass of the Solicitor General’s Office and the Justice 
Department. But in the great tide of events, and in the great and 
enduring struggle in our separated power system so wonderfully 
memorably chronicled by Mr. Madison and others (Federalist 47 and 
the like),79 the president had been on the losing end of the 
proposition, it was thought. Some reasons were obvious. 
President Reagan’s party lost control of the Senate. It is always 
nice, I am sure presidents think, to have control of both Houses, but 
especially the Senate. And it seemed that controversy was dogging 
the administration at just every turn. Iran Contra continued. There 
were hearings on the Hill. Judge Walsh’s investigation—[and] we all 
know that independent counsel investigations spiral wildly out of 
control and last forever. There was also the failed nomination of 
Robert Bork. The Supreme Court’s unfortunate, and many of us 
thought profoundly misguided, decision in Morrison v. Olson.80 The 
statute had been struck down wisely by the D.C. Circuit but then 
overturned in a very odd opinion by Chief Judge Rehnquist, 
overruling in a very ipse dixit fashion Humphrey’s Executor81 among 
 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 80. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 81. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) 
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other worthy cases. There were also continuing controversies 
surrounding the attorney general himself. On and on the list went, 
and so it was against this backdrop that my one and only trip to the 
White House during the Bush administration having to do with a 
purely legal issue [took place]. The concern was separation of powers 
and the diminution in the authority of the presidency in our system 
of separated powers. 
I was invited over by Boyden Gray, whom I knew well, who had 
served with great distinction as counsel to Vice President George 
Bush for eight years and was now quite appropriately serving as 
counsel to the president. The conversation was fairly brief. It was 
pleasant. It was businesslike. Boyden made it absolutely clear that the 
president was deeply concerned about separation of powers issues 
and the erosion of presidential powers. Reference [was] made to the 
War Powers Act82 as being just an example, then, we needed to be 
mindful of that in the course of our daily labors in our stewardship in 
the Justice Department. And that was it. Pleasantries, but that was it. 
And other than a conversation almost four years later concerning the 
Boston Harbor case,83 which Maureen will mention, my subsequent 
visits over to the White House, and there were many, had to do 
entirely with a non-case related project, which also yields up insights 
about what the Solicitor General’s Office has to do, namely “other 
duties as they may be assigned.”84 Return to the statute creating the 
solicitor generalship itself and one will see that one’s job is solely to 
assist the attorney general. There is a connection made at the 
founding in 1870 with the Attorney General’s Office itself and the 
SG’s Office. But my little project was the civil justice reform initiative 
led by Vice President Quail. So there had been no marching orders, 
no directives, just a sensible and very heartfelt statement of 
presidential concern—nothing else to “arrest the attention” of the 
solicitor general, so to speak, from the White House. 
 
Maureen Mahoney: I served in the office from June of 1991 
until May of 1993, which was a particularly interesting period of 
time because it spanned the presidential election and the change of 
administration. I stayed on when these guys left. So, I am going to 
 
 82. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 
 83. See Building & Const. Trade Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & 
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993). 
 84. An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
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relate the stories of two cases that became entangled in the election 
politics so you can see sort of how they played out and how the 
office works. The first one is the Haitian refugee litigation.85 I think 
some of you were probably about ten when this was going on, so I 
will give you some background. But it really illustrates the issues that 
can arise when, as in that case, we had filed the briefs on the merits 
[and] the administration changed before the argument was to 
occur—what happens in those circumstances? But it is also an 
important case to talk about, or useful case to talk about, because it 
illustrates the tremendous breadth of responsibility that the Solicitor 
General’s Office assumes in cases of very substantial national 
importance, and it was a crisis at the time. 
In September of 1991, there was a military coup in Haiti. Over 
the course of the next six months more than 35,000 Haitians left 
Haiti to come to the United States, seeking to enter the country 
illegally by getting into really unseaworthy crafts and trying to cross 
the 600 miles of the ocean. The Coast Guard’s most sacred mission 
is to save people in peril on the seas, but they were overwhelmed 
with the number of people who were coming from Haiti, and many 
people died during that period. The administration had to decide 
what it was going to do, and it made the choice that it needed to 
interdict the vessels and return them to Haiti—both the vessels and 
the people—in order to try to stop the outflow. Initially, what 
happened was they were doing asylum processing, and that is the 
process where you try to determine whether or not the person 
fleeing the country has reason to fear political persecution such that 
they might be eligible for asylum in the United States. They tried to 
do it on Coast Guard cutters. They tried to do it in Guantanamo, 
and it was not long before there were 12,500 Haitians at 
Guantanamo awaiting asylum processing, and they just kept coming 
and people were dying. So the administration made the judgment 
that it could no longer do the asylum processing on the cutters or in 
Guantanamo, that it would have to do this at the embassies or 
through the embassy in Haiti. So, they began to interdict these 
vessels [and] take them straight back to Haiti, and naturally litigation 
ensued. 
The key issues in the cases, which were filed both ultimately in 
Florida and later in New York, were whether or not this policy was 
 
 85. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
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lawful, whether or not the Immigration and Nationality Act86 
required asylum processing before you could return someone, or 
whether the United Nations Treaty on Refugees87 required it. These 
were very, very hotly debated issues out in the public during that 
period of time. 
The important thing about the  office’s role was that Judge Starr 
did not wait for the case to come up to the Supreme Court. He 
instead immediately assumed responsibility for the overall 
management of the litigation and supervised a team of lawyers that 
consisted of lawyers from the Office of the Solicitor General, from 
the Office of the Attorney General, from the Department of 
Transportation, Civil Appellate—across the administration. And the 
resources we expended over the next eighteen months were 
substantial. We handled the case just like you know the cases were 
handled in the district court. We literally interviewed witnesses. We 
prepared affidavits. We assisted in every phase of the case, and Judge 
Starr actually went to the district court in Miami, to the district court 
in New York, to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, [to] 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and personally argued 
the issue every time that it arose. Essentially, the upshot of all of this 
was that he won in the Eleventh Circuit.88 They found that the 
policy was lawful; but the Second Circuit disagreed: [they] found 
that it was unlawful.89 The Supreme Court had actually granted 
several stays over the course of this time in order to allow the 
repatriations to continue, but in the fall of 1992 the Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari in the case arising out of the Second Circuit, 
where they had found the policy unlawful.90 So, now comes the 
election. This is the fall of 1992. 
As we were preparing our briefs for the Supreme Court, Bill 
Clinton was campaigning for president, and one of the things that he 
campaigned on was that this policy was illegal, a view that was shared 
by an editorial in the New York Times.91 So, this was very much an 
 
 86. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2000). 
 87. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July, 28 1951; A Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 2198, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (1966). 
 88. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 89. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 90. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 506 U.S. 814 (1992). 
 91. See, e.g., Backward Priorities on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, A1; Brutality 
Escalates in Haiti Since Coup, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992. 
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election issue. As you all know, President Bush lost his job and so 
Ken Starr did too. And that left me in the  office to begin 
preparation for an oral argument to defend a policy that had been 
condemned by the new president while he was campaigning. So, we 
were sitting there in the  office and there was not a successor at the 
time. Drew Days did not arrive until, I think, May, after the 
argument in the case had occurred. And so there was a bit of a 
vacuum of leadership, and we were kind of waiting for instructions 
but nevertheless continued on. And the White House ultimately 
decided to simply go forward not to make any changes in the policy. 
There was nothing announced. It was all just—we waited. Nothing 
happened. I went into Court, argued the issue as if there had never 
been a change of administration, and the Court upheld the legality 
of the policy in an eight to one decision.92 As it turned out, the only 
real implications of the election was that there was this tremendous 
uncertainty during this period of time. But I also want to tell one 
other anecdote about this case because it is really a testimonial to just 
the tremendous talent that is in the Solicitor General’s Office, and I 
am going to name Ed Kneedler by name because when I was 
preparing for the argument in this case, Ed, [who] was the deputy 
there now and has been there for many, many years, said to me, 
“Well, Maureen, do you think you should go to Haiti because 
Justice Blackmun is going to ask you if you have ever been there?” 
And I said, “Oh, Ed, I do not need to go to Haiti. I can handle the 
argument without going to Haiti.” But sure enough, just as Ed 
predicted, Justice Blackmun asked me if I had ever been to Haiti. 
But even Ed is not omniscient because he did not tell me—he did 
not predict that Justice Blackmun would ask me whether or not I 
had read The Comedians,93 a novel by Graham Greene that concerns 
Haiti. I had to confess ignorance and Vanity Fair essentially took me 
to task and said I ought to read it. So, the moral of the story—you 
thought it was about election politics—it is really that if you want to 
be really prepared for arguments in the Supreme Court, you have got 
to read a lot of fiction. 
A second case that became entangled in election politics was the 
Boston Harbor case.94 The issue there was whether or not the state 
 
 92. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (J. Blackmun was 
the lone dissent). 
 93. GRAHAM GREENE, THE COMEDIANS (1966). 
 94. See Building & Const. Trade Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & 
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of Massachusetts had the authority to enter into contracts which 
provided for union only labor. This was a $6.1 billion construction 
project to clean up the Boston Harbor. The issue landed in the SG’s 
Office in the spring of 1992 because the Supreme Court asked for 
the views of the solicitor general. I do not know if you are all familiar 
with that process, but we were not volunteers on this issue in an 
election year. The Court asked for our views, and when the Court 
does that the solicitor general needs to respond.  
And the case came in. We looked at the issues. Labor 
management relations’ issues are obviously politically charged many 
times. It is certainly no secret that Republicans tend to be more 
allied with management interests than with unionist interests. In this 
case, the issues really looked to be pretty straightforward, pretty 
clear-cut. The state was acting in a proprietary capacity. They had 
determined that they really needed to prevent strikes over the course 
of this project, that they were getting a ten-year no strike clause, and 
that they could enter into this arrangement because after all private 
parties could enter this arrangement and they were not asserting any 
authority to regulate labor management relations. So, we filed a brief 
that said that the state’s authority was not preempted; that it was 
acting lawfully. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, and that 
is when the firestorm began. 
According to an article published by the Legal Times,95 the 
associated builders and contractors sent letters to the White House 
demanding that the brief be pulled. And in July of 1992, the 
Association of Builders and Contractors adopted a resolution that 
said they would not support the reelection campaign of President 
Bush “unless the administration position changes with regard to 
Boston Harbor.”96 The White House apparently told them that it 
would not pull the brief, but instead they did adopt an executive 
order, which provided that, at least at the federal level for federal 
contracts, such union-only clauses would be prohibited.97 That then 
prompted the associated contractors to file a supplemental brief in 
the Supreme Court right before the argument saying that this 
executive order contradicted the position of the solicitor general. At 
 
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993). 
 95. See Tony Mauro, Builder’s Lobbying Even Targeted SG’s Brief, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 
1993, at 8. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Apr. 14, 1992). 
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argument, Justice White asked this question, you know, “what did 
this mean?” and I was able to respond by saying that it really had no 
impact on the case because it did not purport to affect contracts that 
had been entered into by the states in the past, which was accurate. 
Fortunately the Court did rule unanimously that the state had acted 
lawfully. It was not a close question. There was not a single vote that 
went the other way.98 And in the end, the election had no impact 
because the issue really was, I think, just too clear-cut. But I think 
that one of the things that was really interesting about this was that 
Judge Starr had managed these events in a way that caused him to 
earn the following praise from The Legal Times in its report of the 
case: “Starr held his ground while political events swirled around 
him—a final testimony to Starr’s integrity and to the independence 
of the Solicitor General’s Office.”99 Amen. John’s turn. 
 
Kenneth Starr: And, as John reminded me, we lost the election. 
 
Maureen Mahoney: But we won the case. We are lawyers, and 
we won the case. 
 
John Roberts: I would like to begin by echoing all the kind 
things that people have said about Rex Lee as a friend and as a 
colleague. He was both of those to me, if a young callow lawyer in 
the department can be presumptuous enough to call himself a 
colleague of the solicitor general. And Rex was particularly kind and 
gracious, I thought, in dealing with those of us who were young and 
inexperienced. But no one has yet talked about him as an adversary 
and I can do that. 
In 1994, I argued a case in the Supreme Court against General 
Lee, as I always called him and as he liked to be called.100 With the 
foresight that I might someday be speaking at a symposium in honor 
of Rex Lee, I had the graciousness to lose nine to nothing. But the 
argument was revealing. I was the petitioner. I got up first. It was 
immediately apparent from the questioning that there were three 
independent grounds on which the Court was going to rule against 
me unanimously, and they proceeded to beat me over the head for a 
 
 98. See Building & Const. Trade Council, 507 U.S. at 220. 
 99. Mauro, supra note 95, at 8. 
 100. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994). 
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half hour. I staggered to my seat and then Rex got up. And early on 
into his argument, Justice O’Connor—in a very uncharacteristic 
burst of cruelty—asked Rex Lee why he had neglected to raise a 
fourth argument which would also be a winning argument. Rex 
turned and looked down at me, literally and figuratively, and, with a 
wink that I am sure was perceptible only to me, said something to 
the effect that he did not want to be accused of piling on. So Rex, 
among other things, was a very gracious winner. I would like to be 
able to tell a story about him being a gracious loser, but 
unfortunately I never did beat him in a case. 
One thing you can perhaps discern from some of the 
presentations is that everyone who has served in the Office of the 
Solicitor General agrees that the office enjoyed a golden age roughly 
corresponding to the time that they were in the Office of the 
Solicitor General. One of the innovations that has attracted a lot of 
attention was the development of the so-called, and I emphasize 
“so-called,” position of the “political deputy.” Those of us who have 
held that position prefer its official title, which is “principal deputy 
solicitor general,” not “political deputy,” because “political” 
conveys, I think, a very inaccurate impression of what the job entails. 
I think Mike McConnell really did hit the nail on the head in 
describing the function of the office and the way in which it 
promotes rather than undermines the traditional institutional 
independence of the Office of the Solicitor General. The only 
respects in which my role as the principal or political deputy, that I 
was aware of performing that role, was in handling requests—
inquiries from the Attorney General’s Office, through the Attorney 
General’s Office, from the White House, from other parts of the 
department to the effect of “what in the world are you people doing 
over there in this case?” It was my job, I thought, to explain to this 
person that although this particular position—for example Maureen 
mentioned the Boston Harbor case—may be causing you some 
political heartburn, here is why we have to do it: it is compelled by 
our obligation to represent long-standing institutional interests of 
the United States. It is being handled correctly and professionally. 
This is not a case in which holdovers from another administration are 
implementing their political agenda. And in every case of which I am 
aware, that was enough to calm down whoever had gotten 
sufficiently agitated to pick up the phone and call. 
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I viewed it as my function, in other words, to provide insulation 
from political pressure to the career people, and also to a certain 
degree to the solicitor general. These are people who would have 
been concerned that a call to the career lawyer in the office handling 
the case might be misperceived as political pressure. Asking the 
lawyer, “please explain why you are taking this position”—it is a call 
originating from the White House and from the Attorney General’s 
Office—and that can be readily misperceived by a career lawyer. I 
would like to think that as a result of the establishment of the office 
of principal deputy, which turns over with the solicitor general, that 
those types of inquiries that might be misperceived do not happen. 
Those of you who are familiar with other agencies of the 
government might get the wrong idea when people talk about a 
political deputy. It was very important to the correct acceptance of 
that position, I think, that it not be what a political deputy is in 
many other agencies, which is sort of someone who is also 
supervising the entire work of the office and implementing priorities 
and policies across the board. As the principal deputy, I had a docket 
just like the other deputies and was expected to be responsible for it 
and did, you know, my share of all of the work of the office. I did 
not supervise, for example, the work of the other deputies. That was 
directly supervised by the solicitor general. I think that attributed to 
a large degree to the acceptance of the position in the office. And 
again, I agree with Michael’s earlier comments. The biggest 
challenge for those of us who have held office has been trying to live 
up to a standard set by Paul Bator as the first incumbent. 
On the issue of the controversial cases that create some division 
in the office, what impressed me the most coming into the office was 
how controversial the “non-hot button” cases could be within the 
government, and how almost every one of the cases generated some 
degree of controversy. I was surprised about the degree of 
disagreement throughout the executive branch in a wide variety of 
cases. I remember a case coming across my desk that I recall as 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.101 I am looking at that and said, “Well, how can that 
be? They are on the same team. They cannot be against each other.” 
 
 101. The case was actually captioned Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990), but the CFTC and SEC had filed dueling 
briefs, taking opposing positions in the Court of Appeals. 
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And, of course, both of them were knocking on our door and saying, 
“You are our lawyer now in the Supreme Court.” One is saying file a 
certiorari petition and the other is saying oppose a certiorari petition. 
That was resolved by holding, and this was typical, a series of 
interminable meetings with all interested parties that looked like 
nothing so much as Thanksgiving dinner at a dysfunctional family 
because—as you rapidly find out—these agencies have a long history 
of sort of squabbling with each other and now they are—it is wrong 
to view it this way, but—before their parents and the parents are 
going to decide which one gets punished and which one gets 
rewarded. I have always been a little surprised at the prominence of 
the office in resolving those types of decisions. 
The president is the chief executive, but so many intra-executive 
branch disputes end up in the Solicitor General’s Office and were 
resolved by the solicitor general saying, “Well, this is the position we 
are going to take before the Supreme Court” and that became the 
executive branch position. And again, I think it is a surprising 
development that the office has that authority. I remember in 
particular—and by focusing on this case I do not want you to think 
that I lose all the cases that I argue in the Supreme Court—but there 
was a dispute that was captioned Resolution Trust Corporation v. 
Internal Revenue Service—again two players I thought were on the 
same team.102 It involved a very complicated thing called a mortgage 
swap deal that the regulatory agency had set up to allow failing 
S & Ls to take huge tax deductions without recognizing any loss on 
their books and thereby allow them to continue to exist. And the 
IRS was not buying it. They thought this was ridiculous, following 
Judge Friedman’s principle that they would reject any deduction and 
they were rejecting this. And this was a novel situation for me for a 
number of reasons. One, Ken [Starr] was recused. He had adopted a 
very aggressive recusal policy for cases coming out of the D.C. 
Circuit. Ken had been a judge on the court, of course, and 
remarkably to me after having reached that pinnacle of the legal 
profession had decided to resign to become solicitor general. He was 
recused from this case, so I was the acting solicitor general. And I 
basically got to decide which side of this case I wanted to be on. The 
people from the regulatory agency said, “You should take our side.” 
 
 102. See United States v. Centennial Savs. Bank (Resolution Trust Corporation, 
Receiver), 499 U.S. 573 (1991); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 544 (1991). 
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The people from the IRS came in and said, “You should take our 
side.” I sided with the IRS and lost ignominiously. So, it is one of 
those rare cases when you get to choose your side, and I still made 
the wrong decision. But I did what I had occasion to do on a couple 
of other occasions, which is I filed a brief for the Internal Revenue 
Service and then authorized the opposing regulatory agency to 
participate in the Supreme Court through their own attorneys, which 
they did. I did not know they were going to get such good 
attorneys, but that allowed the case to be presented to the Court. I 
did not feel that the exercise of an authority to say to the regulatory 
agency that you may not take your case to the Supreme Court was 
appropriate in this situation largely because, as you might imagine, 
on both sides of the case there were private interests involved and I 
thought it was best for that agency to present its view when I had 
decided to side with the other agency. That was a particularly 
dramatic example of the phenomenon, but it is, I thought, 
extraordinarily typical. 
Somewhere earlier, I guess, Andy [Frey] had mentioned the 
prisoner cases. I did the argument in the case of Hudson v. 
McMillian,103 which established that certain brutality by prison 
guards violated the Eighth Amendment. I went back just yesterday 
and read our “statement of interest.” It is remarkable. The first 
sentence says, “The United States is interested because it prosecutes 
cases of brutality in which the civil rights of the prisoner are 
violated.” The second sentence says, “The United States is interested 
because it defends federal officials who are sued for violating civil 
rights of prisoners.” There is a delicate dance that went on 
throughout. The writing of the brief in that case was an 
extraordinarily delicate dance because this is not a situation—and 
this, I think, is one of the key differences between the private sector 
and the Solicitor General’s Office—in the private sector, you want to 
win or lose and, yes, you know, your client is a little bit interested in 
what the reason is. The reasoning might affect him, but they want to 
win or lose. In the Solicitor General’s Office, you have got to call 
your shot. It is not enough to win. The Civil Division that defends 
federal prison officials would want to hear a lot more when you came 
from this case other than that we won because they are going to have 
to follow the rule of law on the other side in future cases. So you 
 
 103. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 75 
have to get the rationale right. I know that results in instructions to 
the oral advocates that make the job much more difficult than in the 
typical private case. Quite often, the instruction is: “Okay. You can 
take this position on what the brief says, but whatever you do, do 
not get into this area because that is going to cause problems. You 
cannot take a position on that question, or if you get into that, you 
have got to take a position that undermines the result you are trying 
to reach in the particular case.” The care that goes into the crafting 
of a balanced brief that is acceptable to prosecutors bringing cases 
against prison guards and to government lawyers defending prison 
guards has to carry through to the oral argument as well, which is an 
extraordinary challenge for any advocate. 
I just want to add one brief point because people have touched 
on it a number of times and Ken mentioned it as well—and that is 
the role of the  office outside of the Supreme Court. Those who 
have worked in the  office know that, I do not want to say that the 
bulk of the  office’s work, but a big chunk of it does not involve the 
Supreme Court at all. It involves authorizing appeals to a higher 
court by government agencies and government officials who have 
lost in the lower courts. Ken, when he was solicitor general, adopted 
an initiative that I thought was very valuable, which was he went to a 
number of the courts of appeal to argue cases there. The purpose of 
that, as I understood it, was to symbolically remind the court of 
appeals’ judges that every time they are seeing an appeal from a 
United States agency it is not just the losing lawyer in the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office who says, “I am going to get a second opinion.” It 
has been carefully vetted by lawyers in the office and signed off on by 
the solicitor general. I was surprised as this initiative unfolded to 
learn how many of the sitting judges were unaware of that. I think it 
was very valuable for Ken to do that. Nowadays, I do not know if as 
a result of that initiative—I do not want to say it is a tradition—but 
it is not unusual these days to see lawyers from the Office of the 
Solicitor General in district courts, as in the Haitian case,104 or in 
courts of appeal on matters of particular importance and interest, and 
I think it does send a message to those judges that this is a matter of 
particular concern to the federal government. It does sort of give a  
little bit of prominence to the work of the  office which may be the 
part of the iceberg below the surface that is not as prominent. 
 
 104. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 506 U.S. 814 (1992). 
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Kenneth Starr: Let me pick up with those comments from 
Maureen and John with observations that fall into sort of three pods, 
and very briefly on each. One, which I found to be one of the most 
rewarding aspects of service in the  office, was having the weighty 
responsibility of mounting a defense when the constitutionality of an 
act of Congress was challenged and, obviously and in particular, 
compellingly if a statute had been actually invalidated by the court of 
appeals (presumably by a court of appeals—it could be by a three-
judge court under certain circumstances, as you know). 
The one example that I would offer up to show again the 
delicacy of the relationships between the branches and thus one of 
my recurring themes during my period of service in that wonderful  
office, [are], namely, separation of powers concerns and values which 
were so important to the Founding Generation, but by virtue of the 
constitutional rights revolution we have tended in the legal 
community to be much more focused on the Bill of Rights—and [it 
is] terribly important—but somewhat neglectful of the structural 
principles that were so important at the Founding. In this particular 
episode, quite familiar to most Americans, the Supreme Court of the 
United States had invalidated Texas’s particular statute, a flag 
desecration statute in the case of Texas v. Johnson.105 The upshot of 
that five to four decision was one understandably of public concern 
and dismay. Congress was deeply distressed that the flag could be 
desecrated without some sort of legal protection, and there were 
really thoughtful views given over to how, if at all, Congress could in 
fact pass a federal statute that would protect the flag. Hearings were 
held. The administration, and we were newly in office at that time in 
1989, through the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, which 
provides, as I think everyone knows by now, constitutional advice 
among its other functions to the attorney general and to the 
president. And so through our colleague down the hall on the fifth 
floor, Bill Barr—destined to be deputy attorney general and then the 
attorney general during the Bush administration—the administration 
testified that a statutory amendment or a statutory solution would 
simply be inefficacious in light of the breadth of the Texas v. Johnson 
opinion. But in any event, Congress sought to pass, and it was duly 
enacted, the Flag Protection Act of 1989.106 It was very promptly 
 
 105. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1990). The Act has not been repealed, but United States v. 
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challenged and there was an expedited review proceeding to the 
Supreme Court, bypassing the court of appeals entirely in a particular 
mechanism passed by Congress.107 
So, with that backdrop, it was now teed up and the issue was, 
“Well, we have been enforcing the statute or seeking to enforce the 
statute. Now do we defend it in the Supreme Court in light of the 
testimony of Bill Barr down the hall?” And we did not struggle with 
the issue even though a very serious academic and a very respected 
First Amendment scholar thoughtfully suggested that we should 
simply do the equivalent of a confession of error. We had not 
secured a judgment. Both district courts had struck down the statute 
as unconstitutional, but we should essentially decline to defend it. 
We did not struggle at all in the  office and there was no political 
dimension of it at all because of our understood duty to defend the 
Justice Department’s duty, and then it fell to us in the Supreme 
Court to defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress if it could 
in fact be defended and if it did not trench upon separation of 
powers concerns, especially as to the power of the presidency. 
Pod number two. This returns or echoes my contextual point at 
the outset. A lot of the very visible work of the  office during a 
particular administration will obviously be reflecting of the 
necessities at the time as they translate into litigation. As I reflected 
in advance of these proceedings on the cases that we were called 
upon to address, they fell very substantially into issues of race. The 
enduring issue in the American polity, the dilemma—the American 
dilemma as Gunnar Myrdal put it over a half century ago108—that 
continuing dilemma translated into litigation, and indeed the first 
case I was privileged to argue, like John I lost the case, was the City 
of Yonkers109 case about the enforcement power of federal courts. I 
do not want to burden you with a litany of specific examples, other 
than I must give a Rex Lee example. Although this did not relate 
quite so specifically to the enduring issue, it nonetheless was national 
origin discrimination. This was the case of the University of 
 
Haggerty and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (consolidated before the 
Supreme Court), held that the Act was unconstitutional. 
 107. See Eichman, 496 U.S. 310. 
 108. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). 
 109. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
78 
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.110 And 
there, as part of our duty, whether we felt in our heart of hearts that 
there should be a First Amendment academic privilege, which is 
what Rex was arguing for very ably on behalf of the University of 
Pennsylvania in his capacity as a partner at Sidley & Austin, or 
whether the EEOC could in fact in the course of a discrimination 
investigation secure the tenure files there at there at the Wharton 
school. Our success in the office was bright on that particular case 
and Rex argued valiantly but unsuccessfully. But a member of this 
very audience, Lynn Wardle of the Law School, was in the audience 
for that argument in his capacity as a senior litigation counsel of the 
Civil Division, a visiting scholar. And at the end of the argument, 
Lynn without the ability of a transcript had counted the number of 
questions that were asked—and this gives a sense of the dynamic of 
the arguments themselves that the Solicitor General’s Office is 
confronted with. And Lynn said, “Do you know how many 
questions you were asked during the course of your thirty-minute, 
bottom-side presentation in the EEOC [case]?” I had no idea. And 
he said, and Lynn is here, but as I recall, it was like sixty-two or 
sixty-three questions in the space of thirty minutes. When I 
recounted that to one of our colleagues in the office, I forget who, 
the person just said, “Well, perhaps, General, if you had answered 
some of the questions, they would not have asked quite so many.” 
The third pod in addition to the large number of race-related or 
discrimination-related cases that came before us—the Mississippi 
higher education111 case brings to mind. Another case in which I 
argued on Rex’s side (and we were successful) had to do with federal 
power over school districts that a district judge, Judge Bohanon in 
Oklahoma City, had determined were in fact unitary [and] had in 
fact dismantled the prior unconstitutional segregated system.112 
I will close my remarks with the observations of the third pod, 
which are the electric issues, the social issues, and the like. And the 
one that I wanted to lift up—I could talk about Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey113 where we did argue that Roe v. Wade114 should simply be 
 
 110. 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
 111. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
 112. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 113. 505 U.S. 803 (1992). 
 114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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overruled—we viewed it as profoundly wrong. Lee v. Wiseman,115 a 
school prayer case in the context of the graduation prayer, and the 
like. But the one I wanted to say just a word about is the Nancy Beth 
Cruzan so-called “right to die” case.116 And I had not thought about 
these end of life issues seriously at all. Happily, my family had not 
been confronted at that time with any such issues. And so enjoying 
that blissful ignorance, I simply was not steeped in the area when it 
came up through the state system and the Court granted certiorari 
without CVSG-ing—“calling for the views of the solicitor general”—
we were confronted with what do we do. Do we participate in like? 
The process, which perhaps has already been described, is when the 
Court grants certiorari there is a fanning out very professionally of 
the papers throughout the far-flung reaches of the executive branch. 
And I was quite astonished to get the feedback of how many 
agencies of government, departments and agencies of government, 
were very keenly interested in the issue of right to die. I thought 
HHS might be interested but there were a legion. I am not going to 
burden the discussion with it. So it became quite obvious quite apart 
from what the right to life community might be urging upon us at a 
political level that there was this programmatic interest that was very, 
very deep and very keen. 
It became a very delicate process that John has so ably and 
brilliantly described of sorting out what the position would be. The 
brief writing itself was very delicate, as you can imagine, given the 
subject matter, given the novelty of the issue, the lack of case law. 
But our basic urging was, “Please, do not do what you did in Roe v. 
Wade,”117 which is constitutionalize this area of social policy. 
Happily, the Court has seen fit—that in the main—to say [that in] 
these burgeoning areas of morality ethics and the like of social policy 
we are going to allow the democratic process to work. But while that 
could be criticized as an agenda-type thing of “Why are you 
involved?” it just was quite striking to me throughout my tenure 
how programmatically interested the government is in so many 
different issues. 
 
 115. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 116. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 117. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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We are on time, which gives us the opportunity to actually 
invite—we were hopeful of having audience comment and 
participation. We have ten minutes? 
 
Moderator: Seven minutes. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Seven minutes. All right. Professor McConnell. 
 
Michael McConnell: This is a question for John about the case 
in which the Securities Exchange Commission—I forget the name of 
the other side. Did [the] agency that you were not siding with get to 
wear morning coats? 
 
John Roberts: No. There was a case—I am not even sure they 
got argument time because, as I said, there were private parties on 
both sides. There was a case where I authorized—the United States 
had filed papers taking a position before an agency. The agency then 
ruled against that position. The case was brought to the Supreme 
Court and I decided we would adhere to the position the United 
States had taken and authorized the agency to defend its order and 
they did not wear morning coats. I think that is reserved for 
members of the Solicitor General’s Office representing the interest of 
the United States. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Recognizing General Fried, if I may. May I just 
be allowed the courtesy of saying, I want to second John’s comment 
with respect to the institution of what I called the non-career deputy, 
the principal deputy. Charles succeeded Paul Bator, and so when you 
have this kind of remarkable academic distinction, for all of the 
reasons that were very ably stated by John, structurally, the  office 
really needed this and it became quite apparent in the first Reagan 
administration that it was a keen need. The issue was find in fact the 
right kind of person, a Charles Fried, Paul Bator, Don Ayer, and 
there have been other wonderful persons to occupy that role. 
The second thing I want to say is on the politics of it. At my own 
confirmation hearings, we were really roundly criticized, and I 
remember very vividly then-Chairman Bybee suggesting that this 
really should now be dismantled. You should not continue this. This 
was a Reagan administration initiative. You should not have a 
political deputy, and so forth. And I resisted. I said, “I respectfully 
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disagree. I think it is very important. I was present at the creation 
down the hall on the fifth floor, and so on and so forth.” So I was 
pleased to hear, at least it is my understanding, that when General 
Days assumed office (and he will obviously speak to this), but I do 
not think it became an issue, a structural issue or a political issue any 
longer and has in fact now become part and I think a salutary part of 
the traditions for the office. With apologies, Professor Fried. General 
Fried. 
 
Charles Fried: [My comment is prompted] in part by the 
discussion about wearing of morning coats. I must admit I have 
never seen anyone who was not a member of the Solicitor’s General 
Office [wearing a morning coat] except on one occasion in Davis v. 
Bandemer.118 I gather that Erwin Griswold always appeared in 
morning clothes irrespective of whom he was representing. 
I actually toyed with the idea of taking the SG’s lawyers out of 
morning clothes because it seemed to me the SG’s Office enjoyed so 
many unfair advantages over other litigants. But the word came 
down from Chief Justice Burger that they [wanted the  office to keep 
wearing morning coats]. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Tradition. Andy and then Tom. 
 
Andrew Frey: What Charles just said, which is that by and large 
the United States was represented by people from the Solicitor 
General’s Office who are experienced Supreme Court advocates, 
people who have had several or many oral arguments before the 
Supreme Court who are no longer quaking with nervousness before 
[the Court]. The other parties normally are represented by people 
who have their once-in-a-lifetime chance to be there. It is hard to 
underestimate the advantages which the United States [government 
has going into Court]. It really does help. 
 
Thomas Merrill: I had the great pleasure of serving both under 
Charles Fried and under you, [Kenneth Starr], for I believe it was 
fourteen months. And my recollection was that early in your tenure 
there were some major [storms] inside the department. But 
unquestionably the tone changed and level of tension that we heard 
 
 118. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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about during Rex Lee’s solicitor generalship and Charles’ faded. I 
was wondering what any of the three of you thought was the cause 
of that. 
 
Kenneth Starr: I am probably the least qualified to comment. 
Maureen? 
 
Maureen Mahoney: Not me. 
 
Kenneth Starr: John will probably choose not to comment 
because I think John has no views on any subject. But, John, would 
you care to comment? 
 
John Roberts: No, but of course Tom— 
 
Kenneth Starr: Charles. 
 
Charles Fried: It is very simple. You had a much more 
sympathetic Court. We had to fight for every vote. You had a Court 
where Reagan and Bush had appointed a large number of justices, so 
the tension was not there. 
 
Kenneth Starr: I do not know then why they asked us so many 
pesky questions. That is an interesting observation. 
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Reagan II Panel 
 
Charles Fried: Solicitor General, 1985–1989. 
 
Thomas W. Merrill: Deputy Solicitor General, 1987–1990. 
 
Donald B. Ayer: Deputy Solicitor General, 1986–1989. 
 
Charles Fried: Well, we thought that we would be a bit more 
informal this time and speak more briefly and leave more time for 
your comments, which will provoke us, and that would give it a 
slightly different tempo. 
I would like to begin by saying something which would make 
Tom Lee blush, and that is on the subject of the political deputy. I 
think that was, in my experience, one of the most salutary changes 
which Rex instituted and one of the important things about it was 
that it helped guarantee the independence and the tranquility of the 
professional staff. I had a wonderful professional staff. I have never 
worked with such marvelous people before or since. Some of them I 
hired to the office: for instance, Mike Dreeben, Louis Cohen, David 
Shapiro. And I give you those names so that you will see that politics 
had absolutely nothing to do with whom one picked. In order to 
allow that to be possible, it was necessary to have a political deputy 
who on one hand was on the same intellectual and professional level 
as the staff and on the other hand had impeccable political 
credentials because the staff interacts with the staff of other parts of 
the department. And there is no doubt that those staffs do try to use 
a little bit of muscle and a little bit of elbow on them. The political 
deputy is a marvelous device for insulating our staff from those 
pressures without wheeling in the heavy artillery of the head of the 
office. The two political deputies I had, Carolyn Kuhl and Don 
[Ayer], just made everything work. It was the dream arrangement. 
Well, talking about the duties of the solicitor general and the 
standards by which he acts, what was said yesterday was very 
interesting but struck me—when I think back to my own 
experience—as a little bit over abstract and overly rigorous as if there 
is some kind of checklist: Was this in the government’s interest? If 
not, was it in the interest of the executive branch? In my 
recollection, it was not quite like that. I had a much—I must admit 
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and perhaps I am admitting to a defect, but I won’t apologize for 
it—looser notion. My notion was that the president had chosen me 
to do a particular kind of job because there was a particular sense of 
how things had developed and how they ought to develop. It is not 
as if I had been chosen to run the Bureau of Weights and Measures. 
I was not at all shy about stating my conception of the job and 
had the advantage of having acted as deputy solicitor general, so the 
people who chose me knew exactly what I thought. They paid their 
money, and they took their choice. And what I thought was that on 
the whole, the legal system had gone a little bit off the rails. I would 
say in the direction of what one might call the Skelly Wright–William 
Brennan direction and that one of the things that it was important to 
do was to try to haul it back a little bit. If you can explain that in 
terms of the government’s interests or the interests of the executive, 
okay, that is fine, but that is not exactly how I viewed it. 
I had another sense and that is because I was hearing quite a lot 
about the solicitor general as the tenth justice. That kind of thought 
had two aspects to it. It denigrated the integrity of other 
government officials throughout the government. For instance, the 
head of the Commerce Department when he announces the 
consumer price index must do so with perfect accuracy. And if 
somebody asks him to fiddle with figures for political reasons, he has 
to say, “No. If you want somebody to do that, fire me and get 
somebody else to do it.” The secretary of labor, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the unemployment figures, similarly. And the secretary 
of state has to be able to keep the word that he gives to foreign 
countries. So, I think there is a morality to doing these jobs 
throughout the government and that it is not particularly to the 
solicitor general. 
Similarly, I think it denigrates a little bit the ideal of a lawyer 
altogether. I think of Tony Kronman’s picture of the Lost Lawyer. I 
do not think that that Lawyer is all that lost and I think the solicitor 
general is Kronman’s kind of lawyer. He is a person who believes 
that his duty to the courts and the system and his client generally is 
to speak the truth—to do so as accurately as possible, not to misstate 
the record, not to misstate the precedents, and not to do silly things. 
That is the duty of lots of lawyers. And let me give you an example 
of a lawyer that I very much admire and [whom] many of you know 
and have encountered in your work: Larry Gold, who for many years 
was general counsel to the AFL-CIO. Well, I do not think there is a 
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great deal of difference between the integrity he showed and the 
integrity that is expected of the solicitor general. He would never 
make an argument that did not hold water or misstate a record. Of 
course, the court respected him. I remember a justice of the court 
saying, “Whenever I get a brief signed by Larry Gold, I read it—even 
if it is an amicus brief—with particular care.” Well, that, I think, is 
the regard any lawyer who appears before the Supreme Court 
regularly aspires to and, of course, it is what we all aspire to in the 
Solicitor General’s Office. 
Well, let me tell you a story and then I will subside. Then you 
can help me figure out whether I followed the canons of being a 
solicitor general and what they were and what it is that moved me. 
This is the story—I will take you back a little bit. There is 
something called Landrum-Griffin119 which was passed in 1959 as 
part of the redressing of the balance in our labor laws. But, those 
who have the feeling that it is the natural condition of man to 
belong to a union objected to a profession called “labor persuaders.” 
Labor persuaders are people who are hired by a company during a 
representational election to help the company make the case to the 
workers that maybe it is not the best idea to unionize. Well, this is 
thought to be a little bit like cigarette advertising. 
In order to express this, the Congress and the Department of 
Labor [“department” or “DOL”] could not quite say, “You cannot 
do this” because that would violate the First Amendment. They said 
that anybody who is in this profession of labor persuader must 
register all his labor persuader clients and how much they pay them, 
and disclose that regularly with the department. With this exception: 
if what you do is you give legal advice to a company in a 
representational fight, then you do not need to disclose that. The 
usual concern about client privilege and so on is [recognized]. 
Well, this is the problem: there are some law firms that do both. 
Way back, I think in 1959, the Department of Labor adopted the 
position that if you are a law firm also doing persuader work, you 
must disclose not only your persuader clients but also your legal 
clients. And that was the position. It was a position that had been 
challenged but prevailed in many circuits until the Eighth Circuit got 
hold of it—Dick Arnold actually. He said, “This is crazy. That 
 
 119. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2000). 
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cannot be right. You must disclose your persuader clients, but not 
your legal clients. The DOL’s interpretation is a terrible stretch, and 
I do not care how many circuits went the other way. It is not right.” 
And that was his decision. 
The solicitor of labor came to me and said, “Would you 
authorize rehearing en banc?” I said, “I am very uncomfortable 
about this because you are wrong. Dick Arnold is dead right. This is 
a terrible stretch. It is a distortion of the law. You know, you were 
named by Ronald Reagan just like me. And one of the things that he 
named us for was that the bureaucracy should stop stretching its 
authority well past any intended legislative purpose to try and cover 
the world. You should not be doing this.” He said, “Hey, thanks for 
the lecture. Can I go for en banc?” I said, “All right. I will let you go 
en banc because I do not have to sign that, but you are not going to 
go any further.” He lost en banc, and needless to say, he was back 
asking to go for certiorari. I said, “No. I am not going to sign my 
name to a piece of paper which defends an outrageous bureaucratic 
overstretch like that. And I do not care how many circuits have gone 
along with it. I am not going to do it.” 
Well, the Secretary of Labor got very upset about it, and he 
called for a meeting with the attorney general. He wanted to meet 
with the attorney general. This, by the way, is very typical of a much 
under-appreciated attorney general. So, he called for a meeting with 
Ed Meese. And Ed Meese said, “Fine. I would love to meet with you 
about it.” He asked for a memo from me beforehand, which I 
prepared, and he had the meeting. 
Well, the meeting was a very large meeting. It is what we used to 
call a “monster rally.” Many people were present: the Secretary of 
Labor, and so was the attorney general, and so was I. He presented 
his position; I presented mine. And then the attorney general sat 
there taking notes, which he often did—copious notes. As I 
remember, the Secretary of Labor was talking all about politics and 
how the Senate “this” and how this committee “that,” and one 
thing or another. And then the attorney general afterwards said to 
me, “You do what you want.” And what I wanted to do was not to 
authorize that certiorari, which, by the way, put the DOL in an 
embarrassing position because it meant that Eighth Circuit labor 
persuaders had a different policy, and in the end the DOL changed 
the policy for the whole country. The Secretary of Labor did not  
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take it to the president, which we did not expect he would, and there 
it rested. 
Well, what model of the solicitor general’s role did that 
exemplify? I am not at all sure. And what was there about my role as 
the government’s lawyer or the tenth justice or any other thing like 
that that led me to that conclusion? I cannot possibly tell you, but I 
have no doubt that it was the right decision. And perhaps in the 
discussion, you can tell me why it was the right decision, or persuade 
me that it was wrong. 
 
Donald Ayer: I want to begin just by joining what has been, so 
far at least, the unanimous endorsement of the principal deputy 
position, which I wish was not so commonly referred to as the 
political deputy. I think that everything that has been said does make 
a lot of sense. It is a very useful non-career position in an office that 
is principally a career office. 
I am grateful that, as a result of scheduling happenstance, we are 
taking the administrations slightly out of chronological order, 
because it affords me the opportunity to fill a gap which I think was 
apparent in the discussions yesterday of the first Reagan 
administration and the first Bush administration. You will remember 
Andy Frey talking about the pressure on Rex [Lee], particularly in 
the civil rights area; and Professor Wilkins talking about how the 
debate, which really probably had been there all along, sort of came 
to the surface about the proper role for the SG; and Ken Geller 
talking about the concern within the office in the early eighties about 
the risk of the office destroying its credibility by taking positions too 
far out and essentially beyond the reasonable reach of existing 
precedent and existing positions the Government had taken. I think 
that concern is really the same concern that the current solicitor 
general talked about last night, and for which Rex Lee was really the 
premiere spokesman: the awareness that he was in a continuing 
conversation with the Court—a mutually respectful and candid 
conversation—and was not going to destroy that candor and trust by 
serving as a pamphleteer general. There were real tensions then that 
were talked about yesterday. But, when we come to the Bush 
administration, though I am not going to say there were no tensions, 
that was certainly not a substantial theme of what we heard and I 
think especially it was not an important theme in the civil rights area. 
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What I want to try to do today is provide a little bit of historical 
background, which I am sure will be generally familiar to many of 
you. It will be about what happened during the four years between 
these two administrations—particularly in one area, civil rights and 
affirmative action—to get us from the atmosphere of the first Reagan 
administration that was described by some of the folks yesterday, to a 
very different climate and atmosphere that existed in the Bush 
administration. I would like also to talk a little bit about takings law, 
which, like affirmative action, was an important issue in the campaign 
of 1980, when Reagan emphasized the theme of overweening 
government and the rights of individuals against their government. 
Out of that, I think, spun a concern about government doing things 
that impact people’s property rights, which in turn gave rise to 
takings’ arguments in the regulatory context. So, I want to start with 
civil rights and spend most the time I have on that and talk just 
briefly about takings law. 
Yesterday you heard Andy [Frey], I think, briefly allude to the  
Bob Jones 120 decision, which was a case in the early 1980s that 
involved the issue of whether the IRS could deny tax exemptions to 
previously tax-exempt private universities that maintained racially 
discriminatory policies. There are people here who were involved in 
it, who can say a lot more about Bob Jones than I can. But the short 
of it is there was a pretty heated discussion within the department. 
Some of the folks here who were involved in that discussion 
disagreed with the position that was ultimately taken, which was to 
oppose the IRS policy denying tax-exempt status to discriminatory 
institutions. Rex Lee was recused in the case, and his absence created 
a rather spectacular hole in the office, such that there was no person 
of seniority who was willing and ready to forthrightly support the 
position that the administration wanted to take. The net result was 
that a brief was filed, signed by the senior career deputy, but 
containing a footnote saying he did not agree with the brief’s 
position. The administration, of course, lost in the Supreme Court, 
and the whole thing was most unpleasant and a bad early step in the 
civil rights area. 
Of course, Bob Jones also highlighted the fact that the office 
included only one non-career employee—the SG himself—and what 
grew out of that, as you heard yesterday, was the creation of the 
 
 120. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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principal deputy position. But after this bad start, if you jump to the 
end of the Reagan administration in the context of civil rights, things 
ended up much better. The administration was, on the whole, fairly 
successful in pursuing the central tenets of its civil rights agenda, and 
the administration ended with the traditions and regular practices of 
the solicitor general pretty well intact. On the former point, I would 
offer you as the stopping point and, I think, an accurate stopping 
point in the affirmative action area, the decision in Croson.121 Croson 
involved government set-aside contracts, and in the spring of 1989 
the Court there adopted what I think it fair to say remains today the 
analytical structure for government set-aside programs and voluntary 
affirmative action by governmental bodies. Then, as now, the Court 
said that, in order to rely on race, government must have a 
compelling interest and that compelling interest has got to have 
something rather specific to do with a history of discriminatory 
practices. And when you do rely on race, it has to be in a way that is 
narrowly tailored to the historical discrimination that you have 
identified. None of these are self-answering questions, but it is a very 
limiting process. I think the Court’s approach is aptly summed up by 
a phrase that Charles used, actually back in 1986, well before Croson 
was decided. He saw where this both should be going and, in fact, 
was going, when he said, “the rule is not never, it is hardly ever.” I 
think that is pretty much where we are today. 
So, I think the story ended successfully from the standpoint of 
the administration’s civil rights policies. Apart from affirmative 
action, the administration won important Supreme Court victories in 
a number of cases, including Wards Cove,122 and several others that 
were in the civil rights area, Martin v. Wilks,123 and Patterson.124 
What ended up happening, in fact, was that the move in the 
conservative direction was so far that it ended up being politically 
unsustainable. Which is to say that in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,125 
was passed by a majority of the Congress and signed by President 
Bush the second time around. But that is getting ahead of the story. 
 
 
 121. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 122. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 123. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
 124. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 125. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified as amended to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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What I want to describe here, because I found it to be a riveting 
story during the years I was involved in it, is the road that got us 
from Bob Jones 126 to Croson.127 I will leave out most of the details 
because I do not know most of them but will talk about a few of 
them that I do know. It was a bumpy road, attended, as you heard 
yesterday, by a lot of gnashing of teeth in various circles about what 
the SG’s position would be—a lot of heat, more heat than light a lot 
of the time, and a lot of pressure and criticism. This heated 
atmosphere took shape long before I arrived, stimulated by the 
purest notion that the government should be entirely colorblind, 
which found its judicial root in the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.128 
Colorblindness led, in turn, to the principle of victim specificity, 
which limited remedial actions for discrimination to those that 
benefit actual victims of discrimination. The remedy does not go 
beyond the actual victim. It simply goes to the person who was 
discriminated against, and that, of course, essentially rules out 
affirmative action except in the form of outreach, where you increase 
the applicant pool by encouraging people to apply for jobs or 
promotions. Victim specificity does not allow government to do 
things that are race conscious in making choices with regard to 
governmental benefits. 
That was, I think it is fair to say, the keystone of the 
department’s civil rights policy in the first Reagan administration. I 
think it took shape around the time of Bob Jones and was the 
dominant theme for several years. It was promoted with evangelical 
fervor, as government lawyers went into courts where consent 
decrees had been entered and asked to have them rolled back to be 
consistent with victim specificity. That caused, in turn, you can 
imagine, lots of uproar and lots of criticism in lots of circles. 
The key Supreme Court development that gave victim specificity 
life and proved to be, as Charles has described it in his book, “a false 
dawn”129 was the case of Firefighters v. Stotts,130 which Rex [Lee] 
argued in [the] 1983 term and which was decided, I think, in the 
spring of 1984. It was argued and briefed by the government 
 
 126. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 127. City of Richmond v. J.S. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 129. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 106–110 (1991). 
 130. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
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primarily on the principle of victim specificity, but on the facts it was 
a case about layoffs and it was a case under Title VII131 that involved 
seniority systems. All of which, for those of you who have thought 
about these issues, you understand is a very narrowing set of facts. 
The effect on someone who is laid off is much more severe than the 
effect where someone applies for a job in the first place and is one of 
fifty people that are simply never hired in the first place. If you have a 
job and you lose it, it is a much greater impact, and any 
consideration of race to reach that result will be scrutinized much 
more closely. 
So, the language of the court in Justice White’s opinion in 
Stotts was such as to give some support to the government’s victim 
specificity argument. It was not sweeping. It did not announce an 
unlimited principle, but it did talk in terms of victim specificity, and 
the Civil Rights Division took Stotts as the symbol of its victory, in 
essence, and took it around the country again. The department took 
Stotts back to the lower courts and presented victim specificity again 
as a reason to undo a whole range of sweeping remedies. But, again, 
it was sorely disappointed in the reception that it got from those 
courts. In fact, I think it is true that they had no success at all in 
promoting that idea in the lower courts. And that failure to secure 
reversal of any pre-existing race-conscious remedies fueled, within 
DOJ among those really focused on these issues, a tremendous 
anger. It also fueled a strategy of looking for a case, or more than 
one case, to go back to the Supreme Court to nail down the victory 
that we had won in Stotts and to find the circumstance where the 
court would come out, pound the table, and say, “Yes, we mean it, 
and you must follow the law.” Again, this is still all before I got 
there, so I am again subject to being corrected on the facts. 
In the fall of 1985, after Stotts had been decided in the spring of 
1984, and after a year of going unsuccessfully back to the lower 
courts, there were two cases that had been teed up which were good 
candidates. One case was Wygant132 and the other was Sheetmetal 
Workers.133 
 
 131. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 
 132. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 133. Local 28 of Sheetmetal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
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Sheetmetal Workers was a case of egregious discrimination by a 
union where an exasperated trial court judge ended up ordering a 
rigid racial percent goal for union membership to be achieved by a 
certain date. I think it was 29.3% union membership to be black by a 
certain date. Well, that was a pretty stark quota and a pretty stark 
case in which to make an argument that says, “Look, only the 
victims get relief.” 
Wygant was a case of a laid-off teacher in a public school who 
had been laid off essentially to maintain proportionality in the labor 
force, not to make room for a victim of discrimination, but in fact to 
allow adherence, in a time of shrinking budgets, to goals that had 
been set in prior court orders, just to meet these goals. So, here were 
two cases that seemed to offer a good opportunity, and my 
understanding is that they were primarily argued, and I think 
reasonably so, on the theory of victim specificity. 
In the spring of 1986, those two cases were decided, and in them 
we won some important battles but lost the victim specificity war. In 
Wygant, the layoff was found to be invalid. Important things were 
said there. In Sheetmetal Workers, it was a five to four loss. Sheetmetal 
Workers, I think, is key here because not only did they uphold this 
fairly stark 29% numerical goal, but five justices specifically said that 
victim specificity as an across-the-board rule was not the law. These 
cases were made up of a remarkable array of opinions which, if read 
carefully and together, really did contain the kernel of what came out 
of Croson.134 The requirement of a compelling state interest based on 
a specific history of discrimination was there, as was the idea of 
narrow tailoring to minimize the trammeling on individual rights 
based on racial considerations. In the SG’s Office, during the early 
summer of 1986—just after I arrived there—we spent a lot of time 
digesting these opinions and trying to figure out how to interpret 
them in the next round of cases, which were now teed up for the 
next year, for the fall of 1986. 
One case called Paradise135 involved the Alabama State Troopers, 
who had an egregious history of discrimination, again somewhat like 
Sheetmetal Workers. The federal court had, as a result, ordered a 
catch-up, one-for-one promotion quota to get the force more 
integrated with black troopers and increase their presence at higher 
 
 134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 135. United States. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 93 
levels. There was a clear history of deliberate racial discrimination, 
yet it was a case on which the United States had actually sought 
certiorari, again for the purpose of asserting its victim-specific theory, 
which, of course, had been rejected in Sheetmetal Workers about the 
time that certiorari was granted. So, here was this case with a fairly 
ugly set of facts and an extreme remedy, and our primary theoretical 
line of attack had been rejected. 
The other case, which is the one that I worked on that summer, 
was Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency,136 which 
involved a voluntary affirmative action plan by a county government, 
which had only been challenged under Title VII, and not under the 
Equal Protection Clause. With regard to Title VII challenges to 
voluntary affirmative action plans, the leading precedent there, of 
course, at that time was the Weber137 case, which had upheld 
voluntary affirmative action where it is flexibly designed and a 
voluntary effort to remedy a manifest imbalance in the workforce. 
Weber thus embodied a much less rigorous standard than the 
compelling interest-narrow tailoring formulation toward which the 
court seemed to be heading, where an equal protection challenge to 
governmental action is concerned. 
From where I sat, what ensued that summer was a fairly severe 
test of the ideals and aspirations that have been discussed here about 
the way the solicitor general works and the way he tries to relate to 
the Court. Perhaps all of this was unavoidable. Several people had 
shed a lot of blood to pursue the victim-specificity argument, which 
I do not think you could say in the first instance was either foolish or 
unreasonable to argue, and yet it had now been rejected. What you 
now had was a much more nuanced set of views and opinions, which 
were coming together to look like Croson,138 I think, but did not yet. 
And the question was: How do you deal with that and what do you 
do in the next case? And what ensued was a process in which those 
who had been at this a long time had a hard time letting go. 
Looking through some old papers, I found a characteristic quote 
from a memo written early on in that process which kind of 
summarizes it. One of the folks who was pushing most strongly to 
maintain our view as best we could wrote in a memo, “In our brief, 
 
 136. Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 137. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 138. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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we should allude to our rejected colorblind, victim-specific 
arguments and make clear as unprovocatively as we can that we still 
hold them.” 
Well, there may be nothing wrong with doing that, but I doubt 
that such a statement can be very productive, where the Court has 
labored and sweat and come up with a set of views and you are now 
trying to go to the next step in the next case. In the office, we tried 
to come up with a brief initially that would kind of distill out what 
was in the Supreme Court opinions that had just come down, as well 
as what had come before. Our draft tried to work through those 
recent cases and articulate a standard that other courts could apply. 
What we argued for was something that was pretty close to the 
Croson standard, at least moving pretty far in that direction. And it 
ended up in the end, frankly, being a tentative brief in the sense that 
it said the Court should articulate the standard in this way and then 
send this Johnson139 affirmative action case back, and let the lower 
court look at it against the standard and see if it meets the standard. 
Asking for a remand rather than a final decision on the merits 
striking down the plan did not go down well in the circles in the 
Civil Rights Division that wanted the brief to be more aggressive. 
That disagreement, among others, produced a series of, I would say, 
high decibel meetings in which loyalty was questioned and various 
other exchanges went on, which were fortunately somewhat unique. 
For somebody that had been there for two months, it was an 
interesting place to find myself as the principal deputy. Mostly, I just 
found myself getting mad and tuning out because we were trying to 
do a job which was hard enough to start with and which got very 
difficult when people were screaming in your ear and calling you 
names. And that is what was going on. 
The brief we ended up filing—you can be the judge of it if you 
want to go back and read it—all I can say is we did the best we 
could, and it is what it is. I have one regret, and that is that, in sort 
of in a half-baked way, we went back and reargued Weber, as though 
the Court had invited reconsideration of that case. Of course it had 
not, and the result of that strategy was fairly predictable. 
I reread the brief in Paradise140 the other day. Deputy Solicitor 
General Al Lauber worked on that, and I think did probably a better 
 
 139. Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 140. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
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job than I was able to do working toward a line of argument that 
was going to be where the Court would end up, which frankly was 
not a bad place from the standpoint of the administration’s own 
agenda. 
Well, as you might guess, both of these cases had an unhappy 
ending in the spring of 1987. Again, they were close. In Paradise, we 
lost five to four. In Johnson, we lost six to three. Johnson essentially 
just applied Weber 141 and said that if suit is brought only under Title 
VII, it does not matter if the defendant is a government. If 
somebody had challenged this on equal protection grounds, it might 
be a different issue, but this is Title VII, and that is that. And so they 
upheld this program. 
I think this was all an important turning point in terms of getting 
from where we were at the end of the first Reagan administration to 
where we were at the beginning of the Bush administration. As I 
recall, it was following Johnson and Paradise that the work of the 
office in the civil rights area got back closer to normal. Things got 
less confrontational, and we had many fewer of the intense sort of 
“so is your father” kind of discussions that we had in connection 
with these earlier briefs. We were able to return to a more 
regularized, deliberative way of addressing these issues. 
Now, the Croson142 brief was really a special project of Charles’s. 
The arguments were consciously built on things the Court had said, 
especially in Wygant, but in other cases as well. I think it is fair to say 
that the Court, in its opinion, said an awful lot of what we suggested 
in that brief. Again, I think Croson is not a bad place to have ended 
up in the affirmative action area. 
At the end of the administration, the Court was moving ahead of 
us in the direction of more conservative views on these civil rights 
cases. One good example of that is the Patterson143 case, which you 
all may remember, where the Court asked for supplemental briefing 
on whether § 1981144 reaches private conduct. It was thought at first 
to apply only to governmental conduct, but Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer145 and Runyon v. McCrary146 made it applicable to private 
 
 141. Weber, 443 U.S. 193. 
 142. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 
 143. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 145. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 146. 447 U.S. 160 (1976). 
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conduct of certain kinds. Patterson presented the question of just 
exactly the limits of that applicability in the employment context, 
and the Court asked for supplemental briefing going back to square 
one, which was, should we reconsider Runyon v. McCrary?—i.e., 
should § 1981 ever apply to private conduct. And Charles, after 
much thought within our office and a lot of work by a bunch of 
people, thinking about whether we should or should not file a 
supplemental brief (we were amicus in the case) decided not to file a 
supplemental brief. Rather than go in and ask to reconsider Runyon 
v. McCrary, we simply filed no brief. 
But then, on the merits, the Court ended up adopting a position 
more limiting of [§] 1981 than we had suggested. They essentially 
limited § 1981 to the hiring context only. And we in our brief had 
laid out a theory that it would cover hiring, but, in a state that had a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it would also allow an action 
for, say, harassment under that state law governing good faith and 
fair dealing. 
The same thing was true in some other cases. Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies147 was a case where the Court also went beyond where 
we were. In some of those other cases I think that I mentioned 
earlier, they pretty much accepted our position, but again as I said, 
politically, that turned out to be farther than the country collectively 
could go at that point, and led to legislation a few years later. That is 
really what I have to say on civil rights. 
I want to just quickly touch on takings law because it has a little 
bit of the same flavor in that it really comes out of the 1980 election. 
It is an important issue: How are we going to limit overweening 
government? The focus, I think, to a great degree was coming out of 
California and out of zoning cases. We have known since 1922 when 
Justice Holmes said it, that regulation can be a taking if it “goes too 
far,”148 but we did not know when it might go too far or how you 
deal with all these local governments which are telling people they 
could not do certain things with their land. And that was really 
something that came up in the election, so something needed to be 
done with this. 
On the other side, we had to consider the government’s 
traditional role as a regulator. The federal government is a regulator 
 
 147. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
 148. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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and arguably often taker of property. And so the question was: Is the 
U.S. Department of Justice really going to make a bunch of sharply 
stated arguments in favor of plaintiffs trying to sue governments for 
regulatory takings? Well, the long and the short of it is that before I 
got there, within the department, a useful compromise was worked 
out. The Takings Clause,149 which says there shall be no taking 
without just compensation, could be read two ways. You can read it 
as saying that, if the government takes, the Constitution gives you a 
right to compensation. Or you can read it saying the government 
cannot take unless it pays you, so that a property owner’s remedy is 
not damages but an injunction. State governments had taken the 
latter view, as, previously, had the federal government. Strong 
takings advocates wanted the opposite view and claimed a damage 
remedy under the Fifth Amendment itself, whenever regulation 
“goes too far.” The compromise reached within the department was 
to deny that the Takings Clause embodies its own damage remedy, 
but to contend that § 1983150 does provide a remedy against those 
pesky local regulators who were telling people what they could not 
do with their land, so that they could get damages even if it was only 
a temporary taking. 
A lot of these cases—there are several that came along—broke 
their pick on the problem of ripeness. The Court kept telling 
claimants that they had not exhausted their state remedies. In the 
summer of 1986, we had a case called First English Evangelical 
Church.151 We essentially presented the view that § 1983 was the 
available remedy. The Supreme Court in its opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist went right past us and said there is a self-contained 
damage remedy in the Fifth Amendment and decided that issue. 
There is another important case called Nollan,152 but I think I have 
probably run over my time and I will stop. 
 
Thomas Merrill: Yeah. I was going to start with some nice 
comments about how wonderful it was to work for Charles [Fried] 
and Don [Ayer]. But since they have eaten up all the time, I will 
have to cut that part out. 
 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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 152. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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I will speak briefly about separation of powers. In 1987, when I 
joined the office, there was a very high level of expectation, I think, 
within the Justice Department about separation of powers. There 
was a sense that we were on the cusp of a breakthrough in realizing a 
position that the executive branch had long sought, which was, 
roughly speaking, that the doctrine should be taken seriously, that 
under the Constitution executive functions are to be performed only 
by the executive branch, that the executive branch is headed by one 
president, and that every one who performs executive functions, 
therefore, must be accountable to the president. This expectation 
was created by decisions like Chadha,153 which Rex Lee had 
successfully achieved in 1983, and by Bowsher v. Synar,154 which 
Charles had successfully achieved in 1986. 
In 1988, that expectation was dealt a severe and perhaps blatant 
fatal blow by Morrison v. Olson,155 the case that upheld the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. The 
independent counsel performs investigatory and prosecutorial 
functions, which we all assumed were executive, and the independent 
counsel was appointed by a court and is subject to its removal only 
for good cause. So the traditional measures of accountability to the 
president did not seem present. The Court nevertheless upheld it 
and that was a very severe setback to the position that the Justice 
Department had collectively been seeking and hoping to achieve 
during this period of time. 
What I wanted to talk about briefly, if I can, are two episodes 
that occurred after Morrison v. Olson, in which I was involved and 
which illustrate how, I think, the solicitor general attempted to deal 
with the Morrison setback and to preserve as much as possible our 
sense of what separation of powers should look like. These episodes 
also illustrate certain functions of the Solicitor General’s Office, 
which have not been given much attention so far and are worth 
putting out on the table because they give you a more well-rounded 
sense of the kinds of things that the office does. 
The first was a case called Ameron Inc. v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers.156 I inherited this case when I showed up in 
 
 153. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 154. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 155. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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1987. The Supreme Court had already granted certiorari pursuant to 
our petition. And for reasons I do not specifically recall right now, it 
was being held for Morrison. It was either our motion or the Court’s 
own notion to hold off on briefing until Morrison had been decided. 
So in the summer of 1988, I turned for the first time to Ameron in 
preparation for supervising the briefing of that case. I became quite 
alarmed by what I found. 
The issue in the case involved something called the Competition 
in Contracting Act,157 which was a statute that Congress had passed 
in order to try to encourage greater use of competitive bidding in 
the procurement process that the government follows. In particular, 
one provision of the Act authorized the comptroller general, who is 
the head of the General Accounting Office and who Bowsher158 had 
just said was a legislative officer, to issue a stay of any contract of the 
federal government that the executive branch had entered into in 
order to allow the comptroller to review a protest by a disappointed 
bidder who had not received the contract. The statute had provisions 
for an automatic stay and also for a discretionary stay that the 
comptroller general could issue in order to permit these protests to 
be reviewed. In addition, the statute allowed the executive to 
override the stay, but only for specific enumerated reasons like 
national security. 
The Office of Legal Counsel [“OLC”], I believe it was, maybe in 
conjunction with the Civil Division, had identified the stay 
provisions as violating the Department’s understanding of separation 
of powers. The argument was that deciding when to enter into or to 
implement a contract was an executive decision. Here was a 
legislative officer who was permitted to block or temporarily interfere 
with that decision. The comptroller was clearly not accountable to 
the president; therefore, this sort of strict separation principle is 
being violated. So, in the flush of anticipation after Bowsher, we had 
sought certiorari and the Court granted the case. 
As I looked at it, I could see a number of serious problems with 
going forward with this case in 1988. One was that it was a sort of a 
test case. It had arisen when OLC convinced the Army to simply 
defy a stay issue by the comptroller general, thereby forcing the 
disappointed bidder to sue the federal government in court, raising 
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the constitutional issue. So, it still looked like we were being the 
aggressor—we were sort of picking fights rather than defending our 
prerogatives. Another problem was that the interference with 
executive functions seemed rather minor. It was just a timing 
question. There was no suggestion that Congress could decide 
whether we could enter into the contract or not, but was just 
delaying it. A third [problem] was that there was this override 
mechanism, so the argument could be made that the executive could 
protect its essential interests by overriding a stay if it had to. And 
finally, the issue involved the expenditure [of] money, which has 
traditionally been understood to be a sort of shared function of 
Congress and the executive—it was not like prosecuting crimes as in 
the Morrison case. Putting all of this together, to me it looked like a 
big loser. My fear was that if we went to the Court and went 
through with the argument, the decision of the case—well, we 
would lose on the merits. That would not be such a bad thing, but 
the court in writing an opinion justifying this might say things about 
executive power and how it is okay if a little bit is shared here and 
there, which would be a very damaging precedent coming on top of 
Morrison and would work to the long-term disadvantage of the 
separation of powers interest. 
So I recommended, and Charles [Fried] readily agreed, that we 
should pull the plug on the case. We filed a motion with the Court 
asking to have our certiorari petition dismissed, which was granted as 
it routinely is. This was mildly embarrassing. We had asked the Court 
to take the case, and they had agreed; and now we were asking them 
to dismiss the case. We took a little bit of heat within the department 
from people that thought we were not being faithful to the true 
vision of separation of powers—but not an awful lot of heat. The 
case just quietly went away. 
I think the Ameron episode illustrates a dramatic example of the 
solicitor general’s prosecutorial discretion, if you will. One of the 
things the office does is to try to very carefully pick and choose 
which cases it takes before the Court, make sure the facts are right, 
[and] make sure that the government’s position is likely to be one 
the justices find compelling. Sometimes you cannot avoid cases like 
Morrison v. Olsen going up, but, if at all possible, the office tries very 
carefully to cull and manage the caseload in a way that maximizes the 
chances of prevailing. Ameron was a little bit unusual but a clear  
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example of doing this, in deciding that here was a separation of 
powers case we did not want to risk losing. 
The second episode that I will briefly recount involved an appeal 
recommendation. The appeal authorization function of the solicitor 
general has been mentioned a couple of times, but it has not been 
given a lot of attention. This was a very unusual appeal 
recommendation because, as best I know, it is the only one that ever 
was resolved in the Oval Office of the White House. The president 
of the United States, in effect, was the person who finally decided 
whether or not we were going to appeal the case from the district 
court to the court of appeals. 
The issue involved a statute that Congress had passed which 
required the Justice Department to seek to close the PLO observer 
mission of the United Nations in New York City. The statute and 
the issue, needless to say, were very political. The statute had been 
lobbied for vigorously by AIPAC, the American Israeli Political 
Action Committee. There was a lot of opposition to this in the State 
Department and also in the international community, but Congress 
had passed the statute and the Civil Division had gone into court in 
New York and sought an order closing the PLO observer mission. 
The district judge, whose name I do not recall, had issued an 
opinion saying, and here I am paraphrasing, “I am not going to 
grant relief because even though the statute seems plain, the PLO 
mission enjoys a status under customary international law.” There 
was no argument that the mission was protected by a treaty. But he 
said, “Protected by customary international law, and I think that 
Congress must specifically say that it intends to abrogate customary 
international law before it can do so by statute.” Now, as the appeal 
recommendation came up to us from the Civil Division, two things 
were obvious. One was this was a political hot potato, and two, the 
legal reasoning was weak. Ordinarily you would think that this 
would lead to a rather routine “yes” authorization of appeal. But one 
thing bothered me, in particular, about the papers that came up to 
our office: there was no mention in the Civil Division’s memo 
whatsoever of the president’s prerogative in the field of foreign 
affairs, and in particular there was no mention of the fact that, in 
Article II of the Constitution, one of the relatively few enumerated 
powers given to the president is the right to receive ambassadors and 
other foreign ministers. And one can readily see how deciding 
whether or not there should be a PLO observer mission in the 
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United States would be within the scope of receiving or not 
receiving ambassadors or public ministers. And so I was concerned 
that if we aggressively appealed this decision and sought vindication 
of the statute, we would create a precedent that says that Congress 
has the power to legislatively control the president’s constitutional 
authority to receive or not receive public ministers. 
Well, in what Charles [Fried] would probably characterize as a 
standard mid-level bureaucratic response, I decided what was needed 
was more memos. I recommended to Charles that we deny an appeal 
until the Civil Division came up with a more complete analysis of 
how this recommendation was consistent with Article II and 
separation of powers. 
Charles, being more imaginative and direct, instead issued what I 
think is the most unusual appeal authorization I ever saw, which was 
“Appeal—comma—Subject to the Condition that the President 
States Publicly that This Is Consistent with the Foreign Policy 
Interests of the United States.” And this was very ingenious. I think 
what Charles was saying here, and he can speak to this himself if 
there is any time left, is that we were not getting involved in 
politics—the solicitor general has nothing to do with that. We were 
perfectly satisfied with the legal case for an appeal—there was no 
question about that, but we were deeply concerned that the 
separation of powers concern had to be addressed. If the president 
wanted this mission closed, then there was nothing inconsistent 
between his constitutional power and enforcement of the statute. 
But if he did not want the mission closed, then this was inconsistent 
with his constitutional prerogatives, and that needed to be faced 
head on. Well, needless to say, the Civil Division was unhappy with 
this resolution. They sought—what was the phrase—“monster 
meeting?” 
 
Charles Fried: “Monster rally.” 
 
Thomas Merrill: . . . “Monster rally” in the Attorney General’s 
Office. Abe Sofaer came over from the State Department. He was 
the legal advisor at that time. He made the argument in favor of not 
appealing. For Civil Division, John Bolton said, “Let’s appeal.” The 
attorney general, I believe it was Richard Thornburg at that time, 
agreed with the appeal recommendation. I think he stripped away, 
although the details escape me now, the Charles Fried qualification. 
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That was the last I heard of it until I read the newspapers for the 
next several days to see what happened to my little appeal 
recommendation. 
The first article in the Washington Post said that a meeting had 
been scheduled in the White House in which Secretary of State 
George Schultz was going to appeal directly to the president from 
Attorney General Richard Thornburg’s appeal authorization. And 
then the next day there was an article reporting that the president of 
the United States had decided not to authorize an appeal; that the 
State Department won and the Justice Department lost. 
Now, what did this say about the Solicitor General’s Office? I am 
not really sure. I have no idea what was said in the Oval Office. 
Ronald Reagan probably did not read my memo or any of the other 
legal papers that were generated. I have often fantasized, however, 
that maybe, just maybe, because of what we did in the Solicitor 
General’s Office, somebody in the White House mentioned Article 
II in the course of these discussions and thought about the 
constitutional implications rather than just thinking about the 
political and foreign policy implications. If in fact that did happen, 
then I think here is another illustration of how the Solicitor 
General’s Office, by consistently attending to these issues, 
consistently can have the impact and protect the separation of 
powers. 
 
Charles Fried: Was not AB Culvahouse the President’s Legal 
Counsel? And I would have thought he definitely would have 
[looked at the office’s work]. 
 
Thomas Merrill: I would hope so. 
 
Donald Ayer: He was an excellent man, [Culvahouse]. 
 
Moderator: General Fried, do you have anything you would like 
to add to that? 
 
Charles Fried: The idea was that we would defend the 
president’s prerogative but only if he wants to exercise it. So, it is not 
a case of having him decide the legal issue, but having him decide 
whether this is something that he cares about. 
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Clinton I Panel 
 
Drew S. Days III: Solicitor General, 1993–1996. 
 
Walter E. Dellinger III: Acting Solicitor General, 1996–1997. 
 
Michael R. Dreeben: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1988–1994; 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1994–present. 
 
Drew Days: Good morning. I did not work for Rex Lee and I 
did not work with him in his law firm, but I felt that he was a friend 
and a colleague to whom I could turn. Our first encounter was when 
I served on a committee that Rex chaired. It had a very odd name: 
the ABA Reading Committee. It was kind of like having “sleepers” 
around the country who sprang into action when an event occurred, 
namely the nomination of a person to fill a vacancy on the Supreme 
Court, and to the extent that that person was a jurist, we were 
assigned to read portions of that person’s work—opinions. This was 
a very interesting assignment, and I really marveled at Rex’s ability to 
herd cats among the people on the committee and to provide 
guidance and to ask probing questions that really brought out the 
type of information that I think was helpful to the ABA in evaluating 
candidates for the Supreme Court. This was in the good old days, 
some people would call it, when the ABA had credibility in the 
process of selecting judges. It was not an outlier, at least in some 
circles. Rex in that setting was the Rex Lee that has been spoken of 
so often in the last day or so: kind, thoughtful, balanced, highly 
professional and always polite and respectful. 
My second encounter with Rex, which followed on that first 
encounter, was when I became solicitor general. I cannot tell you 
how much I appreciated Rex reaching out to me and saying, “I’ve 
been there, I’ve done that, and I’d like to be of assistance. How can 
I be helpful?” It was not only at the initial part of my tenure, but 
later in my tenure, when I had several problems that I thought he 
might be helpful in terms of untangling things that I was 
confronting. Rex was a good listener on the other end of the 
telephone line, willing to take time out even from his arranging 
medical appointments and tests so that he could hear me out and 
provide the type of guidance that he thought I needed. And so I will 
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never be able to thank Rex enough for what he was willing to do for 
me and, therefore I am particularly grateful to Brigham Young 
[University] and to others who are responsible for putting this 
conference together, for inviting me to be a participant in this 
dedication to the memory of Rex Lee. 
Before I get into what life was like in the first Clinton 
administration, I would like to say a few words about some of the 
issues that have been discussed earlier. One, of course, is the 
so-called principal or political deputy. 
I am not certain exactly what I had in terms of categories. I was 
told after I was confirmed as solicitor general that it was my 
decision—I could select anybody I wanted, within reason 
obviously—but I was also told that a group of eminently qualified 
lawyers would be sent over by the White House for me to interview 
them and consider them in my process of selecting a deputy who 
would be the principal deputy. I dutifully interviewed those people—
they were indeed quite able, exceptional lawyers—but I decided to 
select someone I knew well, who was an experienced academic, an 
alumnus of the Solicitor General’s Office, and someone I felt—to 
follow the characterization that Charles [Fried] used on several 
occasions—someone who would be worthy of the respect of the 
professional staff, someone who could hold his or her own in that 
very rarefied atmosphere in the Office of the Solicitor General.159 
There has been a lot of talk about the role of the principal 
deputy in serving as a buffer or an insulator against improper or 
perhaps inappropriate interference or contacts by the political people 
(as they were called in the Clinton administration) in the White 
House, with the professional staff. And that certainly is a function—
one that I think is very important for a principal deputy to discharge. 
But I appreciated having a principal deputy because it gave me 
someone to talk to, someone I could talk to in confidence without 
fear of it going any farther than the conference room or my office, 
conversations about matters that really should not have been part of 
the considerations of the professional staff in carrying out their 
responsibilities. So, in addition to all the other very sophisticated 
ways in which people have thought about the principal deputy, or 
the political deputy, think about it as kind of a buddy system that 
 
 159. In 1993, Drew Days selected Paul Bender to serve as his Principal Deputy Solicitor 
General. 
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serves the interests of the country and the United States well in my 
estimation. 
One of the things that has not been discussed to my recollection 
in the time that we have been here is something called an “agenda” 
in the Solicitor General’s Office. I know this only because I was 
hounded by members of the media, not Linda Greenhouse, of 
course, and other reputable members of that estate, but by others 
who kept asking me, “Well, what is your agenda? What are you 
going to do? What are your targets?” And, naive person that I was, I 
said, “Well, I have no agenda. I am just going to carry out the will of 
the people and make certain that the interests of the United States 
are well protected. What do you mean by an agenda?” For some 
time I have continued to regard myself as a purist in this regard. God 
forbid that a solicitor general should have an agenda. But the more I 
have thought about it, I have wondered whether the reason why I 
did not have an agenda was because for a person of my political and 
social leanings things looked pretty good. 
Now, one of the things that Don [Ayer] did not cover in his 
description of what was going on in the eighties in terms of civil 
rights was what was happening in the Congress. And the story was 
that there was a pitched battle going on, if one can describe it that 
way, between the Court and Congress over civil rights legislation, 
such that whenever the Court entered a judgment or wrote an 
opinion that ruled in a way that appeared to cut back on civil rights 
laws, Congress was there with something, for example, called the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act, or the Civil Rights Act of 1991.160 So 
from my perspective, the role that Congress had played in righting 
the balance, if you will, from what the Supreme Court had done on 
some of these issues may have caused me not to develop an agenda 
going into the office. 
It was also true that for liberal folk like me, some of the items 
that would be put on an agenda, a hit list, like capital punishment, 
were clearly off the list because I was working for a president who 
was in favor of capital punishment. I had sworn to defend capital 
punishment in my confirmation hearings, and I certainly was not 
going to go back on that. But if one were to put that aside, the fact 
was that Lyle Deniston, a member of the corps that covers the 
 
 160. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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Supreme Court, described me as a liberal guy in a moderate 
administration. I think that was an accurate description, and I was 
sensitive to it, and it had an impact on the way that I functioned in 
my role as solicitor general. 
Insofar as abortion was concerned, Casey161 had been decided 
and things seemed to be settled in that regard up to a point. On 
questions of affirmative action, although Don [Ayer] talked about 
the Croson162 case, Charles Fried knows well that there was another 
kind of pitched battle, a much more rarefied pitched battle, between 
professors at some law schools on the east coast over what Croson 
really meant. My gang would say, “No, it doesn’t.” And Charles’s 
group would say, “Oh, yes it does.” And we went back and forth in 
the Yale Law Journal for several issues in that particular debate. So, 
maybe that is why I did not have an agenda, but if things had been 
otherwise, perhaps I would have. 
Certainly, political scientists and sociologists who have studied 
the Solicitor General’s Office have come to a quite shocking 
conclusion looking at the data: that solicitors general in Democratic 
administrations tend to do things that look very Democratic, and 
solicitors general in Republican administrations tend to do things 
that look very Republican. How this happens remains a mystery, to 
be elucidated at a later stage, undoubtedly. 
Well, I am pleased to say that for all the sturm und drang that 
has been described in detail by some of the people on the earlier 
panels, there really were no major controversies in the Department of 
Justice or between the White House and the Justice Department that 
touched significantly upon the work of the solicitor general or my 
work during my three-year tenure. 
As others have said, by and large the solicitor general carries on 
the legal work of the United States in the Supreme Court and in 
lower courts from administration to administration, irrespective of 
the party in power, in criminal cases, in cases that have to do with 
the financial interests of the United States, the property interests of 
the United States, and so forth and so on. 
What is notable, it seems to me, about the time I spent as 
solicitor general was not so much what I was doing, not about my 
agenda, but what was happening in the Supreme Court during the 
 
 161. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 162. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
108 
period from 1993 to 1996, because during that period the Supreme 
Court rendered a number of decisions, as I think most of you are 
well aware, that signaled a new departure with respect to issues of 
federalism and civil rights, voting rights in particular. And with the 
benefit of hindsight, we can now see that those decisions were just 
building blocks, if you will—the beginnings that have been built on 
in the intervening years into a major body of case law elaborating 
upon these earlier doctrines and earlier decisions. Let me mention a 
few of them. 
The first is United States v. Lopez.163 I was told in a very unkind 
fashion by some of my law professor friends when the Supreme 
Court handed down Lopez—and they were in the courtroom when 
that happened—they said to me, “Thank you. Thank you. It’s going 
to make Con Law I interesting once again. No longer will we have 
to say that the Court always defers to Congress with respect to its 
exercise of the commerce power.” As you will recall, the Supreme 
Court struck down something called the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
of 1990,164 which forbade the possession of a firearm within a certain 
distance of a school. It declared that unconstitutional as exceeding 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. This represented, as I just 
mentioned, a major shift from the Court’s sixty-year history of 
showing great deference to Congress’s exercise of its commerce 
power to regulate everything from home-grown wheat to loan 
sharking. 
The second case that I want to mention is Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida,165 a case that wags cannot resist calling the “Seminal” Tribe 
case, but I hope you will forebear. It held that Congress did not have 
power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the state’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under something called the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act.166 It even precluded in that decision resort 
to what is known as the Ex parte Young167 procedure, traditionally 
available to litigants seeking equitable relief against state officials for 
violation of federal law. 
 
 
 163. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 164. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789 (repealed 1995). 
 165. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 166. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2000). 
 167. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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The next case, Adarand v. Pena,168 begins what I refer to as my 
“deja vu all over again” experience. In the Carter administration I 
was assistant attorney general for civil rights, and I argued several 
civil rights cases. I found that the cases I argued were back on the 
block during my tenure as solicitor general. So, when I looked at 
Adarand v. Pena, I said, “I have already argued that case. It is called 
Fullilove.”169 But the Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that a 
federal government contracting program, to the extent that it 
embodied any racial classifications, had to satisfy the highest level of 
review—strict scrutiny—in order to pass constitutional muster. 
Don [Ayer] talked about the Croson170 case, and as I indicated, 
there was some debate over that, but even for people who disagreed, 
I think there was the sense that there was more in Croson than met 
the eye. For one thing, it was focused on contract set-asides at the 
state and local level, and the question then presented in Adarand 
was, “What about the federal government?” And the intervening 
decision of the Supreme Court called Metro Broadcasting171 
suggested that indeed that distinction was an important one. In fact, 
in Croson, Justice Scalia seemed to have gone out of his way to say, 
“I am talking about factions, those factions that Madison was fearful 
of. That is what I call the municipalities and states, but the federal 
government is an entirely different matter.”172 So, we have Adarand 
as an entirely different matter, and the Court said, “No. Everybody is 
going to have to play by one rule—our rule—which is that strict 
scrutiny will apply across the board.”173 
Now, although Walter [Dellinger] is going to chime in later, I 
have to introduce another part of his persona with respect to 
Adarand v. Pena because that did cause a bit of controversy and 
anxiety within the Clinton administration. This seemed to be a major 
blow not only to affirmative action, but to the ability of the federal 
government to do its work, to promote economic development in a 
way that it felt was appropriate. So, the bugle sounded, the alarms 
 
 168. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny 
to race-based preferences in awards of federal agency construction subcontracts). 
 169. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to race-
based preferences in awards of federal agency construction subcontracts). 
 170. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 171. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 172. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 522–23 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 173. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
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rang, and Walter Dellinger, assistant attorney general for the Office 
of Legal Counsel, came out on his charger to figure out how we 
could put together legal and factual arguments that would prop up a 
very endangered system of federal government contracting after 
Adarand v. Pena, and I think he was quite successful at doing that. 
As a consequence, lower courts felt that they were not completely 
bound by the language of Adarand, and indeed had some, to use a 
term of art, “wiggle room” to allow for certain types of uses of racial 
and gender classifications in contracting. 
The next case is Missouri v. Jenkins,174 a further limit to the 
remedial powers of federal courts with respect to school 
desegregation. I had argued that case before also in two cases 
involving Ohio cities. Dayton175 and Columbus176 addressed the issues 
that were coming back in the context of the Missouri v. Jenkins case. 
And what the Supreme Court basically said was, “We are tired of 
this; this has gone on too long. School districts ought to be freed 
and district judges ought to be told to just stop, to go on and do 
other things that perhaps they can do more effectively.” 
But the last group of cases that I want to talk about has to do 
with voting rights and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.177 The 
situation with respect to the Voting Rights Act was not bad when I 
took office in 1993, but beginning just before I took office, there 
was a decision by the Supreme Court called Shaw v. Reno,178 which 
essentially mystified everyone, including members of the Court, as to 
exactly what it meant. Most people focused on its vague 
desideratum, which was “bizarreness”—if a district was bizarre, 
whatever that meant, that was bad, and that was unconstitutional, 
and some way of “un-bizarring” it had to be done as quickly as 
possible. 
Well, the Justices set about, in a series of cases from Georgia,179 
Louisiana,180 and Texas,181 making clearer what the Shaw claim was 
all about. And it turned out that bizarreness had something to do 
 
 174. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 175. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
 176. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb (2000). 
 178. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 179. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 180. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
 181. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
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with it, but it was not the total answer to the question, “Is this 
constitutional?” because we found that there were really a lot of 
bizarre districts around the country. In fact, bizarreness was 
apparently a craving for some legislative redistricting bodies; they 
kind of like those tentacles going out in very strange directions. But 
suffice it to say that the Supreme Court concluded that in the 
redistricting process, race may not be a predominant motivating 
factor. Other considerations (compactness and contiguity, protecting 
incumbents, and so forth) might well be adequate and would satisfy 
constitutional demands. But essentially those decisions left pretty 
much in disarray the status of redistricting under the Voting Rights 
Act and under the Constitution. 
Walter had a subsequent case. Walter is from a state that has 
been the font of material for the Supreme Court with respect to 
redistricting. How many times has Shaw been before the Supreme 
Court? Five or six times, I think. It gets bizarrer and bizarrer every 
time. 
 
Walter Dellinger: We have a Bermuda Triangle of redistricting 
litigation [in North Carolina]. 
 
Drew Days: Well, I rest my case in that regard. 
The last thing, and I want to turn to Michael [Dreeben], but I 
want to bring up something that Charles [Fried] may have 
encountered and perhaps Bob Bork encountered and maybe Archie 
Cox as well, and that is the degree to which General Days did worse 
than Professor Days. I think it was with a perverse delight that some 
of the clerks enjoyed citing me against myself in cases that I lost. 
Justices would, with whatever is a written version of a straight face, 
cite me and say, “Professor Days said such and so about affirmative 
action or section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,” and then move on to 
devastate my argument in the rest of the opinion. Now that I am 
Professor Days again, it comes in really handy with students, but I 
was not amused, I have to tell you frankly, by that type of 
recognition on the part of the Court in some of these cases. 
Now, let me leave off by saying that Charles Fried reacted to Ken 
Starr’s discussion yesterday of his office’s successful track record by 
arguing that Ken had a more sympathetic Court. I make the same 
rejoinder to Ted Olson’s comment last night about the phenomenal  
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success rate that his office has had this past term. Let me stop here. 
Thank you. 
 
Michael Dreeben: As the only person on this panel that was in 
the office when Charles Fried was the solicitor general, continuing 
through Walter [Dellinger] and Seth [Waxman], and with Ken 
[Starr] also, it is a great honor for me to be on this panel today. 
Charles Fried hired me into the office in 1988. Drew Days promoted 
me to deputy solicitor general in 1994. Walter Dellinger was my 
criminal law professor at Duke. I am now the deputy with the 
principal responsibility for the criminal work. 
I want to discuss the office from a slightly different perspective 
than you get from the solicitors general. Having worked on the 
career staff as an assistant for many years and now serving as a career 
deputy, I see some of the longer-range themes in the office and the 
work of the office as played out in some of the less high-profile cases, 
which is really the majority of the work that the office does. I think 
that the work in those cases can inform, in some respects, what the 
role of the office is more generally. 
There have been several competing accounts of what the role of 
the solicitor general should be, or is, that have been offered by 
various panelists, and others have been voiced within the office from 
time to time. 
One is that the solicitor general represents the United States, or 
sometimes, “the people of the United States.” This is a great phrase 
and it is certainly true, but it is so vague as to be of absolutely no 
help in resolving any particular controversy. And usually when 
someone says that they want to advocate a position that is in the 
interest of the people of the United States, you can be fairly 
confident that you are going to get their view of what is in the 
interest of the people of the United States. You are going to have to 
go further if you want to get significant guidance as to what to do. 
Another theory is that the solicitor general is the lawyer for the 
executive branch. That is undoubtedly correct in a purely formal 
sense. The solicitor general works for an administration. He is 
appointed by a president. The executive power is lodged in that 
president. The solicitor general is not a free agent that can impose 
his own policy decisions on the rest of the government without 
accountability. But it still is not particularly helpful to make that 
observation because when the executive branch interests collide with 
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acts of Congress that may be more or less clear, a parochial view that 
says, “Well, we just represent the president and the executive 
branch,” is a lot easier to put forward by those people who do not 
actually have to go before the Justices and argue a case. The Justices 
are going to expect lawyers from our office to be able to respond to 
problems in their [legal] positions by reasoning from precedent and 
along the lines that the Court is accustomed to hearing, and you 
have to be able to function in that kind of environment in order to 
represent the United States as a lawyer in court. 
A third view is that the office really represents the institutional 
interest of the government, which is, I think as Andy Frey put it, 
distinct from whoever happens to be occupying the particular office 
at any one moment. It is undoubtedly true that that is a very valid 
consideration that often has a great bearing on what position the 
solicitor general will decide to take in a particular case. But even 
describing the office’s mission as representing institutional interests 
does not help you all that much when those institutional interests 
conflict. This can occur over very important matters, but as John 
Roberts indicated, it can also be over seemingly technical or 
unimportant matters. A lawyer who has recently announced that he 
is leaving our office and going back to private practice wrote an 
email that reported some of his strong memories of being in the 
office, and one of them was being in a meeting in which there was a 
shouting and screaming match between the Labor Department and 
the Federal Maritime Commission over the definition of a Jones 
Act182 seaman. I mean, you are working with people who can get 
excited enough to scream at each other over those things, and the 
solicitor general is going to have to make judgments about which 
institutional interests of the government he is going to represent. 
One case that came up during Solicitor General Days’s tenure 
was Jaffee v. Redmond,183 which involved the question of whether 
the Court should recognize a psychotherapist/patient privilege for 
communications that would then be inadmissible in court 
proceedings. The Jaffee case actually came up when a city 
policewoman shot someone and felt that this traumatic experience 
required help. She was referred to a psychotherapist, spent many 
 
 182. Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act (Merchant Marine)), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 
861–889 (2000). 
 183. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
114 
sessions with a psychotherapist reliving her experiences, and then 
ended up as the defendant in a 1983184 case and asserted a 
psychotherapist/patient privilege in federal court to keep her 
statements out of court. 
When this case was taken by the Supreme Court, the United 
States was not involved, but it was one that we had a clear interest in. 
We were looking at amicus participation. We got competing views of 
what the United States should do. On one hand, [we heard] from 
the Criminal Division, which is very hostile to evidentiary privileges 
and did not want to see the recognition of any new privilege by the 
Supreme Court. On the other hand, the law enforcement 
community felt fairly strongly that exactly what this officer had done, 
namely, seek psychotherapy after a traumatic incident, was what they 
counsel their officers to do, and they were very concerned about the 
effect on morale as well as the proper functioning of law 
enforcement. 
When you have these kinds of competing objectives in the 
government, both of which are wholly institutional, the solicitor 
general is going to have to do some kind of a reconciliation of the 
various interests, maybe make a decision that accommodates both 
interests, maybe make a decision that simply chooses one over the 
other. In that particular case, the solicitor general eventually decided 
to support the recognition of a limited psychotherapist/patient 
privilege, which is not as hard a call as the Criminal Division made it 
seem to be, since all fifty states already had some version of the 
psychotherapist/patient privilege. We had already seen evidence that 
the criminal justice system could function even if the privilege were 
recognized. But it was important, and it was part of our brief, to 
advocate for various exceptions that might be applicable in cases of 
child abuse and in other circumstances, like spousal abuse, that have 
since taken on a sub-jurisprudence in the world as courts try to 
figure out what Jaffee v. Redmond means, since the Court did 
ultimately recognize privilege. That is the institutional interest model 
of our office. 
A fourth model, which I do not think has been discussed, is one 
that comes from the Supreme Court itself in a case called Providence 
 
 184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (creating a private cause of action against some public 
officials who violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights when acting under color of official 
authority). 
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Journal,185 which involved whether judges could petition for 
certiorari to obtain review of decisions that had rejected contempt 
findings that judges had imposed. The Court held that the judges 
could not file their own petition for certiorari. The solicitor general 
was the only officer in the government who had that power because 
the solicitor general represents the United States, and the Court 
concluded that “the United States,” within the meaning of the 
statute,186 encompasses all three branches of government: the 
Congress, the executive, and the judicial branch. As a result of that 
interpretation, I think it is fair to say that we really have as clients the 
United States in all branches of government, and it would be 
difficult to say that we can exclude any one of them and 
single-mindedly pursue one particular branch’s interest. Ted Olson 
last night, I think, put that point in a somewhat different way, but it 
reflects what we actually do in the office, and that is that we have 
responsibilities to all three branches of government. 
Any one of these accounts, which are not necessarily consistent 
with each other, could be favored by anyone at any particular time, 
but on the question of whether any one of them is completely right, 
I find myself more or less in agreement with Charles Fried’s initial 
reaction, which is they are fairly abstract, and they do not illuminate 
what really goes on in the office. But I would take what Charles 
Fried said one step further and not discard them altogether, because 
what I think they do is work in combination to create a very healthy 
ambiguity about exactly what the solicitor general’s job is when there 
are competing interests that are pressed upon him: political, 
institutional, his view of what the right analysis of the law is, and so 
on. By having a somewhat complex status with potentially different 
client interests to serve, the solicitor general is actually able to 
achieve a fair amount of independence. The SG can tell people in the 
government, who are urging a position on him that he is not 
particularly wild about taking, that that is not going to sell in front 
of the Supreme Court, and here is the legal interpretation that 
supports that conclusion. 
The SG’s credibility in the interpretation of the law and in 
knowing what can be sold or what cannot be sold to the Supreme 
Court gives him a measure of independence as against institutional 
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interests of the government and against political pressures that are 
put on him. At the same time, the institutional interests can 
sometimes be played off against each other or against political 
objectives to put the SG in a position to frame a brief which is 
characteristically, in my experience, more nuanced, less hard-edged 
than any of the more bright-line proponents of a particular theory 
are urging him to do. I wanted to talk about a couple of cases that 
illustrate that very briefly. 
But before I go to the cases, it is important to say that part of 
how the SG is able to achieve some measure of independence by 
playing off his interpretations of the law with other policy objectives 
and institutional objectives is through the creation of very powerful 
traditions in the office that are passed down to new lawyers who join 
the office, usually in the form of stories about what happened. These 
stories may not always be accurate. Some of them may be wholly 
apocryphal. Some of them may be shaded. If you hear Larry 
Wallace’s account of Bob Jones,187 for example, you get a very 
different picture than I suppose you would get from Don Ayer or 
Tom Merrill. But the important thing is that these stories tend to 
reinforce a culture within the office that emphasizes technically 
excellent legal work, a real sense of obligation, and devotion to 
present to the Supreme Court an honest product. [That does not 
mean] a product that is not an advocate’s brief; believe me, we are 
advocates, and as the alums who are in the audience know from 
opposing us, we play hard when we have decided what we want to 
do. We will definitely argue hard for our positions, but always with 
the sense that you just do not want to be standing up in front of the 
Supreme Court arguing a position that is untenable for any reason—
because it is obviously political, because it is contrary to established 
doctrine that the Court is not going to overrule, or because it is 
contrary to the record. 
The mythology in the office is built up by telling stories about 
people like Rex Lee, whom I only had the opportunity to meet once. 
The SG has an office at the Supreme Court, which makes him one of 
the two officers of government, I believe, who has offices in two 
branches of government, the other being the vice president. It is 
really not much of an office, but it is where we hang out before 
arguments and then go back and sort of cheer each other on 
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afterwards. And any former member of the office can barge into our 
office at any moment. Rex was in court, having just argued a case, 
and he was ebullient and filled with vitality, and he bounded into the 
office. And instead of paying attention to all of the clients and other 
people who were around him, he started walking over to the people 
he had never seen before, like me, and introducing himself, shaking 
my hand, and asking me questions about myself. I was very 
impressed with the time that Rex Lee would take for a young and 
very inexperienced assistant, to get to know him. 
I’ll just talk briefly about a couple of cases that illustrate on a 
more mundane level, but I think perhaps a more characteristic level, 
how the SG moderates positions by virtue of being between the 
Court, the institutions of government that have their own agendas, 
and political actors. 
One of them is Wilson v. Arkansas,188 which was a case that came 
to the Supreme Court at least twenty years after anyone in the 
country really cared about the issue. It involved no-knock entries by 
police to execute a search warrant. This was a very hot issue during 
the Nixon administration when President Nixon secured legislation 
that authorized no-knock entries. And I can remember as a high 
school student reading editorials denouncing this. But as a legal 
matter it just simmered and went below the surface. Nothing ever 
happened about it until the early 1990s, when the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas decided to issue an opinion that held that there is no 
requirement that police knock and announce before entering to 
execute a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not incorporate that 
common law principle. The defendant, Wilson, then sought 
certiorari and obtained it, and we were looking at filing an amicus 
brief. 
Normally the government does file amicus briefs in criminal cases 
if there is any possible way to support the state. We very rarely file 
amicus briefs in criminal cases that do not support the state. That is 
the dominant institutional pattern though, I think it is safe to say, all 
solicitors general that I am aware of. In Wilson, however, we had a 
little bit of a problem. After thorough research by an assistant in our 
office, it became clear that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s position 
was entirely untenable. There was an incredible wealth of common 
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law history that supported the notion that the knock-and-announce 
rule was embedded in the fabric of how searches and seizures were 
done. There was a lot of movement on the Supreme Court, at least 
among some Justices, toward adopting a view that referred back to 
the common law to determine what protections were incorporated 
into the Fourth Amendment, although not consistently. 
So, we were facing the problem of having great difficulty seeing 
how we could support the state in the face of this case law. We 
ultimately determined that we could file a brief that supported the 
state, but it would not be a brief that said there is no knock-and-
announce rule. It would be a brief that says there is one, but it is 
subject to exceptions, as for instance, when the police think that the 
suspect is about to destroy the evidence to be seized, like drugs, or 
the suspect will escape, or the suspect will resist violently. These were 
all common law exceptions that we wanted to get foursquare before 
the Court and, therefore, filed a brief that argued those. 
This could be said to be somewhat contrary to the narrowly 
conceived institutional interest of the United States because certainly 
law enforcement would be better off if they did not have to justify 
knock-and-announce under any standard. They could just go in; the 
evidence would not be suppressed. And yet, we determined that this 
was an untenable position, and the solicitor general authorized the 
kind of brief that I described. 
When we got to argument, the attorney general of Arkansas, 
General Bryant, was defending his position of the firm line in the 
sand—there is no knock-and-announce principle. He got a lot of 
rough sledding from Justices who were saying, “You mean, you can 
take a bulldozer and just knock somebody’s door down? Would that 
be okay?” He was nodding his head, and we were sort of shaking our 
heads. Finally, the Court had enough and Justice O’Connor asked a 
question, and this is a quote: “Well, what’s the matter with the 
proposal of the solicitor general? That would certainly take into 
account the long common law tradition. I, for one, can’t buy your 
proposal at all. You have no comment on what the solicitor general 
proposes?” She went on in that vein for a while and finally the 
attorney general of Arkansas conceded and said, “Well, you have 
described the U.S. government’s position, and that is the state’s 
fallback position,” at which point Justice Scalia leaned forward and 
said, “Time to fall back, General.” 
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Another case that implicated similarly competing pressures but in 
a somewhat different way was Felker v. Turpin.189 Last night Ted 
Olson described the speed with which something got back to the 
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.190 In Felker v. Turpin, the Court 
looked at the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
[“AEDPA”],191 which was enacted and signed into law on April 24th 
and made major, sweeping changes in the law of habeas corpus—
primarily in the direction that the Supreme Court had been moving, 
but tightening it up even further. The law was in effect for nine days 
when I got a call from Emily Spadoni, the docket person in our 
office, who said, “The Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in a 
case, and they have posed some questions. You might want to come 
down and see it—it looks criminal.” So I went down to her office 
and picked it up and the questions were all about the 
constitutionality of the AEDPA. I looked at her and said, “This has 
got to be a joke, right? This is a mistake. This law was signed into 
law nine days ago and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and 
has specified three questions on its constitutionality?” Walter 
Dellinger’s comment on this was that he was “slack-jawed” that the 
Court would do it. But the Court did. It granted cert (it was entirely 
a state case—we were not involved in any phase of it and had never 
heard of it before), and invited the solicitor general to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States. 
There were really three questions that the Court had posed in 
Felker. One of them was the extent to which the AEDPA had left 
open the original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. The 
AEDPA had imposed massive restrictions on second or successive 
habeas petitions, which are ones that follow an earlier federal habeas 
petition, and had required that second or successive petitions go 
through a gatekeeper at the Court of Appeals which had to certify 
that the petitions met one of two very narrow circumstances, 
basically actual innocence or a newly discovered new rule of 
constitutional law that was made retroactive to the cases on collateral 
review. Absent that, there were not going to be any successor 
petitions. And Congress went further and also said, “There shall be 
no review of the gatekeeper decision by writ of certiorari.” Felker 
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filed his application for a second habeas petition after the AEDPA 
[took effect]. The Eleventh Circuit said, “You do not qualify under 
the AEDPA standards. You say that the law is unconstitutional, but 
we say it is not because it is not all that different from prior habeas 
law.” Felker then petitioned for certiorari, which the statute said he 
could not do, and filed his own writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme 
Court itself. Now, the Supreme Court has historically, since the first 
Judiciary Act,192 had the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
but it does not like to start out with anything in its court. The last 
thing that it wants to do is be the last guardian of habeas corpus; it 
wants everything to go through the lower courts. And the question 
was, “Did the AEDPA do away with the Court’s authority to hear 
original habeas [petitions] or not?” 
The second question in the case was the constitutionality of the 
restrictions on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and [the third 
question was] whether the law violated the Suspension Clause, which 
prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus. Now, in this case we took 
a very middle-line position. We did not follow the state’s hard-line 
position that there was no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court. Again, we crafted a position that allowed the Court 
to avoid some of the real land mines in this area of the law. Because 
time is running out, I will not describe what happened in this case, 
but suffice it to say that we encountered pressures within the 
department both to be more friendly towards habeas petitioners and 
more restrictive of the habeas power. Again, the solicitor general was 
able to steer a middle-ground position, which the Court adopted 
almost totally in a unanimous opinion. That was in part a reflection 
of the ability of our office to take many different points of view and 
refract them into a single operating position. 
 
Walter Dellinger: Over the course of the next three panels on 
which I will be participating, I want to set out an overview of the 
office with particular examples. Some may fall in this panel and some 
in the subsequent panels. 
I begin with three propositions, all of which are important and 
each of which is in tension with the others. The first is that the 
solicitor general’s client is the United States. The second principle is 
that the solicitor general’s supervisor is the president of the United 
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States (and the attorney general, under appropriate circumstances). 
And the third principle is that the president, when he steps into the 
shoes of the solicitor general, also has as his client the United States. 
If you think through all three of those propositions, I think it brings 
you to a working way to conceive of the office. By the last of those, I 
mean that the president must be—and those who work more directly 
for the president must be—convinced that even when the president 
steps in to take a position different than the solicitor general, he has 
the obligation to take into account the long-range interest of the 
United States and not just the interest of a particular president or 
particular administration. 
I will talk about a series of cases which to me illustrate points 
about the importance of the solicitor general having a fairly 
complicated view of his role. 
First, I think that the best way to maintain the independence of 
the office is by active engagement with the rest of the administration 
early and often. I think the solicitor general should be in the 
president’s face on a number of issues to try to persuade the 
president of what is in the long-range interest of the United States, 
not to withdraw behind a moat and hope for lack of interference 
with the person who is elected by the people of the United States. 
The Solicitor General’s Office brings to bear, secondly, the view 
of the generalist and the ability to maintain technical accuracy and a 
position of integrity. And the SG, I think, will inevitably serve as a 
moderating influence. It was quite striking listening to Don Ayer, 
who was pushing in the Solicitor General’s Office to take a position 
on the use of race in affirmative action. The SG was saying, “It is 
untenable to take the position that the right answer is zero outside 
the context of particular, individualized remediation.” I found myself 
pushing the other way in my administration—that the right answer is 
not that you can do anything in the name of affirmative action and 
get away with it—and coming in the direction of the Croson193 
position that you articulated, [Don Ayer]. As you had moved from 
the right towards the center, I found the SG’s Office in my time 
moving from the left towards the center against the forces of the 
administration. And it struck me as you were talking, Don, to look at 
the six cases that I thought I could discuss which were cases in which 
there was a controversy, or there were pressures, or there were issues 
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with which I had to deal. I realized that in these half-dozen cases, in 
every instance, not surprisingly, I was taking essentially the more 
“conservative” position, if you label that, than would be natural in a 
Democratic administration. Perhaps that will inevitably be the case 
when one is pushing more for long-term stability and the interest of 
the United States. 
Let me [mention] one point about politics, which is that the 
Solicitor General’s Office is not always right. We have the model 
from Lincoln Caplan194 that the Solicitor General’s Office is 
representing the rule of law and independence, and the White House 
is representing narrow partisan political interests and, therefore, will 
be urging the wrong position on the government. I just want to 
caution that that is not always the right model. The perfect example 
in my view was a case called Barclays Bank.195 
Now, I come at this from a different vantage point than anybody 
else here. During the four and one-half years I was in the 
government, I served first in the White House for three months 
while we waited for things to sort out at the Department of Justice. I 
was in the White House being one of the people that are sort of 
labeled the guys in the black hats at this conference, though I 
thought of myself as someone who could play a white-hat role in 
that context and help defend the solicitor general. Then, for more 
than three years I headed the Office of Legal Counsel [“OLC”] and 
saw the SG’s Office from that perspective. And then, while I 
continued technically as the head of OLC until the day I left the 
government, I spent more than a full term as acting solicitor general 
and saw the work from all of these vantage points. 
Barclays Bank [involved] a tax dispute in which California was 
trying to tax foreign corporations, like Barclays Bank of England, in 
a way that is inconsistent with the international treaties and the 
right-thinking position of all people in the international community. 
The SG’s Office was inclined, through the career people, to support 
the position of Barclays Bank and the right-thinking internationalists. 
But the White House realized that the State of California, which was 
going to lose billions of dollars if it lost the capacity to continue its 
present taxing principles, had fifty-four more electoral votes than the 
Barclays Bank of England had. And the idea that the U.S. would 
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weigh in to take billions away from the state seemed to set this up as 
an almost prototypical kind of dispute. 
I wanted to weigh in to defend the prerogatives of the SG’s 
Office. But I became convinced that actually the White House 
position was right as a matter of law and the SG’s position was 
wrong. [I came to see] that, in fact, there is a politics in the SG’s 
Office that does not recognize itself as politics. The problem was that 
the Senate simply had rejected a provision of a treaty that would 
apply this to sub-national levels. The State of California really did 
have this authority to tax in this way, no matter how unwise it was, 
and I thought the SG’s Office was quite wrong. To some degree, it 
wrapped itself in the envelope that “we must be taking the high-
minded position because it is the position contrary to California’s 
fifty-four electoral votes.” At the end of the day, the office agreed to 
support California’s position, which was vindicated seven to two by 
the Supreme Court. It is not always the case that the SG’s Office is 
right. There is a kind of politics that does not know its name. 
Now, as to the role of the SG as a moderating influence. We use 
the term “politicization” as the most pejorative term that can be 
used at a conference of this kind. But in a country governed by 
majority rule, politics is a way in which we as a community of good 
will go about governing ourselves. Politics is not in itself an evil 
thing, and therefore, I think it appropriate for an administration who 
believes that the Court has gone off on the wrong track to speak in 
the name of the people of the United States and tell the Court 
that—even in cases in which there is not a more narrow 
programmatic or agency interest of the United States. 
Judicial review, as Alexander Bickel said, is a variant institution in 
a political culture based on majority rule.196 We tolerate judicial 
review and lifetime independence of the judiciary because we know it 
serves these enormously valuable functions. The Justices may not 
have their salary reduced. They may not be fired. They may not be 
displaced. They are protected by the great lifetime tenure standard, 
and all of that has inured to our benefit as a country. But when a 
president is elected, as Ronald Reagan was in 1980, who had the 
advantage of clearly standing for certain things, and on some of 
those things thought the Court was going in the wrong direction, it 
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seems to me perfectly appropriate for that president’s solicitor 
general to appear before the Court and say why a newly elected 
president thinks on some of these issues the Court has got it wrong. 
Our sensitivity to the Court’s independence should stop short of 
saying that the people, through the elected president and the 
solicitor general, should not even speak to the Court about where 
they think they have gone wrong on issues like school prayer and 
others. 
In my view, Rex Lee got the school prayer issue exactly right by 
taking the position that although the United States has no really 
serious programmatic or agency interest as such in school prayer, of 
course the newly elected president wanted to speak to the Court on 
that issue in favor of opening up public areas to religion—but that 
through the solicitor general he should do so only to the extent that 
it is professionally responsible, coherent, and consistent with the 
Court’s own precedents. So, while brooking the criticism of those 
who say, “You should not get in at all on those issues, you should 
stick to the knitting of agency issues,” [Rex Lee] also rejected those 
who had pushed the SG all the way to accomplish what would be 
accomplished by a constitutional amendment supported by President 
Reagan but not supported by the existing law. And that seems to me 
to get it just right. 
Now, by saying that I think the SG can operate best by a policy 
of engagement, not a policy of withdrawal or separation, I can give 
you several examples during my tenure of getting out front of an 
issue and engaging the administration. 
A very simple example is the striker-replacement executive 
order.197 The president, as contractor-in-chief, has some statutory 
authority to place restrictions on those who contract with the 
government to promote the efficiency and economy of government 
contracts. President Clinton, in a very controversial move, issued an 
executive order saying that you may not be a contractor with the 
United States government if you replace striking workers with 
permanent replacements. This was a major commitment of the 
administration, made by the vice president himself at the AFL-CIO’s 
annual meeting. It was a huge political commitment to this executive 
order. One of the toughest decisions we had to make at OLC was 
whether we thought it was lawful. I agonized over this at OLC and 
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insisted on the Labor Department’s having more and more affidavits 
as to why it would promote efficiency to contract only with people 
that would not bring in replacements. I was barely persuaded that we 
could sign off on the authority of the executive order based on some 
Bush administration precedents about posting your right not to join 
a union as part of contracting executive orders. 
The government got its ears pinned back in the D.C. Circuit in a 
very strong opinion by Judge Silberman,198 three to zero, saying this 
was beyond the president’s executive order capacity; the president 
does not have the authority to rule by decree, and this is beyond 
what is necessary for efficiency and improvement. There was an 
immediate announcement that we would defend this till the last dog 
died. And indeed, en banc review was authorized to the D.C. 
Circuit. En banc review was denied with only two dissents, from 
Judge Tatel and Judge Rogers.199 To me, there was a silence that was 
enormous; Judge Harry Edwards, one of the best labor law scholars 
academia has ever known, did not dissent from the denial of en banc 
review. That sent to me a strong message. 
I also believed that this was a very weak case in which to test 
before this Court the important authority of the president to issue 
executive orders to carry out his policies. If we were to take this to 
the Supreme Court, our basic argument would be: if this is beyond 
the president’s authority, so would be 11,246,200 the major 
anti-discrimination executive order. And I was not about to put that 
on the table. I could see there were members of the court saying, 
“Oh, you mean if we invalidate this, it means we also have to 
invalidate 11,246, the foundational anti-discrimination executive 
order? Yes, keep talking.” I did not think it defensible, in light of 
Judge Silberman’s powerful opinion, but was told, “There is just no 
question but that you have to take this up. There is a commitment to 
this.” What I did was go ask to see the Secretary of Labor, who 
fortunately in this instance began his legal career as an assistant in the 
Solicitor General’s Office—Robert Reich. I sat down, and I said, “It 
is going to be very bad for the long-range interest of the United 
States and the executive branch to try to defend a not clearly 
defensible exercise of the president’s authority.” And he said, “I 
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can’t believe you are asking me to change the Labor Department’s 
recommendation.” I said, “No, I’m not. You are the Department of 
Labor. Your job is to urge us strongly to take this to the Supreme 
Court. My job is to say, ‘No.’ You owe it to the constituency of this 
department. I understand the dynamics of that. You have to urge 
that we take this to the Supreme Court, but I want you to 
understand fully why I am going to decline.” What is interesting is 
by the time the matter came to the White House, I was told, of 
course, that the Secretary of Labor would go to the president to 
overrule me, and I said, “Well, you speak to the Secretary of Labor. I 
believe in getting out on these issues.” 
Let me give one more example of these three positions. I know 
we need to take a break. I will just mention the first part of the great 
controversy over obscene art, National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley,201 to make the point that I do believe that the solicitor 
general’s client is the United States and not the executive branch. 
The NEA gives money to people whose art it thinks passes 
professional review standards, and it includes giving it to people who 
do things like use government funds to buy chocolate with which to 
smear their naked bodies while they engage in screeds, as Karen 
Finley does. The NEA’s position is that it does these on the merits—
it does not take politics into account. Therefore, it was horrified 
when an amendment was passed that forbade the granting of funds 
for this kind of obscene use. Karen Finley and three others sued 
whose grants were targets of this act of Congress. [The District 
Court granted summary judgment for Finley,202 and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.203] There had never been an agency more 
delighted over losing a case than when the NEA lost the Finley case 
in the Ninth Circuit. 
[So the question arose whether to ask the Supreme Court to hear 
the case. The NEA did not want to appeal.] They said, “We don’t 
like that law and now we’re free of it because we lost in the Ninth 
Circuit.” I said, “Of course, we have to appeal. It is an act of 
Congress. It is wholly defensible, and it is probably constitutional. 
What you folks do not understand is that you also engage in 
censorship when you choose which art you are going to fund.” I 
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made too many enemies on this case. I said, “Are you telling me that 
if Karen Finley did exactly the same thing and if she smeared her 
naked body with chocolate and criticized the capital gains tax, that 
you would have thought it equally worthy of funding? No, you 
would not. You are making judgments yourself. It is a problem of 
saying that you can make judgments but the Philistines in the House 
of Representatives cannot. This is defensible, and we have to defend 
it and that is because, even though the administration in a large 
sense was happy with the invalidation of this act of Congress, we 
have a larger interest that it is a law of the United States that has to 
be defended.” 
I believe that given the amount of time we have, I want to save 
until the next Clinton panel the further nuances of why you have to 
recognize that the president is your superior and why you have to 
convince the president that his client is the United States and not 
yourself. Thank you. 
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Clinton II Panel 
 
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997–2001. 
 
Walter E. Dellinger III: Acting Solicitor General, 1996–1997. 
 
Barbara D. Underwood: Acting Solicitor General, 2001; Principal 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1998–2001. 
 
Michael R. Dreeben: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1988–1994; 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1994–present. 
 
Seth Waxman: I came up here and promptly put my papers 
down firmly between Michael Dreeben and [the statue of] Rex Lee, 
which is a wonderful place to situate oneself.  I came back from the 
break to find my papers placed in the number one seat. That being 
now the case, I will use my prerogative to take the last fifteen 
minutes of this session. It makes sense for Walter to speak first, since 
he was the acting SG during the first seven months of Clinton II. I 
suggest we then hear from Barbara and Michael, and I will bat clean 
up—taking the unenviable position of being the only thing that 
stands—or speaks—between you and lunch. I am quite mindful of 
my own highly underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint when 
speaking without the Supreme Court’s red light. So it is partly to 
protect myself that I will go last. 
 
Walter Dellinger: The last time I was here, I knew I was going 
to be taking over the SG’s Office and had a chance to meet with Rex 
Lee privately. After a wonderful lunch that we had—and no one else 
knew—I told him in confidence that I was going to be taking over 
that office. It was a truly wonderful experience. 
I have here a surprising number of former students, for someone 
of my youth. On the faculty of Brigham Young University, Lynn 
Wardle and Jack Welch; and elder of the Church [of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints] Todd Christofferson, are all former students of 
mine, as well as Michael Dreeben and Ken Starr—an unusually large 
number that makes me particularly honored to be here. 
Let me slow down and calm down a bit. 
 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 129 
Seth Waxman: Don’t slow down too much! 
 
Walter Dellinger: I’ll speak more slowly within the allotted time 
of this panel. 
I think there have been eras in which the Solicitor General’s 
Office in a sense tried to wall itself off from the administration and 
hoped that other people were not noticing what it was doing. If they 
read about it in the papers, that was fine, but it was too late to do 
anything. As I was beginning to describe [in the previous panel], I 
took almost the exact opposite tack—active confrontation—in order 
to make sure that my superiors, the attorney general and the 
president, understood the professional view of the long-range 
interest of the United States. I think probably I met more frequently 
with the president on legal issues that Ken was describing, and I gave 
this advice to Ted Olson when he and I had meetings before his 
confirmation hearings. 
I thought it useful to go over to the White House before the 
term began to meet with the attorney general and the deputy 
attorney general and then to go meet at the White House with the 
president and the White House Counsel. I reviewed everything that 
was coming up and what position we would plan to take, and which 
ones we thought they might disagree with us on, and if they were 
inclined to disagree with us, why I thought they were wrong. 
I had the advantage of longevity in the administration when I 
came in, which was a very useful fact. I had been head of the OLC 
[Office of Legal Counsel] for nearly four years, and I was 
accustomed to telling the administration “no,” which is something 
you do more often in the role of solicitor general. Particularly given 
some of the particularities of this administration, I had to say “no” 
perhaps more often than usual, but I was quite comfortable with that 
role and with fairly regular communications with the White House. 
As I said, I tended to wind up pushing us in a somewhat more 
conservative direction just by the nature of the office. The short 
example is Agostini v. Felton,204 where I did believe it was fully 
defensible that we could ask the Court to overrule Aguilar v. 
Felton.205 [We believed] the use of Title I funds to provide remedial 
assistance to low-income, learning-disabled children wherever they 
 
 204. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 205. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
130 
can be found during the school day, including the public schools, 
was both constitutional and highly defensible, and we were not 
asking the Court to reconsider its 1970s precedent. And though we 
tried to be somewhat cautious, I did have to ignore some constraints 
from those that wanted us not to set a precedent that would lead to 
a bad outcome. It was inevitable that a decision overruling Aguilar 
v. Felton would be a step down that road, but I did meet early and 
often with the Secretary of Education to make sure that he 
understood the position we were going to be taking. 
I think it is very important in certain cases to recognize that the 
president is your superior, and not some deputy White House 
Counsel. I much admired one solicitor general whom I heard say on 
the phone when he was asked, “Do you recognize that the president 
has the authority to overrule you?” He said, “I do recognize that. 
What I do not recognize is that I was speaking with the president of 
the United States.” As, of course, he was not. On one occasion when 
Jack Quinn spent some hours trying to persuade me that we wanted 
to be supporting referendum advocates in a case called Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona,206 [because] the Ninth Circuit had taken 
a case that was jurisdictionally flawed in nine different ways and 
because we sort of believed in referendum people. I finally had to 
say, “If you want to take this to the president, take it to the 
president.” A great check is to tell people that you want the 
president personally involved. “If you think it is important enough to 
engage the president, then I am happy to be overruled. I am happy 
to be overruled. But I am not talking to the president.” I actually 
learned that from one of my predecessors. That, I think, is a very 
good stance to take, that an SG be overruled on a question like that 
only if the matter is of sufficient importance that it is taken to the 
president, and the president hears you out. And then I think you 
ought to carefully acknowledge who is elected by the electoral 
process of Article II of the Constitution and who is not, who is 
named in the Constitution and who is not, and who is entitled to 
make these decisions for the executive branch and who is not. That is 
the key. 
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In Piscataway,207 Sharon Taxman was dismissed [from her job as 
a high school teacher]. She would have been entitled, by virtue of 
winning a coin flip, to seniority to maintain a position when the 
school board reduced the number of positions in the business 
faculty.208 I think there was no defense of diversity there that was at 
all tenable because the school system did not lack diversity—it was 
only a lack of diversity among ten teachers in the business 
curriculum—and there was no showing that any students had their 
curriculum dominated by courses in this one particular part of the 
high school curriculum. The Bush administration had joined Sharon 
Taxman to bring this lawsuit. During Clinton I, we had reversed 
positions and sided with the school board defending their policy. I 
had argued against that from my vantage point at OLC, and when 
the matter got to the Supreme Court, I found myself in the position 
of making the call in the Solicitor General’s Office. 
I was told there was no way we could get the administration to 
do a double reverse and a double back flip, but I really thought the 
position we would be arguing was utterly untenable. It was wrong as 
a matter of law and terrible for a civil rights policy. To me it was as 
untenable as the position that Don [Ayer] was faced with in arguing 
that the right answer is zero—to argue why, in light of Wygant209 
and other cases, the right answer is that you do not need any 
justification, or you do not need to demonstrate a lack of diversity or 
not in this case. I thought the predicted reaction of the Court was to 
say that “if this is what they think they mean by affirmative action, 
we are going to have to say the only answer is zero.” And I do not 
happen to believe that the right answer is zero. I believe it is 
somewhere along the axis of where Justice Powell and Justice 
O’Connor would be. 
But in that instance, knowing how difficult it would be to get 
the administration to suffer a reversal on the part of the civil rights 
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community, I scheduled meetings with the leadership of the civil 
rights community and explained what our position was going to be. 
I can say that I knew that they would disagree, but thoroughly 
ventilating it with them [was important] before I then asked for a 
meeting with the president, where I was accompanied by my deputy, 
Seth Waxman. I think that was one of the best meetings I had in the 
government, where we set out why we thought we needed to take 
the position that we thought that the school board was wrong and 
that Sharon Taxman should prevail, even though we thought the 
Third Circuit had gone too far in a scorched-earth, zero-is-the-
answer opinion. The president agreed to let us do that, and I 
thought early engagement was the way to take that position. 
Finally, let me just mention one other example. Not only is it 
proper for the solicitor general to enter into cases where he believes 
that the Court may have gone wrong, but he can also be useful even 
where the administration does not have a programmatic interest. 
Being an amicus is a real joy because you can sort of pick your 
position. You do not have a real client. That was true of the 
physician-assisted suicide cases, where I thought our office played its 
most useful role of any in my time. 
The physician-assisted suicide debate came down, in that term, 
to a debate between what I thought were somewhat untenably 
extreme positions. One was the right-to-die position, argued by the 
advocates who had prevailed in the Ninth Circuit and in the Second 
Circuit, that there was a constitutional right to die. The argument by 
the states of New York and Washington was that there was no 
cognizable liberty interest involved here at all. Now, I was persuaded 
by talking to a number of people—by some very thoughtful 
reflections by career people at the SG’s Office—that there really was 
a deeply cognizable liberty interest in ameliorating pain and 
suffering. But that ended there. You could not simply say there is no 
liberty interest here; Cruzan’s210 supposition that one has a right to 
resist unwanted medical treatment should really be the law—there 
should be a liberty interest in declining unwanted medical treatment, 
and that should be extended to those who wish to avoid the 
infliction of pain. But for the present, the states did have a quite 
legitimate and, indeed, compelling interest in preventing lethal 
medication, and there were not sufficient safeguards in place. The 
 
 210. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 133 
line they used at oral argument was to say that the problem that the 
states are concerned with is a legitimate one: in a managed care, 
cost-conscious system, lethal medication is the least expensive 
treatment for any illness. So the states have, at this time, a very 
serious reason for not unleashing cheap, inexpensive lethal 
medication in the cost-conscious medical care system, but you 
should not say that there is no liberty interest here of any 
substantiality at all. 
So we were able to take the position that made the states 
somewhat unhappy, though our bottom line was that their statutes 
were constitutional, and that made the right-to-life philosophical 
commitment group unhappy. And I thought it made Justice 
O’Connor unhappy because she started questioning me about it 
before I could say, “May it please the court.” But it is the position 
she came to. She already had come to it and was testing it out. That 
allowed Justice O’Connor to capture the Court, essentially adopting 
the position of the middle that we put forth. I think the two sides of 
the client interests did not have the flexibility to argue a more 
intermediate position, which really did appeal to the Court. I think 
that it is a very useful function to have a body who can sometimes 
take a position in between what the parties do. It does not have to 
be the solicitor general, but [the SG’s Office has] the only people 
who have access to the Court, to come in in certain cases without a 
strong client agenda and to try and help the Court figure out what is 
the right resolution. 
The single best decision I made as solicitor general was to select 
Seth Waxman as my deputy. And to save time for Seth, I will move 
this on to Barbara. 
 
Seth Waxman: Thank you, Walter. When I said, “Don’t go too 
slow,” I hope you understood that— 
 
Walter Dellinger: I did. You have said it to me many times! 
[Waxman and Dellinger laugh.] 
 
Seth Waxman: Barbara was my “political” deputy—I guess that 
is what we are calling it for purposes of this conference. When I 
became SG I understood that I could pick pretty much anyone I 
wanted as a political deputy. I do not think I have ever had a 
“political” conversation with Barbara, and I do not consider myself 
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to be much of a political partisan. In fact, I am quite confident that 
this was the only time that the political deputy position has been 
filled by a career prosecutor. My prior professional involvement with 
Barbara was in the role of her student: Barbara taught me Criminal 
Law I and Criminal Law II at the Yale Law School. When I joined 
the administration of Janet Reno, I was amazed to discover that 
Barbara was the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District 
of New York. And when I became SG and thought hard about what 
I most wanted in terms of a deputy, it was the person who had made 
such an impression upon me as a young law student. And so my 
“political deputy” was in fact detailed from the Executive Office of 
United States Attorneys. So, for the views of my “political” deputy, 
here is Barbara. 
 
Barbara Underwood: In that vein, I think I probably had the 
distinction of being the only political deputy to be retained as the 
acting solicitor general by a new administration of a different 
political party. I took it as a tribute to the nonpolitical character of 
my work as the so-called political deputy. I suggest that “political” is 
not quite the right word. The person in that position is also, and 
more appropriately,  known as the principal deputy. It’s a position 
that allows the head of the agency to appoint one new deputy to 
work with the career deputies who remain from one administration 
to the next. It makes a lot of sense, and not just “political” sense, 
that when somebody becomes the head of an office that person 
should be able to bring in one new principal assistant. Maybe I am 
particularly sympathetic to that view since I have gone from one 
government office to another in just that role—as first assistant, or 
right-hand person, to a series of state and federal agency heads. 
Most of what I did in the Solicitor General’s Office was 
completely without political content, but it is true that the principal 
deputy can play a role in dealing with the White House, or with 
political people in other agencies, in  a way that might be more 
difficult for career members of the solicitor general’s staff. 
One case that required me to discuss sensitive political questions 
with people in the White House Counsel’s office was Stenberg v. 
Carhart,211 the so-called “partial birth abortion” case, which 
involved a state statute that was, as the Supreme Court eventually 
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held, both hopelessly vague and an undue burden on women’s 
health and abortion rights, but at the same time was aimed at a 
problem in which the states had a legitimate interest. Prior 
administrations had been criticized for filing amicus curiae briefs in 
abortion cases, on the ground that the federal government had no 
programmatic interest in the issue. But it seemed clear to, among 
others, the Department of Health and Human Services that we did 
have a strong programmatic interest, because the federal government 
provides or pays for health services, including abortions, to people 
who depend for health care on the Indian Health Service, the federal 
Bureau of Prisons, or Medicare or Medicaid, and thus the statute 
could affect the ability of the federal government to provide or pay 
for medically appropriate abortion services to those people. The 
Department of Health and Human Services was a very strong 
proponent of filing a brief amicus curiae in support of the doctor’s 
challenge to the statute. 
 In addition, the President had taken a strong public stand on 
the issue. Congress had passed somewhat similar bills, and the 
President had vetoed them stating that these particular bills were 
vague and were an undue burden on the right to abortion, but that 
he would sign a suitably precise and tailored bill that allowed 
abortions of this type when necessary for a woman’s health. 
 The question was whether we could and should file a brief 
that would (1) protect and advance the interest of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, (2) be consistent with what the 
President had said, and (3) be useful to the Court, or whether we 
should just stay out of the case. Some thought that it would be 
appropriate for the solicitor general to file such a brief, but that such 
a brief could not be written. That, of course, was a lawyer’s 
challenge. We set out to meet the challenge by drafting a brief that 
met all three objectives, we persuaded the skeptics that we had done 
so and filed the brief, and the Supreme Court essentially adopted our 
views. 
In the course of working out the government’s position in that 
case, we served a function that is quite characteristic of the solicitor 
general’s role as amicus curiae. It’s a role that Walter was just 
describing in the right-to-die cases. We took a more moderate 
position than that favored by either of the parties in the case. The 
lawyers for the doctor wanted to argue that any attempt to regulate 
the method by which abortions are performed is unlawful, while the 
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state took the position that almost any regulation short of 
prohibition is lawful. We were saying something in between—that 
while there is room for lawful regulation of abortion, this statute had 
two fatal defects: first, it was so vague that doctors could not know 
whether they were complying with it or not, and second, it was too 
broad, in that it prohibited abortions that were necessary for the 
health and safety of some women. 
That whole process of deciding whether to file and what to say in 
such a politically sensitive matter would have been very difficult for 
someone who did not have the political confidence of the White 
House Counsel’s office as well as the professional respect of the 
lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office. Convincing the President’s 
staff that the brief satisfied all the necessary interests required 
political—or perhaps diplomatic—skills. But writing the brief 
required only the traditional advocacy skills familiar to every member 
of the solicitor general’s staff. 
The work of the Solicitor General’s Office calls on advocacy skills 
of a very special sort. I’d like to talk about one role of the solicitor 
general that is not often available to other litigants: the role of 
helping the Court to decide which of the many possible cases should 
be selected as the vehicle to bring an issue before the Court. The 
laws and legal theories that the solicitor general defends can arise in a 
wide variety of factual contexts, and the SG has a greater opportunity 
than most litigants to try to put the government’s position before 
the Court in a case with favorable facts. 
We tried very hard to do that in a series of cases that arose during 
my tenure involving the  Disabilities Act.212 One issue was whether 
the Disabilities Act protects people who have correctable disabilities. 
The [Justice Department’s] Civil Rights Division and the EEOC 
[Equal Employment Opportunities Commission], who enforce the 
Disabilities Act, argued strongly that it does. We hoped to present 
that issue to the Court in a case involving diabetes or epilepsy—
serious conditions that can be controlled with medication, but 
nevertheless often result in discrimination. Unfortunately, the case in 
which the Court decided the issue involved not people with epilepsy 
or diabetes, but people who were near-sighted and wore glasses.213 
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The Court had asked for the views of the solicitor general as to 
whether certiorari should be granted in the glasses case, and we 
urged the Court not to take the case. Unfortunately, they ignored 
our advice. Not surprisingly, on facts like that, the Court found that 
the Disabilities Act does not cover correctable disabilities. 
In another case we had more success in getting a legal question 
before the Court on sympathetic facts. Many states were challenging 
the applicability of the Disabilities Act to state governments, as 
employers and as providers of public facilities. In defending against 
that challenge, we wanted to go to the Court in a case involving 
especially egregious discrimination. My personal favorite was one 
involving a state courthouse that was accessible only through large 
flights of steps. A person in a wheelchair was suing to compel the 
state to provide him with access to the courthouse by some means 
other than crawling up the steps. That case remained pending in the 
court of appeals, and was not ripe for review by the Supreme Court. 
But we found another case that also presented very sympathetic facts: 
a recovered breast cancer patient who had been removed from her 
job as a nursing supervisor in a state hospital.214 Despite the favorable 
facts, and despite a really splendid legislative record of state 
discrimination on the basis of disability, the Court nevertheless 
rejected our position and found the states immune to suit. I suppose 
that shows that facts are not everything; sometimes there is simply a 
pure disagreement about the law. 
In another case, though, the process of trying to engineer the 
facts may have made a difference. There was a split in the circuits 
about whether a law enforcement officer could invoke qualified 
immunity to a suit for the unconstitutional use of excessive force. 
Some courts had held that there could be no immunity in such cases, 
because immunity is only for reasonable mistakes, and excessive force 
is by definition unreasonable. Other courts had adopted our view, 
that because the law of excessive force evolves, an officer can make a 
reasonable mistake about actions a court later finds unreasonable. 
The issue was before the Court in a state tort case in which a 
New Orleans police officer had shot a fleeing felon in the back, 
paralyzing him; the paralyzed man had sued the officer. While the 
officer claimed he saw a gun, there was no evidence to support that 
claim, or so the briefs said. The Fifth Circuit had ruled that although 
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the officer used excessive force, he was entitled to immunity from 
suit because his mistake was reasonable,215 and the case was now 
before the Court on the victim’s petition to the Supreme Court. We 
were quite concerned that this case was going to make bad law for 
the government, that the Court would conclude that there can be no 
immunity for use of excessive force, because an officer can never be 
reasonable in doing an unreasonable thing like shooting somebody 
in the back. 
I asked the attorney who was working with me on the case to dig 
into the record to see what we could find. There had to be more to 
this story. We found two gems in the record. First, we found that 
these people were running through a swamp in waist-deep mud, so 
their failure to find the fleeing felon’s gun did not show he didn’t 
have one—if he had dropped it in the mud they would have been 
unable to find it. 
 
Seth Waxman: That also gives new meaning to the word 
“fleeing.” 
 
Barbara Underwood: Yes. 
 
Seth Waxman: If they are waist-deep in the mud. 
 
Barbara Underwood: And second, the trial court had given an 
instruction that was not right on anybody’s theory of the law but 
favored the defendant, and he lost anyway. So it muddied the legal 
question. We filed an amicus brief urging the Court to dismiss the 
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the case did not 
really present the very important legal question that the Court had 
intended to decide. And that is just what the Court did. The result 
was good for the city and the officer, since they had won below. And 
it was good for us because we got to litigate the issue a year or so 
later, on much better facts.  
 The case that eventually led to a decision on the issue involved 
somebody who had been violating restrictions on demonstrations at 
a San Francisco military base and had caused some concern about the 
 
 215. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 525 U.S. 1098 
(1999), cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 139 
welfare of the vice president, who was only a few feet away.216 He 
claimed that when federal law enforcement officers arrested him, 
they shoved him too hard. In that case we successfully argued that 
the officers were immune, and that an officer can reasonably believe 
he is using appropriate force even if a court later finds the force was 
excessive. I think if the issue had gone up on the New Orleans 
shooting, instead of the California shove, we could well have had a 
different result. 
 
Seth Waxman: Just to punctuate the presentations of my non-
career and career deputies, I want to react to some of the things that 
have been said suggesting that one of the functions of the non-career 
appointees is to insulate and protect the career attorneys from the 
administration in power. I have a different view. I think one of the 
great strengths under our system of government is the wonderful 
dialectic and transparency between career people and non-career 
people: each has to accommodate the other, and the country is 
stronger for that. I strove to conduct the operations of my office, 
and its relations with the president and the attorney general and 
other non-career appointees, so as to make little or no distinction 
between my non-career deputy and my career deputies. Maybe I 
created facts on the ground by appointing a career political deputy. 
To some extent I was able to do this because of the perspective of 
the president and the attorney general I served. Janet Reno was 
insistent about learning first-hand the views of the career prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials; she did not want those views filtered 
through political appointees. The least important people in Janet 
Reno’s legendary meetings about issues were the non-career people. 
And as a result, I did not distinguish in case assignments, or in the 
way people talked within the office, between Barbara and the other 
deputies. But Michael will speak for himself—and I’m confident will 
do so characteristically well. 
 
Michael Dreeben: I want to pick up exactly where Seth left off 
because in late Clinton I and Clinton II, there were two cases that 
crossed the criminal docket that really put the Solicitor General’s 
Office in the eye of a huge political storm. I want to describe how 
the office reacted to those cases in determining what position the 
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solicitor general would ultimately take. Of course, the solicitor 
general determined that himself, but he had help from the staff. I 
will use these stories to try to illustrate how the established 
traditional processes of the department helped to diffuse and prevent 
political pressures from obscuring the solicitor general’s ability to 
choose what the legal rule is that he should support. 
The first case is an indirect decedent of the Morrison v. Olson217 
case that was described earlier. As a result of the Supreme Court’s 
having upheld the independent counsel statute, a former solicitor 
general, Ken Starr, was able to take on a second career as an 
independent counsel and that, of course, involved the Whitewater 
investigation. Now, our office really would have loved to stay as far 
away from anything to do with that investigation as absolutely 
possible. But as fate would have it, we found ourselves caught in the 
middle of a dispute that landed on the Supreme Court’s docket with 
the following caption: Office of the President, petitioner v. Office of the 
Independent Counsel.218 Now, these are two branches of the United 
States and normally one would think that they should not be on 
opposite sides. But as it developed, this case grew out of a subpoena 
that the independent counsel issued for notes that were taken of 
conversations between Hillary Rodham Clinton and White House 
attorneys in preparation for grand jury appearances and congressional 
appearances. The Office of the President asserted an attorney-client 
privilege. The District Court accepted [the assertion of privilege] in a 
kind of odd way, saying that Mrs. Clinton thought there was one at 
the time, and therefore she is entitled to rely on it.219 The Eighth 
Circuit reversed220 and said there is no attorney-client privilege for 
the First Lady or any other government official who consults with 
government counsel as opposed to private counsel. 
At that point, the case resulted in a certiorari petition, and it 
came to the attention of Walter Dellinger and Seth Waxman that this 
may be an issue on which we have some interest in trying to decide 
whether the United States, through the Justice Department, has 
something to say. And it would not be enough to have just two gray  
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briefs in the case. We needed a third gray brief in the case that 
represented the institutional interests of government.221 
We went about deciding what to do not as one might think 
would be conceivable, by calling up the White House and saying, 
“What do you want us to do? I mean, after all we work for you.” 
Instead, we processed this in the same way that we would handle any 
case that was high-profile enough and had an energetic counsel team 
involved. We had meetings first with—I think it was first, I am not 
sure of the order—first with Andy Frey, who was retained to 
represent the Office of the President in seeking certiorari to reverse 
the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and who wanted to either persuade us 
to stay out of the case or, better still, come in and support the Office 
of the President fully. We also had a meeting with the independent 
counsel, who wanted to persuade us that the Eighth Circuit was 
correct, that people who work for the government cannot consult 
government lawyers and then keep information from a federal grand 
jury. Those presentations to Acting Solicitor General Dellinger 
presented a very, very difficult case. And I would not suggest for a 
moment that Walter was either at a loss for words or at a loss for 
what to do in the case, but he promptly disqualified himself, and it 
fell to Seth as acting solicitor general to then determine the position 
of the United States. 
What we typically do in a case like this is exactly what happened 
in this case. We received memos from all of the components of 
government. We had had excellent presentations from the parties, 
who were also components of government. And we were presented 
with two completely different views, which were in their own way 
rather absolute. Andy Frey argued that the attorney-client privilege is 
and always must be an absolute privilege, and, since it attaches to 
government officials who consult with attorneys, it must be retained 
inviolate. The independent counsel maintained, on the other hand, 
that you cannot have a privilege when everybody is part of the same 
client; he added many more sophisticated ideas, but the essential 
point was zero privilege. 
What is interesting is that we ultimately did file a brief in support 
of the petition for a writ of certiorari, but we took a position, as 
 
 221. The Supreme Court rules provide that “[a] document filed by the United States, or 
by any other federal party represented by the Solicitor General, shall have a gray cover.” S. CT. 
R. 33.1(e). 
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others have explained, that departed from either of the black-and-
white positions that had been presented so far, and did so in a way 
that I think is quintessentially characteristic of the Solicitor General’s 
Office. First of all, we spent a lot of time figuring out what the 
caption should be; on whose behalf are we filing this brief? You 
know, the president and the independent counsel were already out 
there, so we really could not say we were filing on behalf of the 
United States because both of these parties believed that they were 
the United States. The president had a pretty good claim. So did the 
independent counsel, since the statute appointed him to represent 
the United States. So we filed a brief, amicus curiae for the United 
States, acting through the attorney general, supporting certiorari. I 
am sure that is a first time for that caption. I hope it is the last. 
But what is most interesting about what we did in this brief is 
that we laid out the positions that had been taken by the parties and 
then began our discussion section with a paragraph that started, “We 
see the matter from a different perspective.” We are now talking 
about “we,” the institutional government, the attorney general. And 
our perspective was this: Absent an independent counsel statute, any 
dispute like this—between a head of a government agency and a 
prosecutor seeking evidence—would not be resolved in court. It 
would be resolved within the executive branch, potentially with an 
appeal all the way up to the president, in which the competing 
parties could contend. The prosecutor could say, “I need the 
evidence for this prosecution.” The agency head could say, “He does 
not need it enough to justify chilling my ability to consult with 
counsel in the performing of my governmental duties.” We 
determined that this model of how the Justice Department would do 
things internally, in a nuanced, balanced way, should become the law 
of the land and that courts should attempt to replicate what we 
would do internally. We could not follow the process internally 
because the independent counsel represented prosecutorial interests 
but did not have access to institutional client interests, and the 
president, of course, had interests with respect to the investigation 
that would impede his ability to assess in an objective manner 
whether the grand jury really needed this information. 
We crafted this intermediate position, which suggested that 
certiorari be granted and that the Court address it. Ultimately this 
was a completely unsuccessful proposal. The Court denied certiorari. 
The law has since moved very heavily in favor of the independent 
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counsel’s position. I have not gone back and reassessed whether my 
own view of the law is still what we put between gray covers [when 
we wrote the brief]. On behalf of the attorney general, it is notable 
that we filed a brief that had input from Seth Waxman, acting 
solicitor general, the assistant attorney generals in both the Criminal 
and the Civil Divisions, and the deputies of civil and criminal 
matters, myself and Ed Kneedler, and a career assistant, Jim 
Feldman, and this brief was a product of SG policy formulation in a 
pristine fashion. At no point, at least that I am aware of, were we 
ever discussing this case in the kind of partisan political manner that 
the facts of the case and the circumstances of it could have led 
outsiders to think was going on. 
The second case, and I will talk only briefly about this one—I’ll 
let Seth finish the story if he chooses to, and it also involved 
Walter—was Dickerson v. United States.222 This case presented the 
question about whether Miranda v. Arizona223 should be overruled 
by the Supreme Court—or if you approached from a perspective of 
amicus curiae Paul Cassell, whether § 3501 of the United States 
Code224 should be held to have superseded the non-constitutional 
rule of Miranda. 
A little background, and then I will go to what is really 
interesting about this case from the point of view of our Office. 
Miranda v. Arizona says that unwarned statements—statements in 
which the defendant is not advised of his right to counsel and right 
to remain silent, and has not waived those rights—may not be 
admitted into evidence in the government’s case in chief. Two years 
after Miranda, in 1968, Congress passed a statute that can only be 
described as a direct legislative effort to overrule the Court’s holding 
in Miranda. There was no mistaking that. The statute, § 3501, said 
that statements are admissible in a federal prosecution if the 
statements are voluntary under a multi-factor test. One of the factors 
was whether the defendant had been warned, but it was simply one 
factor, not the per se rule that the court crafted in Miranda. 
Generations of prosecutors ignored § 3501 because of its direct 
conflict with Miranda and because of the apparent inability of 
Congress to supersede a constitutional decision of the Supreme 
 
 222. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 223. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). 
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Court. But there was always a faction who believed that Miranda 
was an illegitimate decision and should be attacked at the earliest 
possible moment. The Supreme Court gave some fuel to that by 
deciding a series of cases in which it distinguished between a true 
violation of the Fifth Amendment and a violation of the prophylactic 
rules surrounding the Fifth Amendment. 
This came to a head for the first time in twenty years when acting 
Solicitor General Dellinger was in our office. We did not rely on 
3501 as a matter of policy, but a prosecutor in the Eastern District of 
Virginia decided that he was going to rely on 3501 as a way to admit 
a statement that arguably was taken in violation of Miranda. 
Actually, as it turns out, we had some pretty good evidence that the 
Miranda warnings were given, but that evidence was not presented 
at the suppression hearing. As a result, you had this crazy case come 
up where we said Miranda warnings had been given, the judge 
found that they had not been given, the prosecutor said that it did 
not matter that they had not been given because of § 3501, and the 
department was in something of a mess. 
When we found out about this, we recognized that this was a 
ticking time bomb, and Walter had the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
withdraw the brief. The United States should not be filing briefs in 
district courts that are contrary to binding Supreme Court 
precedent, at least unless you are prepared to go all the way to the 
Supreme Court and encourage the overruling of Miranda. And that 
had not been, to say the least, vetted and cleared. 
But our effort to keep this issue out of the courts was 
unsuccessful because the Fourth Circuit, on its own, decided that 
§ 3501 did supersede Miranda, that Miranda was a 
non-constitutional rule, and that it, as a court of law rather than a 
court of politics, was obligated to apply § 3501 even though the 
Justice Department, which seemed [to the Fourth Circuit] to be a 
department of politics rather than law, is not relying on it.225 Our 
position in the Fourth Circuit, articulated and defined by Walter, was 
very clear: As a lower federal court, you cannot say that Miranda is 
not a constitutional decision, and you cannot enforce a statute that 
does away with a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. That 
position did not impress the Fourth Circuit, which considered en 
banc but rejected it. 
 
 225. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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It left us with a very strange situation that obviously pits a lot of 
different competing interests in the government. Number one, this 
was our prosecution. We wanted to put Dickerson in jail. He was a 
bank robber. He robbed banks not too far from where I lived. We 
wanted to see this guy off the streets. It would help to have his sort 
of non-confession. Oh, the other thing I forgot to say is he did not 
really confess. What he did was tell a false exculpatory story that he 
was out getting bagels while his partner was in robbing the bank. We 
could not use this evidence. It would have been nice to use this 
evidence. As prosecutors, the government’s interest is to get this 
stuff into evidence. 
In the Solicitor General’s Office, when somebody files a cert 
petition against us, as Dickerson did, our first instinct is to file a brief 
in opposition to keep the case out of the Court. But this one was 
obviously unique. The Fourth Circuit had invalidated a binding 
decision of the Supreme Court, and we saw no choice but to tell the 
Supreme Court that the case had to be heard. The question is: What 
should the Court do on the merits? And I am only going to touch 
on this and then turn it over to Seth to finish. Basically, we were 
dealing in an environment where there were not, at least as I am 
aware, precedents in the SG’s Office that would guide us on how to 
handle it. It is standard SG lore—department lore that was 
articulated by Rex Lee, William French Smith, Theodore Olson, and 
many other people, that the solicitor general will defend the 
constitutionality of a statute unless it is plainly unconstitutional 
(which generally means no reasonable argument, no professionally 
respectable argument, is available for it—in other words, it flunks the 
“risibility standard” that was articulated earlier), or it impermissibly 
encroaches on executive branch functions. 
Now, what was paradoxical here is this law is plainly 
unconstitutional under Miranda, but there were reasonable 
arguments that Miranda should be overruled. And the question is: 
What do you do then? Is the executive branch then obligated to go 
to the Supreme Court and urge the overruling of a constitutional 
precedent simply because there are reasonable arguments available 
for that purpose? If you succeed in that effort, you validate a federal 
law. Or do the executive branch and the solicitor general have some 
independent judgment in determining which should stand: a 
constitutional precedent or a statute that was passed in the teeth of 
that [precedent]? That dilemma implicated interests that go to all 
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aspects of the Solicitor General’s Office: political, institutional, our 
criminal law enforcement interests, our role as the “tenth Justice” 
(using that [phrase] as just a symbol for our duty to the Court and 
to respect its precedents). 
To determine what we should do, we instituted the most 
wide-ranging outreach that I have ever seen in the department to 
components of the government to see what their views were. All of 
the U.S. Attorneys were asked to express their views. Many of the 
divisions expressed their views. It culminated in a meeting in South 
Carolina in which there was oral debate on the issue and finally a 
meeting with the attorney general in which representatives, U.S. 
Attorneys, took different positions, presented their views. After all 
was heard and said and done, the solicitor general made a 
determination that the interests of stare decisis in this case were 
compelling and that the United States did not have a legal argument 
based on the needs of law enforcement that could justify overturning 
Miranda v. Arizona. Thus, we filed a brief that said, “Don’t 
overturn Miranda v. Arizona.” There was a firestorm of political 
criticism that ensued. We held fast, and ultimately, the Court, in a 
seven-to-two decision, agreed that Miranda should not be 
overruled. 
Before turning it over to Seth, the only epilogue I want to give 
to this story is that after all of this happened, Dickerson was still a 
defendant. He went back down. The United States tried him 
without the ability to use his so-called “confession” in the case in 
chief. He decided to take the stand and testify. And as a result of 
that, he was impeached with his statements—[a use of the 
statements] which the court held was permissible and compatible 
with Miranda. So we got the statements in, he was convicted, and 
he is currently serving a fourteen-year sentence. 
 
Seth Waxman: I will say a few words about Dickerson, both 
because Michael has made it impossible not to and also because in 
some ways it represents the very best about how all of the wonderful, 
tried-and-true processes of the SG’s Office ought to work. Dickerson 
was very much like the other case that Michael talked about (which 
is one of, I think, two significant privilege controversies which the 
Independent Counsel laid on our doorstep). These cases may have 
appeared to the outside world as paradigmatically cases in which we 
would be hearing from the White House, or talking to the White 
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House, or thinking about things other than the long-term 
institutional interests of the United States. But absolutely nothing of 
the sort ever happened, nor was any effort made by any political 
person to intrude in our decision-making policy. 
Michael served up very well the issue of the thumb that often 
appears on the scale of defending the constitutionality of Acts of 
Congress. In the § 3501 context, as we saw it, the Solicitor General 
could not credibly argue that Miranda had not been treated by the 
Supreme Court as constitutionally based: the Court, in almost three 
dozen cases since Miranda itself was decided (and indeed in 
Miranda itself) had required the states to comply with the so-called 
Miranda rules, yet the Court has no authority to dictate criminal 
rules and procedure to the states unless the Constitution so requires. 
On the other hand, I did view it as fully available to us to ask the 
Supreme Court to overrule Miranda. In his book, Order and Law,226 
Charles Fried recounts a similar decision he had to make together 
with the attorney general he served. Like Charles, I determined that 
I could not credibly make that argument. In my mind, any such 
request—after all the time that had passed and all the reliance that 
had been placed on Miranda—had to be built on an empirical 
showing that the Miranda regime was demonstrably detrimental to 
the long-term interests of the United States. We would have to tell 
the Supreme Court, “Look, it just does not work and in fact it has 
had a significant, documentable, adverse effect on law enforcement, 
public safety, and therefore, on individual liberties.” And not just tell 
the Justices, but show them. 
So, as Michael says, we went out and systematically solicited the 
views of all 94 U.S. Attorneys, and of every federal police agency—
the FBI, the Secret Service, Marshals Service, all of the Treasury and 
Justice Department agencies. We asked for data, anecdotal evidence, 
anything that they had to offer us as prosecutors or as police officers, 
about the efficacy or inefficacy of Miranda. There was much less 
than one would have imagined. We also invited all of those offices 
and agencies to express their views about whether Miranda should 
or should not be overruled. The “process” we provided was 
exhaustive and exhausting. And at the end, the question of what 
position to take was not really close at all. The Attorney General and 
 
 226. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A 
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the Deputy Attorney General agreed with my conclusion. Because of 
the significance of the issue, though, I asked to speak directly with 
the President to make sure he agreed with the decision. Assisting law 
enforcement was a priority of Bill Clinton’s presidency. The Attorney 
General, Deputy Attorney General, and I met with the President in 
the Cabinet Room. I laid out the issues and explained how I planned 
to approach the case. I set forth the case for and against asking the 
Court to overrule Miranda in order to save the statute. I told the 
President that I was firmly of the view that principles of stare decisis 
and the long-term interests of the United States counsel against 
asking the Court to overrule Miranda—but that, of course, he could 
direct the contrary position. He looked straight across the table and 
said, “How can I help you?” 
Dickerson was a highly unusual exception to the rule that in 
almost all cases the solicitor general will defend the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress. One of the signal features of my tenure as SG 
was the requirement for a full-throated application of this duty to 
defend Acts of Congress, because my tenure coincided with an 
extravagant rise in the incidents of declarations by the Supreme 
Court that Acts of Congress were unconstitutional. I delivered a 
lecture about this phenomenon just down the street from Walter 
Dellinger’s house at the University of North Carolina. And I 
published an article called “Defending Congress,”227 which grew out 
of an invitation that Judge Easterbrook gave me to speak about this 
before the Seventh Circuit. 
In the first two hundred years of our republic, and this includes 
the New Deal, the Court declared acts or portions of acts of 
Congress unconstitutional 127 times. If you want the citation, you 
can find it, I think, in footnote seven of my article. A great number 
of those, of course, were early New Deal enactments that fell prey to 
the skeptical scrutiny of the Charles Evans Hughes Court. But in the 
years between 1995 and 2000, the Supreme Court struck down 
twenty-six acts of Congress. That represents an annualized rate that 
is in fact in excess of any block of years, including the early New 
Deal, of the republic. 
One thinks about how detached and dispassionate the arguments 
that a solicitor general before the Supreme Court should make in 
terms of preserving the reputation and integrity of the Court. An 
 
 227. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001). 
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advocate for the United States should never have in mind win-loss 
records. That is particularly the case when the Court is considering 
either the constitutionality of an Act of Congress or the federal-state 
balance. In those instances, the calculus is entirely different. And the 
process of trying to answer for myself, on behalf of the United 
States, which Acts of Congress we would and would not defend, was 
really the defining characteristic of my tenure. 
One of the very first cases that I argued in the Supreme Court 
was Reno v. ACLU,228 the now (in)famous case involving the 
Communications Decency Act,229 which, by the time it reached the 
Supreme Court, had been found unconstitutional in every particular 
by all six federal judges who had considered it. The Act had obvious 
constitutional vulnerabilities, but we thought a reasonable argument 
existed—aggressive to be sure, innovative to a fault—that the Act 
was constitutional. We wrote a brief I am very proud of. I remember 
getting up to argue the case and leaning over to my opponent, the 
late Bruce Ennis just before I started, to say, “Bruce, every 
organization I have ever even heard of is on your side in this case.” 
Even the Chicago Symphony had filed an amicus brief opposing the 
statute. As a result, when I stood up to argue, so few thought I had 
even the most remote chance to win the case that I felt almost 
weightless—evoking Cassius Clay’s description of what it felt like in 
the ring to “float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.” And yet, I fully 
believed in what I was doing. I was not up there telling the Justices 
that if I were in their shoes I would find the law constitutional in 
every respect; that’s not my function. The arguments we made were 
credible. They were serious. They deserved to be considered by the 
Court. We made them. And I received two votes for two of the three 
provisions of the statute. Litigators need to define “victory” flexibly. 
The second phenomenon I want to discuss is the challenge of 
defending Acts of Congress in an environment in which the Court is 
broadly reconsidering the federal-state balance. It is judging against 
new constitutional standards laws that were enacted by Congress at a 
time when it had no reason to believe, for example, that legislation 
that was clearly justified under the Commerce Clause also had to be 
the subject of special fact-finding under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 
 228. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 229. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561 (1997). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
150 
It really was Ken Starr who got us started off on this, with the 
government’s loss in New York v. United States.230 Drew Days, not 
to be outdone, promptly doubled that by losing both Seminole 
Tribe231 and Lopez.232 Although Walter Dellinger was only there for a 
year, he managed to tie Drew with Printz233 and City of Boerne.234 
But—not to be immodest—I certainly hold the record for having 
given up the most federal power—all, to be sure, in five-to-four 
decisions. Ted Olsen is free to swing for the fences, but Florida 
Prepaid,235 Alden v. Maine,236 Kimel,237 Morrison,238 Garrett239 have 
set a record that will be hard to exceed. 
To be sure, I am perhaps the only SG over the past decade 
actually too win a federalism case—indeed, two: Reno v. Condon240 
and Crosby.241 But on balance, the greatest challenge of my tenure 
was adjusting the SG’s institutional tradition to defend the 
constitutional judgments of the political branches to a Supreme 
Court environment characterized by a very different vision of the 
federal-state balance. 
The federalism docket does impact on just about all the themes 
that my predecessors and colleagues have talked about during this 
conference. We know, for example, that to some degree, the 
institutional traditions of the office lead most SGs to consider 
themselves a it more detached and “objective” than the full-throated 
partisans representing other litigants. But in the federalism debate, 
the solicitor general has got to be a partisan. He represents fully one-
half of the entire debate about federal power and the prerogative of 
the national government under our federalist balance. 
The progression of the Supreme Court’s recent federalism 
jurisprudence has also significantly reduced the solicitor general’s 
 
 230. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 231. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 232. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 233. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 234. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 235. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
 236. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 237. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 238. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 239. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 240. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 241. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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ability (real or imagined) to influence the order or factual context in 
which the Court considers important issues. That is because, among 
other things, we live in an era in which private rights of action are 
now the norm, whereas for much of our history they were the 
exception. Nowadays, it is not only, or even primarily, the SG who 
has the ability to invoke federal law and federal civil rights law. 
Somebody who is near-sighted can invoke the Americans with 
Disabilities Act242 without regard to the coherent development of the 
law: he only wants his own benefits. 
Second, the New Deal model of the SG picking cases so that the 
law could be moved incrementally in the direction in which the 
United States wants it to move—looking at cases from Virginian 
Railway243 on, or the way that Andy Frey, when he was in the Office, 
shepherded the Fourth Amendment cases—is no longer the exclusive 
prerogative of the solicitor general. The model that Thurgood 
Marshall appropriated to the public interest sector is now copied by 
public interest groups of every possible political and jurisprudential 
stripe. 
Finally, the ultimate constraint in this area is that the whole 
premise of picking cases and moving the best one forward in an 
effort to move the law incrementally in a direction that the solicitor 
general, on behalf of the political branches, believes is correct is just 
that—it is a strategy incrementally to move the law. And yet in the 
federalism debate, at least since Garcia,244 the solicitor general and 
the United States have been playing defense; it is the advocates on 
the other side, whether it is the states or people who believe in 
enhanced state power under the Eleventh Amendment or the Tenth  
Amendment or the like, who are trying to move the law. And they 
are doing so very effectively. 
 
 242. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12150 
(1990). 
 243. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n Number 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
 244. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see, e.g., Reply 
Memo in Opposition to Certification of Plaintiff’s Action as a Class Action for Dow Chem. 
Co., In re “Agent Orange” Product Liab. Litig. (Sept. 26, 1979), 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979) (MDL No. 381) (arguing that interests of named plaintiffs might be antagonistic to 
interests of class); Transcript of Oral Argument before Judge Pratt (Jan. 30, 1981), 565 F. 
Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (MDL No. 381) (defense attorney expressing concern for 
representation of future claimants); Defendant’s Supplemental Memo in Opposition to Class 
Certification (Nov. 17, 1982), 565 F. Supp. 1263 (arguing for direct mail notification to each 
of 2.4 million Vietnam veterans); Defendant’s Reply Memo in Opposition to Class 
Certification (Jan. 15, 1983), 565 F. Supp. 1263. 
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Coming to understand how these dynamics play into the role 
and responsibilities of the solicitor general was for me the most 
profound of many learning experiences I had as SG. 
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Panel of Former Solicitors General 
Charles Fried: Solicitor General, 1985–1989. 
 
Kenneth W. Starr: Solicitor General, 1989–1993. 
 
Drew S. Days, III: Solicitor General, 1993–1996. 
 
Walter E. Dellinger, III: Solicitor General, 1996–1997. 
 
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997–2001. 
 
Professor Thomas R. Lee245: I have been asked to moderate 
this final session. What I would like to do is, in the first instance, 
direct a question to one member of the panel and then ask for maybe 
two or three others to respond to the comments that have been 
made or give some other further response to my question. Many of 
these issues have been covered to some degree in earlier sessions, and 
I think one of the opportunities we will have here is for some 
discussion and debate, comparing and contrasting the views of the 
solicitors general who are here with us today. 
Let me start by reading from the Judiciary Act of 1870,246 and let 
me start by directing this question to General Starr. I was going to 
start with General Fried, but he asked me to direct a different 
question to him that he is also interested in answering. So, General 
Starr, let me start with you. The statute says: “There shall be an 
officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney General.”247 An 
oversimplified organizational structure might tell us, then, that the 
hierarchal relationship here runs from the president to the attorney 
general and down to the solicitor general. I would like you to talk 
about that relationship, the relationship that the solicitor general has 
to the attorney general and also to the president, and specifically 
discuss, if you would, the obligations, the responsibilities, that the 
solicitor general has to communicate with the attorney general and  
 
 
 
 245. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
 246. Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
 247. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). 
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with the president. And then I will ask other members of the panel 
to respond. 
 
Kenneth Starr: I think the statute is wonderfully straightforward 
and simple: “to assist the Attorney General.” I found in my own 
experience that that meant when the phone rang and it was—
“Would you please cover a moot court for me in the following 
wonderful law school in some remote hamlet?” (not Provo!)—the 
answer was always “Yes,” unfailingly “Yes.” One simply tried to assist 
the attorney general in a variety of ways. 
I found in my own experience, in contrast to that of Solicitor 
General Lee, whose memory we honor in the course of this 
gathering, that I was not being summoned about substantive matters 
with any regularity, and I have been struck by the comments thus far 
by my colleagues as to the collaborative and collegial kind of 
arrangement that included consultations with the president. The 
only time I was consulted by or, I should say, directed by the 
president, was to overrule me on a particular matter. It was a narrow 
matter, but obviously of importance to the president. So, I found in 
my own experience—and I think this is consistent within the 
traditions of the office—growing out of that simple statute, that the 
solicitor general is expected to carry on the duties of the office and 
to report, to provide information about those issues that the attorney 
general should know about, as well as the deputy attorney general, 
and for the last generation, in the main, the associate attorney 
general, given the division of responsibility in the department. 
That [was] in contrast to General Lee’s experience, which was so 
wonderfully explained by Solicitor General Olson last evening at the 
marvelous banquet. Rex would be with us, as John Roberts will 
recall, literally daily for the attorney general’s staff meeting. I do not 
know this, but I think there may have been [some] in the Office of 
the Solicitor General that questioned whether that was really 
appropriate. Is the appearance of the solicitor general literally daily 
going down the halls of the fifth floor and joining in the attorney 
general’s senior leadership daily meeting appropriate? I felt it was, for 
similar reasons that I thought it was appropriate that the attorney 
general saw fit to summon the FBI Director with regularity, and 
also, if he so chose, to literally have an office in the FBI. We were all 
part of one organized whole. And Rex was not there to have his 
judgment overridden. He was there to provide timely information as 
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well as to provide his excellent judgment on a wide range of matters. 
And again, I thought that was an entirely appropriate role. 
But in my experience serving under Attorney General [Richard] 
Thornburgh and Attorney General [William] Barr, there was less 
day-to-day engagement. We did have a weekly meeting with the 
solicitor general alone, and John [Roberts] would handle that in my 
absence, where we would really just give a report. It was typically a 
one-way report: “Here is in fact what is going on.” The sense I had, 
and I guess the lesson that I draw from that, is that there really is 
overwhelmingly a culture of deference that obtains among the 
various senior officers of the Justice Department and that, I think, 
goes as well with respect to the White House. Our colleagues from 
the Clinton administration will comment, I hope, before this larger 
audience in terms of relationships with the president and perhaps 
with senior White House staff. My own experience was [that] we had 
very limited contact. I am not suggesting it as a virtue, but it simply 
is a fact that it was viewed as unwise for the White House Counsel’s 
Office to be weighing in with the solicitor general. If there was an 
expression of concern, it would come to the attorney general or the 
deputy attorney general. 
Not that the culture of independence was being vaunted—far 
from it. We viewed ourselves as an integral part of the Justice 
Department, to assist in ways that might be entirely unexpected. 
There was also a cultural outlook that we were an organization 
presented from time to time with very challenging missions. 
Maureen Mahoney made some of these comments at yesterday 
afternoon’s session of the Bush panel—namely, that we would be 
called upon, as Ted Olson has been called upon, to handle a variety 
of sticky-wicket matters. She recalled, and I recall not entirely 
pleasantly, nocturnal PI hearings in the Southern District of Florida, 
and I found myself on the floor leading the team. I recall our 
beloved now-Judge Bill Bryson, a very distinguished deputy solicitor 
general during our watch, being summoned by the attorney general 
personally. The matter was the assertion by Manuel Antonio 
Noriega248 that he was entitled to prisoner of war status under the 
Geneva Conventions. That, I am sure, was an issue the district 
 
 248. Noriega, the former president of Panama, was captured by United States troops and 
brought to the United States, where he was tried and convicted in April 1992 on charges of 
racketeering, money laundering, and drug trafficking. 
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attorney’s office in Miami had not handled with any regularity, nor 
had a lot of lawyers in the Justice Department. Frankly, neither had 
Bill Bryson, but the attorney general knew that in that cadre of 
lawyers, and especially among the career civil servants in that office, 
were people where the interest of the United States would be best 
protected. I found that kind of special assignment throughout the 
process. I did not hear a lot of grumbling about this, you know, but 
[occasionally someone] might say in the office or outside [the 
office], “Is this proper?” But of course it is [proper]; we simply exist 
statutorily to assist the attorney general and, through the attorney 
general, [to assist] the president and the causes that the executive 
branch calls upon the office to do. 
The final thing I will say is that—and this was a very substantial 
expenditure of time—that I was asked, I think again consistently 
with the statute, to take on the responsibility for heading up a 
working group on civil justice reform, to have a very elaborate 
inter-agency and also outreach process to the legal community and 
then to fashion recommendations. Unusual, but again, I think, a 
tribute to the office and the expertise of the office in a wide variety 
of matters. 
 
Thomas Lee: Thank you, General Starr. Responses to General 
Starr’s comments or further thoughts about the relationship between 
the solicitor general and his bosses? 
 
Charles Fried: Just one word. And this comments more on the 
reports by the Clinton people, particularly Walter’s frequent 
encounters with his president. I had none except our formal social 
events with the president. And the reason, I think, is very clear. 
Walter’s president was a former law professor. My president was a 
former governor, but very far from a former law professor. And the 
same is true of Ken’s president, and for that matter, Ted Olson’s 
president. 
 
Walter Dellinger: A second comment on that. I am surprised at 
the notion that was put about at the time of the Bakke249  decision, 
which Drew Days was involved in as head of the Civil Rights 
Division. (There is a very famous book for those of you who do not 
 
 249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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know it, The Tenth Justice, by Lincoln Caplan.250) A couple of things 
about that are interesting. The administration had formulated a 
position to take on affirmative action. I believe, if I am correct, that 
Frank Easterbrook was the assistant to the solicitor general who did 
the first memorandum. The notion is, should the White House have 
interfered with what policy was being developed by the career people 
in the Solicitor General’s Office? It does strike me as odd on a 
question like that, where I think the Constitution is open-ended, and 
certainly the precedents were open-ended, that there should be any 
question but that the president ought to have a say in where his 
administration is going to urge the Court to go. I will say that I am 
second to no one in my admiration for Judge Frank Easterbrook, but 
I do not understand why a Carter-Mondale administration would 
have its policy set by Frank Easterbrook. What you do want is his 
best thinking on the issue as part of the process. More at OLC, the 
Office of Legal Counsel, but also to some extent at the SG’s Office, I 
never addressed a sensitive issue without involving career people 
from previous administrations. The great protection of a political 
appointee is to take career people who came in under different 
presidents and get their involvement. So, I think that is critically 
important. 
But the other aspect of that is who talks to whom. There was a 
notion that Wade McCree was protecting Solicitor General Lee from 
White House pressure. I, for one, would not want anyone in the 
White House speaking to the attorney general or the deputy attorney 
general instead of speaking to me about a matter within the bailiwick 
of the Solicitor General’s Office. Not that they are not free to do so, 
but I would want to be included in such a conversation and have it 
myself. By the same token, I would never want them speaking to 
career people without our direct permission. That is why you have 
political people who can stand up to that. 
 The reason for meeting with the president personally, though 
I do agree it is because [the president] would be involved, is so that 
the office, or the department, is not pushed around by more political 
functionaries in the White House political operation. By having 
direct access to the president, [I could say] as solicitor general, 
“They are wrong. Here is why it is not in the interest of the United 
States, and here is why their interest is short-sighted and political.” 
 
 250. CAPLAN, supra note 23. 
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In guarding the role of the office, it seems to me the issue should 
not be independence, because independence means independence 
for people who are elected by the people of the United States. So it 
is hard to maintain that as an ultimate virtue. What we seek from 
independence [for the SG’s Office] is that the United States’ 
positions reflect the long-range interest of the United States and are 
based on arguments that are made with professional responsibility 
and are respectful of the Court’s precedents. You can achieve that, I 
think, more often by engaging at the highest levels of the 
administration rather than by trying to wall the office off. But in 
different administrations, there may be different styles on that point. 
 
Drew Days: I think that is really the fact, that there are a 
number of different personal styles that vary from administration to 
administration and there are administrations where solicitors general 
met with presidents. I think of Archibald Cox and John F. Kennedy. 
The reason why they met was because they had a prior relationship. 
Archibald Cox was an advisor to Senator John Kennedy and, 
therefore, it was perfectly natural for the president to reach out to 
someone who had been his advisor for a number of years. 
But in other circumstances, I think that is quite problematic. For 
one thing, unless one has a personal relationship with the president, 
it is not clear that one gets to the president very often. One is talking 
to surrogate presidents or self-declared mini-presidents. And I do 
not think that really is a productive use of one’s time as a solicitor 
general. I found in the Clinton administration during the few times 
that I went over to the White House, that when I talked to lawyers 
there, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a group of munchkins 
who came in the door and proceeded to kibitz about legal issues 
they knew nothing of. And so I took to meeting with lawyers from 
the White House outside of the White House. We had very nice 
lunches together where we could talk law without the echo and the 
peanut gallery. 
You mentioned the Bakke case. The situation there was that the 
president of the United States trusted the attorney general totally, 
and he basically said to the attorney general, “I trust you to make a 
decision. I am not trusting the vice president or the head of the 
domestic counsel to make these decisions. If they want to say things, 
listen to them, but you are the ultimate decision-maker in that 
matter, and if you decide that Wade McCree and Drew Days should 
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work this out without having calls from the vice president or some 
other people in the White House, that is fine with me.” So that is 
the dynamic of that situation. 
But I agree with you; the notion that we should think of the 
solicitor general as independent of the president is terribly 
misguided. In fact, I have told this story before, so forgive me if you 
have heard me tell it. But what turned out to be my job interview 
with President Clinton was on the day that Janet Reno was 
confirmed as attorney general. I went into the Oval Office with 
President Clinton, and I was prepared for a linear interrogation: you 
know, question one, and then followed by question two, and so 
forth. But no; it was kind of an Arkansas get-acquainted meeting, a 
comfort-level type of conversation. And well into the meeting, the 
president looked at me in his inimitable fashion and said, “What is 
the relationship between the president and the solicitor general?” 
And I said, “Mr. President, you are in the Constitution and the 
solicitor general is not.” I somewhat regretted that after the fact, 
giving him that insight. But I really believe that. 
I have worked in two Justice Departments and two 
administrations. And as I mentioned, President Carter was pretty 
much a delegator of his responsibility to the attorney general and 
fiercely protected people in the Justice Department from all kinds of 
interference, interventions, telephone calls, and so forth. That is one 
way to run a Justice Department. But upon reflection over the years, 
I am not sure that it is the most responsive to the constitutional 
framework. It worked, I think, for the Carter administration. But I 
think the notion that everybody understands that the president is the 
ultimate decision-maker under Article II is very healthy and helpful 
to the way that the process works. 
Let me say one more thing about the attorney general. Again, 
this varies from administration to administration, but I saw my 
relationship with Janet Reno as a symbiotic one, that we were really 
reinforcing one another in a number of ways that were productive 
and constructive. I always realized that she could overrule me, but I 
think she always realized that I spent more time thinking about a lot 
of the issues that were confronting the Justice Department at the 
Supreme Court and the lower court levels than she did, and that that 
worked out very well. 
But there are situations where the relationship can be very 
painful for one or the other of those officers. Robert Jackson was 
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solicitor general before he became attorney general. He never made 
the transition in terms of who should argue cases before the Supreme 
Court, as I understand it, and so he was continually muscling in and 
taking over matters that by rights should have been handled by the 
solicitor general. 
 
Seth Waxman: I agree entirely that the chain of command is 
clear and that the Framers managed to make it all the way through 
all the articles of the Constitution without even conceiving of a 
solicitor general, let alone bothering to mention an attorney general. 
It is important nonetheless to distinguish between those things the 
solicitor general does pursuant to the longstanding notice-and-
comment regulation, and the other things a solicitor general may do 
pursuant to his (and, someday, her!) statutory obligation to be of 
general assistance to the attorney general. 
As to the former—representing the United States in the Supreme 
Court, deciding when the United States should appeal in any court, 
authorizing amicus participation in any appellate court, and 
authorizing intervention in defense of the constitutionality of an act 
of Congress—the solicitor general’s job is to make decisions. It is not 
to make recommendations. It is not to seek advice. It is to stop the 
buck on his desk, make a considered decision, and decide when the 
policy implications of the decision are of sufficient magnitude that 
the attorney general and, in some cases the President, should be 
advised. 
As to all other things—the sort of free-floating assistance Ted 
Olson is performing for the President and the attorney general now 
in the context of the USA PATRIOT Act,251 and which the rest of us 
did in other contexts, the scope of engagement and responsibility 
depends much more on the needs, practices, and proclivities of the 
President or the attorney general. 
The precise contours of the relationship between the solicitor 
general, on the one hand, and the attorney general and the 
President, on the other, depends on both the background strengths 
and inclinations of the other two and the personalities of all three. 
During my tenure at the Department of Justice, I had the benefit of 
 
 251. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). 
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the opportunity personally to observe Drew Days’ relationship with 
Attorney General Reno, and Walter Dellinger’s relationship with 
both the attorney general and the President. That helped me 
enormously in navigating my own course between, and with, the two 
of them. I think this was especially important in my case because I 
had never worked with, or even known, either Janet Reno or Bill 
Clinton before I joined the government. 
I think Charles Fried’s observation—about the difference it made 
that President Clinton was both a lawyer and a former constitutional 
law professor—is a singular insight. I will give you one anecdotal 
example (about which I have previously spoken and written) just to 
give you an example of what a difference it makes. 
The event occurred long before I became solicitor general. 
Indeed, I had been working for the United States for only three 
weeks, as an associate deputy attorney general. Bill Bryson, the 
acting associate attorney general (as well as a deputy solicitor 
general) invited me to accompany him to the White House where we 
were expected to explain to the counsel to the President why the 
United States had taken the position it did in a case called Christians 
v. Crystal Evangelical Church.252 The case involved the 
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
[“RFRA”]253 and the application of that Act to an attempt by Julia 
Christians, who was the trustee in bankruptcy, to recover for the 
church a $40,000 tithe that parishioners had made en route to filing 
for personal bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee said, “Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, that is a fraudulent conveyance, and I would like 
the money back.” The litigation concerned whether she could do 
that consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and 
whether, in that application at least, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act was constitutional. The United States filed a brief in 
the case saying that the Act was constitutional and that a 
contribution to the church should be treated the same way as, say, a 
contribution to the Boy Scouts; this was not their money, this was 
their creditors’ money. 
I had not heard about the case but went with Bill Bryson to 
explain our position (I did a lot of reading in the space of an hour!). 
 
 252. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
 253. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(1996). 
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Apparently, the president had heard about this; he had a very, very 
strong interest in the Free Exercise Clause. It was my first trip to the 
White House. I asked Bill, “What’s this going to be like?” And he 
(having worked for his entire career at the Department of Justice) 
said, “I have no idea: this is my first trip to the White House too.” 
We went into the Counsel’s office, and started explaining the case. 
And after several minutes, the president himself walked in. I had 
never met him. He asked what we were discussing, and his counsel 
explained. And he said, “Well, I’d like to hear about that.” He sat 
down, listened, and then started peppering us with questions about 
Sherbert v. Verner254 and other Religion Clause precedents—many of 
which I could not readily bring to mind. I remember being 
absolutely amazed that he could recall these cases and recall their 
holdings. My vivid memory is of thinking to myself, “This guy is the 
leader of the free world, and he’s spending twenty minutes talking 
about First Amendment doctrine.” 
We heard nothing from the White House for two or three 
months. One day I received a call from the White House Counsel 
saying, “The president has been considering this Christians matter, 
and he has decided that the position the United States took is 
wrong. He has directed that the brief be withdrawn.” I hung up the 
phone, called Bill Bryson, and said, “Look, I don’t know how often 
this happens, but the President of the United States has directed that 
this brief be withdrawn. Has the court decided the case?” He said, “I 
don’t know.” 
We made several calls. It turned out that the oral argument 
before the Eighth Circuit was scheduled for the very next day. The 
career lawyer from the Civil Division was already in the city at which 
the argument was to occur. We didn’t reach him until the next 
morning—just as he was preparing to take a cab to the courthouse. 
Needless to say, he was a little stunned. So was the lawyer for trustee 
Christians, with whom he was dividing the argument. So was the 
Eighth Circuit. 
That anecdote provides a useful context, I think, for the 
relationship I had with the president. We didn’t meet or discuss cases 
very often. But I felt entirely free when something of the magnitude 
of Dickerson255 or Piscataway256 arose to ask for some of his time. 
 
 254. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 255. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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The point was not to ask him what on earth the United States 
should do. That’s a decision in the first instance for the solicitor 
general to make. The purpose of the meeting was to make sure, 
given how important the issues were, to make sure that he agreed 
that the position we proposed to take represented an appropriate 
exercise of his constitutional authority. It is, after all, his 
constitutional authority, not the solicitor general’s or the attorney 
general’s. 
 
Thomas Lee: To move on to a different line of questioning, 
General Fried, let me ask you about the topic that you and I were 
discussing just before I stood up, which has to do with whether and 
under what circumstances the solicitor ought to urge the overruling 
of a decision of the United States Supreme Court. We were talking 
about the fact that during my father [Rex Lee]’s tenure as solicitor 
general, his approach to the abortion cases was to attempt to whittle 
away at them at the fringes but not to urge their overruling quite 
directly and that that was one of the first things that you did as 
solicitor general. So, maybe you can address that question 
specifically, and in general we will ask for other responses from the 
other members of the panel. 
 
Charles Fried: Well, first of all, it is sometimes said—I think it 
was said a number of times in the course of this conference—that the 
solicitor general must always act with deference to the Supreme 
Court, and with courtesy—that goes without saying. But the 
implication, and sometimes the explicit implication, is that it also 
means that one must stay within the precedents of the Supreme 
Court. Now, the latter is plainly and manifestly wrong. 
I think every solicitor general at some point has asked the 
Supreme Court to reconsider and overrule some of its prior 
decisions. Walter spoke about asking the Supreme Court to 
reconsider and overrule, which they did in the Agostini257  case, the 
previous very wrong decisions in Aguilar258 and Grand Rapids,259 
and that was a fine thing to do. One does not know how the law 
 
 256. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 
521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). 
 257. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 258. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
 259. Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
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could possibly progress and develop if this were really an inhibition. I 
certainly did on a number of occasions. In a case having to do with 
the jurisdiction of military tribunals, I asked as an act of piety to my 
old boss John Harlan that they overrule a terrible decision by Justice 
Douglas, called O’Callahan,260 in the case called Solorio,261 and they 
did. That is how the law changes. 
The abortion situation was different because in that case it was 
rather unlikely that the Court would indeed overrule Roe v. Wade,262 
but here was the situation. At that time, I was not solicitor general; I 
was acting solicitor general. [Rex Lee] had left to go into private 
practice, and a permanent solicitor general had not yet been named. 
I had no expectation that it would be me. This was just where I was, 
and here was the job. I got, in the ordinary course, 
recommendations from relevant divisions in the department 
recommending that we ask for overruling. And here is what I knew. 
I knew that Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, had been severely 
criticized not [only] on right-to-life grounds, but on the grounds 
that it was a very poorly reasoned decision and a very bad piece of 
constitutional law. People like Paul Freund, Archibald Cox, and 
John Ely were on record in writing as having said that, and the case, 
of course, had continued to be very controversial. The president, 
[Ronald Reagan], had been elected, in part in the face of this 
controversy, stating his view over and over again that this was a 
terribly wrong decision. 
Now, at that point, the question came to me: should I not, in an 
appropriate brief, present that issue to the Supreme Court, even 
though they were unlikely to accept it? It had never been presented 
to them squarely before. I saw no excuse for not presenting that 
issue, and so I did. I presented it in terms of the jurisprudential 
defects of Roe v. Wade because that was the—how should I say—
“professionally correct” defect in the case. I did not present it in 
terms of right to life. I did not present it, as some people were 
urging me to do, to say that the unborn were persons protected by 
the Due Process Clause and so on and so forth, that in fact it would 
be unconstitutional to allow abortion (which, by the way, is the 
position taken by the very excellent German constitutional court, so 
 
 260. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
 261. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
 262. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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it is not a crazy position at all), but that was not the ground. The 
ground we presented seemed to be appropriate. A majority of the 
Court brushed it aside, although interestingly enough—Roe v. Wade 
had been seven to two—this decision was five to four.263 So it is not 
as if it had not reached some minds. 
It came up again at a very strange moment. As I said I would, I 
had left the office with the end of my president’s term, and I was 
back at Harvard teaching. Ken had not yet been confirmed, and 
there was a brief in there from the Department of Justice saying Roe 
v. Wade should be overruled.264 And the president asked me: would I 
come back to argue it? Now, I was a law professor at Harvard. I had 
no duty to anybody (except to meet my classes), but it seemed to me 
appropriate that somebody who had held that office present this 
argument to the Supreme Court. There had been a number of new 
Justices on the Court who had not ruled on it, and it seemed to me 
correct that this position about which the president felt very 
strongly, and the administration felt strongly, should be presented. I 
recall that I presented it in an argument which said that, of course, 
that does not mean that the states could do anything they wanted. 
For instance, they could not pass brutal, anti-abortion legislation. I 
expected to be questioned about that, and I was questioned, “What 
do you mean by that, Mr. Fried?” And I said, “For instance, 
legislation which allows you to disregard the health of the mother.” 
And I suggested legislation which confused abortion and 
contraception to the point where perhaps even contraception might 
fall under a legislative cloud which would unravel things all the way 
back to Griswold.265 And I said quite explicitly, “We are not asking 
for that. We do not ask to unravel the law that far.” 
Again, the Webster case resulted in a very confused opinion, one 
which indicated considerable sympathy, much more than in the 
previous instance, for the overruling position. So, it is not surprising 
to me—it seems to me exactly correct—that Ken in the Casey266 case 
should forthrightly have put that position, as he did. 
Now, I think, a further thing. If I were solicitor general 
tomorrow and were asked to do it again, I would not because I think 
 
 263. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 264. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 265. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 266. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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the Casey case has clearly given the Court the full opportunity to 
consider whether they want to overrule this decision. All the new 
members of the Court have now stood up and been heard from. To 
bring it up again would simply be harassment, and I would not do it. 
Indeed, I think for the time being, and perhaps really for a very long 
time, that issue is settled and I hope it is behind us. 
 
Kenneth Starr: It seemed even to be settled at a political level in 
light of Attorney General Ashcroft’s comments at his confirmation 
hearing. 
I wanted to make a very brief comment, if I may, Tom, with 
respect to the broader issue. Stare decisis values have to be, it seems 
to me, assessed against the values of stability in the law. That is to 
say, is there really a sense of stability that the issue has truly been 
settled in a way that has been understood—has not seemed to sow 
seeds of confusion—and the precedent or the line of precedent does 
not stand as inimical, or as an obstacle, to the implementation of 
sensible public policies? 
On this panel, Walter can probably most authoritatively speak to 
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in light of his success as 
acting solicitor general in guiding and shaping some very important 
doctrine—and I think that story richly deserves to be retold here. 
But I want to use the Establishment Clause as another example, 
because the Court just seemed not to be able to come to rest with 
respect to something very basic: what does the Establishment Clause 
mean? There was the Lemon v. Kurtzman267 test, and then Justice 
O’Connor came up with the endorsement test in the context of a 
crèche,268 but conclud[ed] that that was not an endorsement. So one 
tended to wonder: what does that mean, and what does that add to 
understanding? Then when it came time to assess very important 
questions of public policy, namely, Congress’s actions and the 
president’s actions in the 1960s in providing salutary programs to 
inner-city or needy children, doctrine was really standing in the way. 
And it seems to me under those circumstances that you can say, 
“Lemon v. Kurtzman was on the books for so long, but were there 
expressions of discontent?” And there were. With the example [of 
Lemon], five Justices had expressed dismay at that particular test and 
 
 267. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 268. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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how unhelpful it was. So I think that part of the lawyering craft is to 
[ask] how stable is that body of precedent, and then what kind of 
deleterious effects is it having on issues that are very important to the 
president and, really, to the American people? 
 
Drew Days: For me the most interesting part of what Charles 
said about seeking the overruling of a Supreme Court precedent is, 
“in an appropriate brief.” And for me, that means not only an 
appropriate piece of paper, but appropriate work that has been done 
in the lower courts to develop a record—to have some factual basis 
for suggesting to the Court that the terms that it had available to it 
to rule in the earlier case have in fact changed; the circumstances 
have changed in a way that it really makes adherence to that 
precedent untenable. 
 
Thomas Lee: Let me ask General Days if he would respond to 
the next line of questions. It has to do with the change of 
administrations and what the solicitor general ought to do looking 
back at policies or positions that might have been taken by a prior 
administration. One way of thinking about this, I suppose, is what is 
the standard of review? Is it a de novo standard? Is it a clearly 
erroneous standard? Is it an abuse of discretion standard? Or is it 
maybe something even more deferential than that? 
 
Drew Days: I am not sure what the right standard is, but I went 
into the office thinking that it was my responsibility to maintain 
continuity in the law to the greatest extent possible and not take 
office on the assumption that I could start from scratch and simply 
ignore what had been done by prior administrations. Let me give 
you an example of that. 
Walter Dellinger mentioned earlier the Barclays Bank case.269 It 
was true that the president had a position on the taxing of 
multinational corporations. And to follow up on Seth’s comment 
about the president, not only did he have views on this issue, but 
they were informed views, and they were probably correct views on 
this issue because as a former governor he had had experience with 
transfer pricing and the movement of money across country 
boundaries to avoid taxation in places with unfavorable provisions. 
 
 269. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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But Bill Clinton, the candidate, took the position during the 
campaign that if he were elected president, he would enter the 
Barclays Bank case on the side of California, which is the position 
that we ultimately took. So that is one set of circumstances: a 
president committed politically, law professor, lawyer. The message 
has been sent and received by the solicitor general. 
But the solicitor general sits down and looks through the briefs 
that have been filed by his predecessors in the Solicitor General’s 
Office, and they seem to point in the other direction. What is the 
right answer under those circumstances? Well, I will tell you. The 
right answer is to do what the president wants. (Since I had tenure at 
Yale Law School, I just told my staff that I might be gone, but they 
would be fine.) But I felt a responsibility to the Court in changing 
position on this issue, to explain how I arrived at that result, that it 
was not tossing darts at a board and just deciding that that was the 
right mark and going ahead. We spent a great deal of time—the 
White House, the Treasury Department, the State Department—
essentially conducting an autopsy of how my predecessor, Ken Starr, 
and some of his people came to the conclusion that they did. And I 
felt by the time we filed our brief that I had lived up to my 
responsibility to the president, but also lived up to my responsibility 
to the Office of Solicitor General. 
 
Walter Dellinger: Let me add that I do think that there is a very 
strong stare decisis weight to be given to positions taken by the 
United States and that one needs to persuade a president of that fact. 
But presidents, on the other hand, are elected. Sometimes they stand 
for something. No one has, I think, done that more clearly than 
President Reagan. Not everyone agreed with what he stood for, but 
few candidates in modern times, perhaps George McGovern, have 
made it clearer what they stood for than Ronald Reagan did. And he 
won. My defense of Charles Fried is that someone ought to be 
authorized to tell the Supreme Court that a new president thinks 
they are on the wrong course on a matter like Roe v. Wade, and that 
seems to me to be appropriate. 
Let me compare it to OLC. OLC is the Office of Legal Counsel, 
the next ranking position in the department, actually carved out of 
the rib of the Solicitor General’s Office, which used to do both 
functions of providing legal advice to the government. The 
argument that there ought to be independence in the solicitor 
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general is actually much more apt for the Office of Legal Counsel 
because the Office of Legal Counsel is making legal rulings binding 
on the executive branch. You are telling the executive officials, “No. 
You may not do something.” You are a lawmaker. You are at times 
telling the attorney general or the deputy attorney general, “I will 
not give you a legal opinion that you can undertake an extraordinary 
rendition by doing steps A, B, and C and omitting step D.” They 
will not overrule you on that, and you should make that [judgment] 
independently because they are the action officers. They need to get 
legal advice that what they are going to do is lawful, and they do not 
want to overrule that advice and then follow it. There is no 
protection there. Whereas the solicitor general is often an advocate. 
So there is more reason to suggest that the solicitor general should 
follow some policy direction than OLC, which is giving legal advice. 
I can say that though I had interactions with the White House, 
not once in the more than a year that I was in the office was the 
position taken by the senior career people ever overruled during that 
time. And I think people have different styles for doing it. Mine was, 
because I think I had a more open communication than the attorney 
general, exactly the opposite of what would have been the case with 
Griffin Bell and President Carter. President Clinton and Attorney 
General Reno were not close and did not have an easy relationship. 
It was easier for me than for others to defend the position of the 
career people by going to the White House. And so I think it is very 
context-specific. 
But the last footnote is on a president that knows the law. We 
had one case I argued for the United States, William Jefferson 
Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones,270 where I represented not President 
Clinton, but the United States. The difference was quite clear in my 
mind. If the president had called me the night before the argument 
and had given me cases that he had been reading that he thought I 
should cite that I did not think were in the interest of the United 
States, I would have decided not to cite those cases, and maybe the 
case would not have come out so well if I had, but that is my favorite 
example. 
 
Seth Waxman: I think it is worth underscoring a point that is 
often obscured, and that is the almost infinitesimally minute extent 
 
 270. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
170 
to which a change in administration will have a palpable consequence 
to the positions taken or the arguments made either by the solicitor 
general in the Supreme Court or in cases over which the solicitor 
general has authority in the lower courts. So long as the men and 
women who work in the Justice Department understand that what 
matters is the long-term institutional interest of the United States, 
the political leadership does not, cannot, and should not have that 
much sway. Michael Dreeben did as good a job this morning as 
anyone I’ve ever heard in setting forth the different ways to think 
about what it means to consider the interests of the United States. It 
means a very great deal more than following the political 
predilections of the person who happens to be President at the time. 
I did not have the occasion to follow a solicitor general of 
another party. I never had to confront whether I was going to 
disavow a position taken by my predecessor. In the past year, of 
course, many people have asked me, “Is Ted Olson going to adhere 
to the position that you took before the Supreme Court in X or Y or 
Z?” My response always is, “I can’t speak for the solicitor general, 
but the positions that we took were positions that represented the 
views of the United States.” The merits brief filed by Solicitor 
General Olsen in the Adarand 271case tracks to a micron the position 
Solicitor General Waxman took in the brief filed at the petition stage 
of that case. 
We filed our brief in the Palazzolo272 case, an important Just 
Compensation Clause case while I was SG, but the case was argued 
after President Bush had been inaugurated. It occurred to me while I 
was preparing the brief that the President and the person I assumed 
would be solicitor general might have personal views about the Just 
Compensation Clause that would not coincide with the position 
reflected in the brief. I strove to be extra certain that the position we 
were advocating was in fact consistent with what the United States 
had always said, and that that position was indeed in the 
government’s best interest. 
So the instances in which there has been an “overruling” are very 
few and far between. One thinks about the different views of the 
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions in the Cable Act273 that 
 
 271. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). 
 272. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 273. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. For the must-carry provisions, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 534–535 (2000). 
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existed between Ken Starr and Drew Days, or the First Amendment 
questions in the Corporation for Public Broadcasting case274 that 
came up between the Carter and Reagan administrations. In both 
instances, the government changed positions. But these really are at 
the margins. I think the real testament is continuity. 
 
Charles Fried: The place where you saw the greatest temptation, 
and in fact temptation properly yielded to, was not so much in 
positions taken by the solicitor general but [in those] taken 
elsewhere in the department. When the Reagan administration came 
in, they found that there were consent decrees literally littering the 
legal landscape which sought to tie the government down till the 
end of time to very dubious positions. The Reagan administration 
did undertake to challenge those consent decrees, and I think we 
have something of that happening again with what one might call 
midnight regulations and midnight consent decrees that were put in 
by the Clinton administration. I think those are perhaps going to 
find themselves reconsidered. 
Earlier on there was some discussion of the Boston Harbor 
case.275 Maureen [Mahoney] talked about how the Bush 
administration took a politically painful but principled decision in 
favor of the decision that finally came out. Completely correct. I 
argued that case on behalf of the labor unions. The president then, 
in an attempt to meet the objection of his constituency that pushed 
the other way, sought to establish more or less the same policy by 
executive order. And I will report that the first action of President 
Clinton was to rescind that executive order. And among the first 
actions of President Bush was to reinstate it. So, at these political 
levels, you get something quite different than continuity. But after 
all, that is what elections are for. 
 
Walter Dellinger: But there is a point for continuity that I took 
one step further. When I met with President Clinton to discuss with 
him my need to return to private life, I came prepared to discuss who 
should be nominated to be solicitor general. I gave him a list of ten 
 
See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of 
must-carry provisions). 
 274. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
 275. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993). 
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people in several different categories. At the end of the day, I told 
him he should promptly nominate Seth Waxman. I told him that I 
thought the Senator from Utah276 would see that he was promptly 
confirmed, and that would be good for the office. [I told him] why 
Seth was the best choice. But I wanted to give the president a range 
of choices. 
I think I shocked him a bit. First I said, “An easy category is, you 
ought to consider one of the senior chief [circuit court] judges, the 
people who have the status of chief judges whom the Court would 
see as a peer. That is one way to look at this. But another category,” 
I said, “I want you to think about is, given the difficulty the United 
States has in defending its positions on federalism, etcetera, I think 
there is something to be said to consider naming a Republican as 
solicitor general.” And I reviewed several Republicans who I thought 
would meet the criteria. This was not working particularly well with 
the president. 
At the end of the day, I made my final recommendation to him, 
but it gave him comfort that I had discussed a number of people 
before making the argument for why it should be Seth. But I do 
think there is something to be said [for appointing a solicitor general 
of the other party]. A person would have to be particularly 
comfortable in that role, and sometimes there are positions that you 
might have other people argue. It may be a point that we have 
passed in our politics, but I thought at that moment in time it was at 
least worth the president considering. 
 
Thomas Lee: I want to make sure and leave plenty of time for 
audience questions. But before we do that, we have about a half-
hour left. In that time, let me suggest a couple of topics. Who is the 
solicitor general’s client? How does the solicitor general go about 
resolving conflict among various departments or agencies of the 
federal government or the executive branch? We have heard lots of 
fun war stories about briefs that take two contrary positions. Judge 
Easterbrook told us about the Buckley277 case and three different 
briefs being filed. So there are some creative ways of resolving 
conflict. That is one issue that has come up. 
 
 276. Senator Orrin Hatch, of Utah, was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at 
the time. 
 277. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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Another related one has to do with the potential tension 
between the solicitor general’s role as advocate to the executive 
branch pursuing the broad policy vision of the administration versus 
the solicitor general’s role as an officer of the court. 
General Dellinger or General Waxman, would either of you like 
to address either of those? I know they have come up repeatedly, but 
I thought that now that we have got all of you here, maybe we could 
follow up since those seem to have been two important themes. 
 
Seth Waxman: I will be happy to do the first one. In many ways, 
for me the most exciting aspect of being solicitor general was having 
the responsibility for making the kinds of decisions that I adverted to 
before. In a country of 280 million souls, how does one ascertain 
what the interests of the United States are in litigation? That is the 
solicitor general’s most challenging and exciting mission. 
The legislative history of the 1870 Judiciary Act278 is utterly clear 
that that responsibility is to decide and advocate positions that are in 
the interests of the United States. How does one decide that? We 
are, if nothing else, a diverse and opinionated country. The way that 
these decisions get made in the SG’s Office—and as I understand it 
this process has been relatively unchanged for decades at least—is for 
the SG to consider the views of all components of the government 
before formulating a position. The Solicitor General’s Office does 
not go around trying to find intriguing policy issues to attack, 
righteous positions to take, or great cases to bring. It is an entirely 
reactive office. 
Let’s say a prosecutor loses a suppression motion, or there is an 
important case the Environment Division wants to intervene in, or 
the Civil Rights Division wants to file an amicus brief, or a Treasury 
ruling is struck down, or the Consumer Products Safety Commission 
loses an important consent decree request, or anything of the sort. 
No appeal is permitted unless the solicitor general approves, in 
writing. The protocol is that the affected (losing) component of the 
government must submit to the SG an analytic memorandum that 
attaches all the relevant papers, explains the context, the legal issues, 
the reasons why it is in the interest of the United States to take it to 
the next step, and why the position that they advocate is correct. 
 
 278. Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
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The solicitor general does not just review that memo and agree 
or disagree. It is immediately forwarded to all components of the 
executive branch, whether within the Justice Department or outside, 
with either a policy or a law enforcement interest in that issue. These 
components are given the opportunity to express their own 
institutional views on the recommendation. The idea here is that the 
executive branch, with all of its hundreds of different offices and 
departments, serves as a surrogate for the country as a whole. When 
all the memos arrive, the case is assigned to a staff lawyer in the SG’s 
Office, who writes his or her own analytic memo making a 
recommendation. The package then goes to one of the four deputies 
who adds his or her own recommendation. About half a dozen of 
these little (or big) bundles land in the solicitor general’s in-box 
every day. 
Sometimes, there is a significant difference of opinion about 
what the United States should do. When that occurs, either one of 
my deputies or I would meet with representatives of all of the 
interested components. People would come together, having 
considered each other’s institutional positions, to try and see if there 
was a way to hammer out a consensus view, or at least to understand 
each other’s views. It’s amazing how men and women of great 
intelligence and dedication can see things differently depending on 
the institutional perspective they bring to an issue. The entire process 
of trying to arrive at the position that best reflects the position of the 
United States is tremendously edifying; it’s a shame more people 
cannot observe this function of government. It is essentially through 
this cooperative, collaborative effort that the SG receives the 
information and insight necessary to make the decision. That is the 
most thrilling part of the job. 
 
Walter Dellinger: As a footnote to that, even if there were only 
one department or agency involved, it is critically important, I think, 
and a point that we have gone a day and a half without mentioning, 
that the Solicitor General’s Office is made up of generalists, 
including the solicitor general. You could imagine a system with 
some provision resolving conflicts among agencies where each of our 
great cabinet departments and agencies has general counsels, men 
and women of generally a great ability, who would advance their 
own arguments in court, or the ninety-three U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
could carry both, but the fact that generalists bring their judgment 
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to bear upon questions often makes an enormous difference. For 
people who work in a single area for a single agency, it is very 
difficult from that perspective to have the broader interest of the 
United States in mind. Even if you were not resolving conflicts, the 
fact that you are reviewing judgments of particularized agencies, you 
are familiar with the Court and where its sentiments are, and you are 
taking into account a larger base of non-specialized information, I 
think, is altogether salutary for the positive development of the law. 
 
Charles Fried: It is particularly appropriate because, unlike the 
countries in which the Health and Human Services [Department] 
would bring social security matters to a social security court, and 
Department of Labor [matters would go] to a labor board, not only 
is the Solicitor General’s Office an office of generalists, so is the 
Supreme Court. So it is generalists talking to generalists, and that is a 
very important translation function. 
 
Seth Waxman: It is very important, I think, to bear in mind that 
the world Walter just posited—where each U.S. attorney and each 
agency head is free to argue his or her own view of the interest of the 
United States to the Court—is precisely, and I mean exactly, what 
produced the position of solicitor general in the first place, and with 
very strong institutional impetus from the Supreme Court. In a series 
of 19th-century cases, the Court had made rather clear that it had 
just about had it with different people standing up in different cases 
and saying, “The position of the United States on this law or this 
legal principle is X,”—that is, whatever was necessary in order to win 
the case in that particular instance—and then have somebody else 
later stand up in another case and say, “Well, in this case, you know, 
the position of the United States is Y.” The conference report that 
accompanies the 1870 Judiciary Act explains Congress’s vision about 
the role of the solicitor general. It says something very close to these 
exact words: “We propose to appoint a man of sufficient learning 
and intelligence and ability that he may appear in any court in the 
land from New Orleans to New York”—which apparently were the 
known limits of the civilized world at the time—“and there present 
the interest of the United States as it should be presented.” That 
unifying theme—that the United States has to speak with one voice 
and provide the same interpretation of law whether it is in a state 
court in Maine or a federal court in San Diego—was the animating 
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principle behind creation of the position, and it remains the 
animating principle of the office to this very day. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a point that I think reinforces the 
structural and process points that are being made. What you have 
heard in the last few minutes in terms of structure and process, I 
think, is quite powerfully true. I think it rings true with anyone who 
is privileged to serve in the office, whether as solicitor general or in a 
career position. There are those issues, however, where the lens 
through which one looks at the world will give rise to certain 
questions. Certainly the discussion thus far brings to mind the lens of 
concern about judicial power. When one is in the executive branch, 
frequently it is a Federalist Nos. 47 and 51 concern on the part of the 
executive about the legislative power seeking to bring everything 
into its vortex, but obviously it depends upon the context. I do recall 
quite vividly that when I came into the office (ironically after I had 
served in the judiciary), one of the recurring areas of concern—and 
the lens [through which] we examined the world caused us to be 
concerned—was about the exercise of the judicial power in ways that 
seemed to trench upon, or at least compromise, institutions of 
self-government. And so Charles referred to consent decrees and so 
forth. We found continually in my four years in the office issues with 
respect to: Have the judges gone too far? Has judicial power, even if 
appropriately exercised at the outset, been extended overmuch? Has 
there been a displacement of institutions of representative 
government? And that lens may vary somewhat. I doubt if it is a 
dramatic variance, but I think there will be subtle variances in the 
way that one looks at the world, and that may, at times, frankly, 
trump the very considered process-type points that have been made. 
 
Drew Days: I think the question, “who is the client?” is really a 
riddle. When I was the head of the Civil Rights Division and I woke 
up in the morning, I knew who my client was. I was my client. And 
the head of the Antitrust Division knew that he or she was a client 
because these are the policymaking institutions within the Justice 
Department. As solicitor general, when I woke up I had no clue who 
my client was or was going to be during the day. I think it is more a 
process of ruling out than ruling in. We know who are not our 
clients: states, municipalities, private parties for the most part. But 
when it comes down to the question of who is the client, it really is a 
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matter of analyzing the situation and reasoning through a situation 
to determine: Are there federal laws involved? Are there federal 
interests at issue? And so forth and so on. For purposes of 
conversation, I guess that entity becomes one’s client. But it could 
be that by the end of the day, a better client will have come down 
the pike. 
 
Question from Audience: Because of the intensity of the work 
of the solicitor general, are we moving towards a tradition and 
expectation that the solicitor general would serve four years despite 
the political fortunes of the president, and is it the kind of job, given 
its intensity, in which somebody could serve eight years? 
 
Charles Fried: There has only been one solicitor general in 
recent times who approached that, and that is Erwin Griswold. He 
served Lyndon Johnson and then he served Nixon in the first Nixon 
administration, but that is the last time that happened. I would think 
it very unfortunate—not a good idea—for two reasons. First, you 
lose freshness. You think you own the office. You think it is yours, 
and you begin to be a bureaucrat in it rather than a fresh 
intelligence. That is the first thing. And the second, as everybody has 
in various degrees and in various ways acknowledged or even 
emphasized, is the fact that at the end of the day the solicitor general 
speaks as the appointee of the president. Well, that is much 
attenuated if you are just routinely kept on. It is the reason, quite 
frankly, why I made clear a year before the end of the Reagan 
administration that at the end of that administration I would move 
on. 
 
Question from Audience: What is the process by which a 
president appoints a solicitor general, and do you see common 
threads that run through that process? 
 
Drew Days: Ken told me I should answer this, and I am not sure 
quite how to answer it. I think it is often like a bolt of lightning. It is 
somewhat fickle. Let’s put it this way: it does not hurt to be the 
lawyer who argues the case before the Supreme Court that results in 
a person being named the president of the United States. We can 
start there. Someone said to me, “Well, do you think he’s going to 
name Ted Olson as solicitor general?” I said, “Well, that’s a pretty 
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good possibility.” He said, “Well, don’t you think it would be seen 
as a quid pro quo?” I said, “If not now, when?” 
It varies. The people who have occupied the SG’s Office have 
been academics, lawyers, judges, and for the most part, they have 
been very close to the presidents from a political standpoint, a family 
standpoint. They are politically connected. So there is no one 
process. It really changes from administration to administration. 
I wanted very much to be solicitor general, but there continued 
to be a problem of finding an attorney general for the Clinton 
administration. I found that to be a real impediment to my making 
my case to the attorney general. First it was Zoe Baird, and then 
Judge Kimba Wood, and then finally Janet Reno.279 All the while I 
was waiting to be discovered. And it happened. 
 
Kenneth Starr: I think in the first Bush administration—and I 
am sure Charles can speak with more authority to this, even though 
he was not part of the administration—but I think there was a 
concentrated effort to find a judge. I think those who were seriously 
considered were, in the main, judges. But if you go back over the last 
generation, I think Drew’s answer is exactly right. They are drawn 
from the professorial ranks or the judicial ranks or some combination 
thereof, or then, logically, those who have served in the Justice 
Department—and Seth is a beautiful example of a distinguished 
lawyer in private practice who then proved his mettle in the Justice 
Department. But I think that is a tougher route. At least, it is 
certainly tougher at the outset of the administration, where there will 
be a tendency, I think, to go to the academy, a Professor Bork, a 
Judge McCree, a Dean Griswold, and the like—and Professor [Rex] 
Lee. 
 
Walter Dellinger: I know that Drew and Seth and I, none of us 
knew the president before going into the Justice Department. I did 
not. Did you, Ken? 
 
 
 279. In 1993, President Clinton nominated Zoe Baird, then Kimba Wood, to serve as 
attorney general, but both withdrew their nominations. Janet Reno was ultimately nominated 
and confirmed as President Clinton’s attorney general. 
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Kenneth Starr: I knew the president, but not all that terribly  
well, and [our acquaintance] was rather ancient. I knew him when he 
was in Congress in Texas. 
 
Walter Dellinger: And Charles, you did not know President 
Reagan? 
 
Charles Fried: I did not know the president. My situation was 
special and rather like Seth’s in a way. I had been the principal 
deputy in the office and the office was vacant from, I think it was 
March or so, until I was named. So, I was acting in the office and 
doing all these things and they had a chance to get a really good 
look at me. There was the abortion brief280 and also the brief in the 
Wygant 281 case. I had a big hand in writing it, and so did Sam Alito, 
who had this marvelous phrase saying that a particular African 
American baseball player would not have served as a great role model 
if the fences had been pulled in every time he was up at bat, a point 
which some people were greatly offended by because they thought it 
to be pamphleteering. I thought it was entirely appropriate. If it had 
been made in the other direction, it would have been applauded 
rather than deplored by the New York Times. But I was able to bring 
those briefs to the senators upon my courtesy calls and say, “Now, 
this is what you will get. Take it or leave it.” So, I had been in the 
job. That is unusual. 
On the question of judges, you are quite right. I had a 
conversation with the attorney general before I left. He asked for my 
suggestion, and I gave him a list of three names, all three of whom 
were judges. [About] one of them I said, “The situation may 
develop where you may want to name a Democrat.” So there were 
two Republicans and one Democrat. 
 
Question from Audience: General Days made a comment 
about the Carter administration and delegation skills, and referred to 
quite different leadership traits. General Waxman made a comment 
about the decisive nature of the office and how to make the calls. 
General Starr [emphasized] the opposite—represent the president,  
 
 280. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 281. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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more or less. From what you have seen, [which approach] would you 
say was more effective? 
 
Seth Waxman: I will take a crack at it just because I came down 
sort of emphatically in favor of the decisive role. The year in which I 
worked as Walter Dellinger’s deputy really was the most wondrous 
professional period I have ever had. For both Walter and me, it was 
our first time in the Solicitor General’s Office. Walter came to the 
job from a distinguished career in the academy. I think Walter had 
handled one or two complex cases as a consultant, otherwise his 
background was purely of the academy. By contrast, I had spent 
almost two decades as a litigator—trying and arguing cases in state 
and federal courts (including one case in the Supreme Court). We 
had offices in close proximity, and on the weekends, we would 
inevitably be there on Saturdays and Sundays working in our quiet 
and majestic offices. We used to go back and forth in our socks to 
talk about the cases we were handling. At one point several months 
into the job, I recall Walter saying, “You know, I’m wrestling with 
twenty-odd fascinating issues right now. Back in my old job, I would 
have spent two years arriving at my concluded views. First, I’d 
arrange a research seminar where I would have a bunch of students 
thinking, writing papers about it. Then I would get a grant to think 
about it myself. Then I would give some talks. Maybe I would take a 
semester visiting at another institution and then teach a full course 
on the subject. After two years, I would publish a full-blown article 
setting forth my concluded views. But here, in this office, we have to 
make decisions in these cases in a week or two week’s time. The time 
compression is just amazing.” My response to Walter was, “You 
know, I have exactly the opposite reaction. In my prior life, 
everything was like this. [Waxman repeatedly snaps his fingers.] We 
were constantly under pressure to make decisions and present them 
to courts—in briefs, in arguments, and through witnesses and 
documents.” In the world I inhabited before joining the SG’s Office, 
we’d receive an order from court giving us twenty-four hours to 
submit a brief on some emergency matter. Or, a client needed to 
know right away whether we are going to go in and seek a temporary 
restraining order. I told Walter that, in my new position, I felt the 
tremendous luxury of having several whole weeks to decide 
important issues. Those are two perspectives of it. Thank goodness 
the SG has weeks to decide important things; but thank goodness 
PANEL-FULL-FIN 2/15/2003 4:02 PM 
1] Solicitor General Conference 
 181 
too that at the end of that fixed period a decision has to be made. 
Otherwise, there are a raft of issues we’d still be puzzling over. 
 
Walter Dellinger: Let me just add this, to go back to the 
previous question [about selecting a solicitor general]. There are 
many different kinds of backgrounds. All things being equal, I would 
prefer having a very senior judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals, even though only one of this distinguished group meets 
that description. And even though none of this distinguished group 
were close to the president, I think on balance the country and the 
department are going to be very well served by the fact that Solicitor 
General Olson is close to and does have the complete confidence of 
the president. I do not think that means he brings politics to the 
Justice Department. I think that means that when he listens to the 
career deputies, to the Ed Needlers and to the Michael Dreebens, 
when he hears from the career people in all of the departments and 
he reaches a decision about what is in the long-range interests, no 
one is going to second-guess Ted Olson at the White House. I think 
all things being equal, that is very, very good for the department. He 
will be situated in the department; he will be hearing from these 
people; he will be formulating his judgments with that in mind; and 
there will be no one in this administration that can possibly 
second-guess or backdoor Ted Olson. I think everything else being 
equal, that is a good thing to have as solicitor general. 
 
Question from Audience: We have heard a lot about the 
representation by the Solicitor General’s Office of the executive 
branch and advocating for the president. I would like to know, just 
to broaden the discussion to the legislative branch, how were the 
interactions [with the legislative branch]? Were there any interactions 
or attempts to influence from the legislative branch? We have heard 
about the executive input. But we have heard several times that you 
represent the whole government. Should the legislature have its own 
solicitor general? 
 
Charles Fried: The very most sufficient reason why the solicitor 
general so assiduously defends the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress is that if he did not, there would not be such an office. 
Now, there may be other reasons. Indeed, there are. But, as I say, 
that is a sufficient reason. 
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Drew Days: Indeed, there is an office in the Senate and one that 
rotates in the House of Representatives as a result of the 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act.282 It is a very interesting statute because it 
authorizes lawyers from the Congress to represent the Congress in 
the Supreme Court on matters that have to do with the power of the 
Congress. That, however, does not respond to Charles’s point, 
which is a major one: to the extent that the solicitor general allows 
cases to be handled by the lawyers in the Congress, he loses control 
over the matters, loses the very thing that he cherishes most, and 
that is being able to control the movement of cases to the Supreme 
Court and engaging in what we like to call the orderly development 
of the law. 
But [consider] a situation that we discussed in another context: 
what happens when the solicitor general does not want to or does 
not feel capable of defending an act of Congress that has been 
challenged as unconstitutional? Perhaps others on the panel have had 
this experience as well. But I had a couple of situations where I 
found that I could not in good conscience represent the position of 
the Congress with respect to a statute. One of the cases had to do 
with a statute that was passed in 1935, I believe, and it was so out of 
touch with modern understandings of gender equality that quite 
frankly I did not feel that I wanted to be the one in the Clinton 
administration taking a position that upheld discriminatory treatment 
of women as compared to men with respect to immigration and 
citizenship. What happened in that case was as required by the 
statute: the attorney general is required to notify the leaders of the 
Congress if she is not going to defend the statute, which then 
triggers the power of the lawyers in the Congress to provide the 
defense. But I think this had a happy ending. We told Congress that 
we would not defend, but we then worked with a committee of 
Congress to prepare a fixer amendment to the statute which tended 
to remove the constitutional problem and allow life to go on without 
any headaches—or almost no headaches. 
 
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a brief footnote in terms of the 
collaborative process that was evident during my tenure in the case 
 
 282. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–505 (2000)). 
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of Nixon v. United States.283 Walter Nixon [was] a district judge who 
was impeached. Then in his trial in the Senate [he] was subjected to 
what he viewed as an unconstitutional process, namely a fact-finding 
or fact-gathering, I should say, by a committee of the Senate, some 
ten Senators, five from each party. The matter wended its way to the 
Supreme Court. And even though the constitutionality of the 
procedures of the United States Senate was at issue in the case, it still 
fell, with absolutely no rancor whatsoever, to the solicitor general to 
defend the constitutionality [of the Senate procedures] if it could be 
done, and it obviously was easy for us to in fact do that. The 
Supreme Court eventually upheld the power of the Senate to engage 
in such fact-gathering by a committee as long as there was a trial 
before the full body of the Senate. But in that process we worked 
very collaboratively with the very distinguished counsel to the senate, 
Mike Davidson, and his staff. Mike, I believe, served for about 
twenty years, and was a wonderful repository of information as well 
as guidance. And so we had any number of meetings as well as the 
receiving of information from the historical materials that Mike and 
his staff had very assiduously gathered. And we viewed that as simply 
our function. That was our role: to defend in that context the 
prerogatives of the Senate. 
 
Thomas Lee: That is about all the time we have. I do not know 
that you will find five people whose time is more in demand than 
these five gentlemen. I want them to know on behalf of all of us how 
grateful we are for their giving us of their time today. 
 
Dean Reese Hansen: I think that brings us to the moment of 
conclusion of the conference. We wish all of our participants 
Godspeed and best wishes as you travel home. May the skies be 
smooth and sailing clear and passage safe. We hope to have you each 
back sometime soon for another occasion. 
 
 
 283. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
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